Karl Marx

The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850

PAMPHLETS EDITION / 2026

1850 / Reading edition

pamphlets.blog/library

About this edition

The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850

Karl Marx

EDITION BASIS

Henry Kuhn translation, New York Labor News, first printing 1924 (copyright 1922), with Kuhn's preface and Engels's introduction. Reading text: official Socialist Labor Party transcription, August 2018.

PAMPHLETS EDITION

New Pamphlets typography and digital formats, 2026. The complete identified source text is retained.

TEXT AND REUSE

The identified historical author text and named historical translation/editorial contributions are public-domain texts under the assessed United States and source-country terms. Mexico is assessed separately using the prior library's edition-specific framework. Modern editorial additions, artwork, source-site design and navigation are excluded.

EDITORIAL TREATMENT

Kuhn's historical translator's preface, Engels's introduction and all four parts are retained. Modern digitization credits, running titles and footer furniture are excluded. Print line breaks and page-boundary paragraph breaks are reflowed using text geometry; original wording is retained. All29 source line-end hyphens were individually inspected; these are lexical compounds or names, so each hyphen is retained while its line break is removed.

RIGHTS SCOPE

Edition-specific assessment for the United States, Germany and the United States and Mexico; not a blanket worldwide claim covering every edition or translation.

SOURCES

OfficialSLP transcription identifying the historical 1924 edition and translator
https://slp.org/pdf/marx/class_struggles.pdf
Accessed 2026-11-27

1924 edition library record
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA35506859
Accessed 2026-11-27

SLP historical sketch, author caption Henry Kuhn 1859–1930
https://gompers.umd.edu/slp%20anniversary%20sketch.pdf
Accessed 2026-11-27

Contents

Translator’s Preface 4

Introduction by Friedrich Engels 6

I. From February to June,1848 22

II. From June,1848,to June13,1849 43

III. From June13,1849,to March10,1850 69

IV. The Abolition of the General Franchise in1850 97

Translator's Preface

The reader who, in this third decade of the 20th century, peruses the classic work from the pen of Karl Marx here presented, and does so in the light of all that has happened since the middle of the 19th century, cannot fail but be struck by the incisive manner in which the genius of Marx dissects and lays bare the innermost social relations, the hopes, fears, ambitions and strivings that animate the different social layers, shape their resolves and prompt their actions. On the one hand, we observe the intrigues and counter-intrigues of ruling classes, engaged in incessant internecine strife for place and power, but consciously or subconsciously united against what, compared with modern conditions, was then but an embryonic working class which—stumblingly immature, committing blunder after blunder and unable by the lay of the land to avoid blundering—is groping its way toward the light and toward power. Who will not discern a modern note in what Marx quotes from one of the organs of what he calls "the party of order" which, uttering itself upon the outcome of the elections of March 10, 1850, says that "between Socialism and Society exists a duel to the death, an incessant pitiless war. In this desperate duel one or the other must go down; if Society does not destroy Socialism, then Socialism will destroy Society"—which is just what we are being told today, the present capitalist social system calmly and nonchalantly identifying itself with "society," as did its defenders in 1850.

Analogies almost force themselves upon the mind. When it is said that the Paris workers, jointly with the bourgeoisie had made the February revolution, and then, at the side of the bourgeoisie sought to enforce their interests—one is forcibly and unavoidably reminded of the German working class sweeping out the monarchy in 1918, and, leaving the bourgeoisie in possession of the Political State, is now reaping the reward of abstinence in having the small gains of the "revolution" picked one by one from its pockets. The workers of Paris had a Montagne; the workers of Germany have a Social Democracy—either and both the representative of petty bourgeois interests which made either and both betray the working class. Nor are the Legitimists and the Orleanists missing in Germany so long as they have the Hohenzollerns and the Wittelsbachs looking hopefully toward monarchist restoration, all of which and much more in the way of similarities attests the verity of the saying that "history repeats itself."

But it does not, of course, repeat itself in every detail. One of the divergent details is the Russia of today as compared with the Russia of 1850; and another is that in our day, after the terrific convulsions that capitalist society underwent during and

since the World War, the revolutionary situation is becoming every day much clearer. It seems safe to predict that capitalist rehabilitation is well nigh impossible; that an additional lease of life for as many years as have passed since Marx wrote his monograph on “The Class Struggles in France” cannot possibly be conceded to a social system that shows decay in so many different ways, and which, having today to deal in the most developed countries with a working class of overwhelming numbers, and unable in the long run to make tolerable the conditions of life for these numbers, seems headed for inevitable dissolution.

If Marx makes clear, in the pages here presented, that the working class alone can be the emancipator of the working class; and that the “reformer,” like the “duped Montagne, which, constantly tormented by revolutionary desires, . . . always felt itself in the right place behind the bourgeois republicans rather than in front of the revolutionary proletariat,” is never to be trusted unless he forms the tail of the revolutionary procession, as the workers of Germany have found by bitter experience with their Social Democracy, Engels, in his introduction to Marx’s work—written so many years later—makes it no less clear that the strategy and the tactics of the proletarian revolution practiced in 1850, and then looked upon as perfectly proper, are no longer practicable today.

Today, the success of the proletarian revolution, in all the highly developed industrial countries—where alone a real proletarian revolution is possible—lies in the organization of the Might of the working class on the industrial field, with the political organization of Labor as a helpmate, but hardly to be considered as the decisive factor. Against the iron wall of the industrial organization of Labor all the forces of reaction, Fascism, Ku Kluxism—whatever names they may take in different climes—will dash themselves into spray. There, and there alone, lies the hope of the future, of a future that will loom up bright and resplendent in the measure that an awakened working class will take in hand the work of revolutionary industrial organization.

H.K. Richmond Hill, N.Y., January, 1924.

Introduction by Friedrich Engels

The work, herewith republished, represents Marx's first attempt to explain a segment of contemporary history by means of his materialist conception upon the basis of the prevailing economic condition. In the Communist Manifesto, this theory had been applied in rough outline to the entire modern history, and in Marx's and my own articles in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung it had constantly been used for the interpretation of current political events. Here, however, it became a matter of tracing the inherent causal connection of a development extending over several years which was for the whole of Europe as critical as it was typical, that is, bringing back, in the sense of the author, upon political events the effects of what, in the last analysis, were economic causes.

In an attempt to judge events and series of events taken from current history, one will never be able to go back to the very last economic causes. Even in these days, when the professional press furnishes material so copiously, it will be impossible even in England to trace the course of industry and commerce in the world's market, or to follow the changes in production methods day after day in such manner as to be able to draw at any given moment a general conclusion from these highly complicated and ever changing factors, factors of which the most important often work for a long time under cover before they suddenly and forcibly come to the surface. A clear survey of the economic history of a given period can never be gained at the time; it is possible only later, after the subsequent collection and assortment of the material. Here statistics are an indispensable aid, but they always limp behind the event. When dealing with current contemporary history one will often be forced to treat this, the most decisive factor, as constant and to consider the economic situation found at the beginning of a given period as governing the entire period without variation, or to consider only such changes of the situation as emanate from events plainly visible and therefore also quite manifest. The materialist method must here too often confine itself to a tracing back of political conflicts to the conflicts of interests among the social classes and class factions of a given economic development, and to prove that the different political parties are the more or less adequate political expression of these same classes and class factions.

It goes without saying that the inevitable neglect of the simultaneous changes of the economic situation, the real basis of all the events to be investigated, is bound to be a source of error. But all the conditions of a comprehensive presentation of the

history of the day inevitably include sources of error—which deters no one from writing current history.

At the time Marx undertook this work, the said source of error was even far more inevitable. To trace during the revolutionary period, 1848–49, the simultaneous economic transformations, or to maintain a survey of them, was plainly impossible. Precisely so during the first months of the London exile, in the autumn and winter of 1849–50. That was just the time when Marx began this work. But despite these unpropitious circumstances, his thorough knowledge of the economic condition of France, as well as of the political history of that country since the February revolution, enabled him to give a presentation of events, which uncovered their inner connection in a manner not since attained, and which later met, brilliantly, the double test that Marx himself subjected them to.

The first test was occasioned by Marx, since the spring of 1850, again gaining some leisure for economic studies and, as a beginning, taking up the economic history of the last ten years. From the facts themselves it became thoroughly clear to him what, thus far, and from the fractional material at hand, he had half deduced a priori: that the world commercial crisis of 1847 was the real cause of the February and March revolutions, and that the industrial prosperity which arrived gradually in the middle of 1848, coming to full bloom in 1849 and 1850, was the vitalizing factor of the renascent European reaction. This was decisive. While in the first three articles (published in the January-March issue of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, “Politico-economic Review,” Hamburg, 1850) the expectation of an early renewed upward turn of revolutionary energy is still looked for, the historic review, written by Marx and myself, and published in the final double number—May-October—which appeared in the autumn of 1850, breaks once for all with these illusions: “A new revolution is possible only as the consequence of a new crisis. And it is also as certain as the latter.” But that was really the only essential change that had to be made. As to the interpretation of events, given in former parts, as well as the causal connections therein set forth, absolutely nothing had to be changed, as is shown by the continuation of the review covering the period from March 10 down to the autumn of 1850. This continuation I have included as the fourth article in the present edition.

The second test was still harder. Immediately after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état of December 2, 1851, Marx worked anew upon the history of France from February, 1848, down to the aforesaid event which, for the time being, terminated the revolutionary period. (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” Third Edition, Meissner, Hamburg, 1885.) In this brochure is treated once more, though

more briefly, the period dealt with in our joint review. Compare this second presentation, written in the light of a decisive event that occurred more than a year later, with ours, and it will be found that the author had to change but very little.

What gives to our review a decidedly special significance is the circumstance that, for the first time, it expressed the formula which today, with general unanimity of the labor parties of all the countries of the world, briefly summarizes their demand for economic reconstruction: the expropriation of the means of production by society. In the second chapter, anent the "Right to Work," which is designated as the "first awkward formula wherein the revolutionary demands of the proletariat are condensed," it is said: "But behind the Right to Work stands the power over capital, behind the power over capital stands the expropriation of the means of production, their subjection to the associated working class, therefore, the abolition of wage labor and of capital and of their mutual relations." Hence, here is formulated—for the first time—the thesis whereby modern working class Socialism is sharply differentiated, not only from all the different shades of feudal, bourgeois, petty bourgeois, etc., Socialism, but also from the confused notions of a community of goods of the utopian as well as the original labor communism.

If, later, Marx extended the formula to the expropriation of the means of exchange, this extension, which became a matter of course after the Communist Manifesto, simply expressed a corollary of the main thesis. Some wise people in England have recently added that the "means of distribution" should also be assigned to society. It would be difficult for these gentlemen to explain what are these means of distribution as distinct from the means of production and exchange—unless political means of distribution are meant, taxes, doles to the poor, including the Sachsenwald (communal forest) and other endowments. But these, in the first place, are means of distribution already in the possession of society, the State or the Municipality; and, second, it is we who would abolish them.

* * * At the time the February revolution began, in so far as our conception of the conditions and the course of revolutionary movements are concerned, we were all subject to the prevailing historic experience, notably that of France. It was just the latter that had dominated the entire European history since 1789, and from whom now again had come the signal for a general transformation. And thus, inevitably and as a matter of course, were our conceptions of the nature and course of the "social" revolution proclaimed in Paris in February, 1848, the revolution of the proletariat, strongly colored by the memory of the prototypes of 1789 and 1830. And, finally, when the Paris uprising found its echo in the victorious insurrections in Vienna, Milan and Berlin; when all Europe was drawn into the movement, all

the way to the Russian border; when in June the first great battle for dominance was fought in Paris between proletariat and bourgeoisie; when even the victory of its class so shattered the bourgeoisie that it fled back into the arms of the same monarchist-feudal reaction that had just been overthrown, there could be, under the conditions prevailing, no doubt for us that the great decisive struggle was at hand, that it would have to be fought to a finish in one long revolutionary period and with shifting fortunes, but that it could end only in the final victory of the proletariat.

By no means did we, after the defeats of 1849, share the illusions of vulgar democracy, grouped in partibus about the provisional future governments. These reckoned with an imminent, once for all decisive victory of the "people" over its "oppressors"; we reckoned with a long struggle, after the elimination of the "oppressors," among the antagonistic elements concealed among that very "people." Vulgar democracy expected a renewed outbreak from one day to another; we, already in the autumn of 1850, declared that the first phase of the revolutionary period had closed and that nothing could be looked forward to until the advent of a new economic world crisis. Wherefore we were banned with bell, book and candle as traitors to the revolution by the same people who, later on, almost without exception made their peace with Bismarck—in so far as Bismarck considered them worth while.

But history also proved us in the wrong, and revealed our opinion of that day as an illusion. History went even further; not only did it destroy our former error, but also it transformed completely the conditions under which the proletariat will have to battle. The fighting methods of 1848 are today obsolete in every respect, and that is a point which right here deserves closer investigation.

Hitherto, all revolutions implied the elimination of one form of class rule by another; hitherto, all ruling classes formed but small minorities as compared with the ruled popular mass. Whenever one minority was overthrown, another minority instead took hold of the reins of power and remodeled the State institutions according to its interests. In every instance it was that minority group which, according to the degree of economic development, was capable and therefore called upon to rule, on that account and principally, because it always happened that the ruled majority either aided the revolution on the side of the ruling minority, or at least passively tolerated the same. But, leaving aside the concrete contents in each case, the common form of all these revolutions was that they were minority revolutions. Even when the majority cooperated, it was done—consciously or not—only in the service of a minority; and the latter obtained thereby, or even

through the passive, unresisting attitude of the majority, the appearance of being the representative of all the people.

After the first great success, the minority as a rule split; one half was content with what had been gained, while the other half, wanting to go further, set up new demands which in part were really or apparently in the interest of the great mass of the people. The more radical demands would in some isolated cases be enforced, but more often only for the moment; the more moderate party would again get the upper hand and that which had been won last was again lost in whole or in part; the vanquished would then shout treason or would attribute the defeat to accident. In reality the lay of the land was usually this: the gains of the first victory were made secure only through the second victory of the radical party; whenever that, and thereby momentary needs had been attained, the radicals and their successes would vanish from the scene.

All the more modern revolutions, beginning with the great English revolution of the 17th Century, exhibited these features which seem inseparable from every revolutionary struggle. They appear applicable also to the struggles of the proletariat for its emancipation, applicable the more so since, just in 1848, those could be counted who even in a measure understood in which direction emancipation was to be looked for. The proletarian masses themselves, even after their Paris victory, were absolutely at sea as to the course to be pursued. And yet, there was the movement—instinctive, spontaneous, irrepressible. Was not that just the situation wherein the revolution must succeed, led by a minority, it is true, but this time not in the interest of that minority but in the most specific interest of the majority? If in all the longer revolutionary periods the great popular masses were easily won over by the merely plausible lures of the forward-pushing minorities, why should they be less accessible to ideas that were the very reflex of their economic condition, nothing but the clear, logical expression of their needs not yet understood and only vaguely sensed by them? True, this revolutionary disposition of the masses had most always, and often very soon, made way for lassitude or even a reversal into its opposite as soon as the illusion had been dispelled and disenchantment had come. But here was not a case of lures but one of the attainment of the very interests of the great majority itself, interests then by no means clear to that majority, but which soon had to become clear through convincing demonstrations in the course of their realization. And if then, as shown in the third article of Marx, in the spring of 1850 developments had concentrated the real ruling power in the bourgeois republic that had emanated from the “social” revolution of 1848 in the hands of the big bourgeoisie, which, on top of all, entertained monarchistic desires, while all other social classes, peasants as well as

petty bourgeoisie, had been grouped about the proletariat in such manner that in case and after a common victory not the bourgeoisie but the proletariat made wary by experience would become the decisive factor—in such case were not the chances favorable for a reversion of the revolution of the minority into the revolution of the majority?

History has proved us wrong and all others who thought similarly. It has made clear that the status of economic development on the Continent was then by no means ripe for the abolition of capitalist production; it has proved this by the economic revolution which, since 1848, has affected the entire Continent and has introduced large industry in France, Austria, Hungary. Poland, and, more recently, in Russia, and has made of Germany an industrial country of the first rank—all this upon a capitalist basis which, reckoning from 1848, implies great expansive capacity. But it was just this industrial revolution that has everywhere introduced clarity in regard to class relations, which has eliminated a mass of hybrid forms taken over from the period of manufacture and, in Eastern Europe, even from guild handicraft, which has produced a real bourgeoisie and a real industrial proletariat and forced both into the foreground of social evolution. Thereby has the struggle between these two great classes, which in 1848 existed outside of England only in Paris and, perchance, in a few large industrial centers, been spread over the whole of Europe, and has attained an intensity unthinkable in 1848. We had then the many vague sectarian evangels with their panaceas; we have today the one universally accepted, transparently clear theory of Marx, sharply formulating the final purposes of the struggle. We had then the masses, divided and differentiated according to locality and nationality, undeveloped, held together only by a sense of common suffering, aimlessly driven hither and thither between enthusiasm and despair; we have today the one great international army of Socialists, advancing irresistibly, daily growing in numbers, organization, discipline, discernment and certainty of victory. And if this powerful army of the proletariat has not yet reached the goal, if, far from winning the victory by one fell blow, it must gradually proceed by hard, tenacious struggle from position to position, it proved once for all how impossible it was in 1848 to bring about the social transformation by a sheer coup de main.

Given a bourgeoisie split in two dynastic-monarchist sections, but which above all things demanded tranquility and security for its financial transactions, and opposed to it a defeated but still threatening proletariat about which petty bourgeois and peasant elements more and more grouped themselves—a permanent threat of violent outbreaks which, however, offered no prospect for the solution—that was the situation almost made to order for the coup d’état of the third, the

pseudo-democratic pretender, Louis Bonaparte. By means of the army he made, on December 2, 1851, an end of the tense situation and secured internal quiet to Europe, only to bestow upon her a new era of war. The period of revolutions from below had come to a close for the time being; there followed a period of revolutions from above.

The imperialist reaction of 1851 gave to us new proof of the unripeness of the proletarian aspirations of the time. But the reaction itself was to create the conditions under which they had to ripen. Internal tranquility secured full development of the new industrial prosperity, the necessity to provide work for the army and to divert the revolutionary currents into outward channels produced the wars, wherein Bonaparte, under the pretext of upholding the "principle of nationality," sought to gather in annexations for France. His imitator, Bismarck, adopted the same policy for Prussia: he made his coup d'état, his revolution from above, in 1866, against the German Bund and Austria, and no less against the Prussian "conflict-chamber." But Europe was too small for two Bonapartes, and so the irony of history willed it that Bismarck overthrew Bonaparte, and that King William of Prussia not only restored the limited German empire but also the French republic. The general result was, however, that in Europe the independence and internal unity of the great nations, with the exception of Poland, had become a fact. It had done so, of course, within relatively modest limits—but at any rate so much so that the working class process of development no longer was hampered by nationalist complications. The gravediggers of the revolution of 1848 had become the executors of its last will and testament. And, beside them, already rose threatening the heir of 1848, the proletariat in its Internationale.

After the war of 1870–71, Bonaparte disappears from the stage and Bismarck's mission is finished, so that he can subside again to his status of an ordinary Junker. The termination of this period is formed by the Paris Commune. A surreptitious attempt by Thiers to abstract from the Paris National Guard its cannon, caused a victorious uprising. It was again shown that, in Paris, no revolution is possible other than a proletarian one. Government fell, after the victory, into the lap of the working class, all by itself. And again it was shown how impossible even then, twenty years after the period depicted in our review, was the rule of the working class. On the one hand, France left Paris in the lurch, looked on while it was bled to death under the bullets of MacMahon; on the other hand, the Commune consumed itself in a futile struggle between the two parties that split it, the Blanquists (the majority), and the Proudhonists (the minority), neither of whom knew what was to be done. As sterile as the coup de main of 1848 was the gift-victory of 1871.

With the Paris Commune, the militant proletariat was considered finally buried. But, on the contrary, from the Commune and the Franco-German war may be dated its most powerful rise. By the complete transformation of the methods of warfare, through the conscription of the entire population capable of bearing arms into armies that could thereafter be counted only by the millions, through firearms, projectiles and explosives of hitherto unheard-of effectiveness, a sudden end was made, on the one hand, of the Bonapartist period of wars, and subsequent peaceful industrial development was made secure because any war was made impossible other than a world war of unheard-of horrors and of absolutely incalculable outcome. On the other hand, this military transformation caused the cost of maintaining these armies to rise in geometric progression, drove taxation to unattainable heights and thereby the poorer classes of the people into the arms of Socialism. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the most immediate cause of the mad competition in armaments, might produce a chauvinist cleavage between the French and the German bourgeoisie; but for the workers of both countries it formed a new bond of union. The anniversary of the Paris Commune became the first common festive day for the entire proletariat.

The war of 1870–71 and the defeat of the Commune had, as predicted by Marx, shifted the center of gravity of the European labor movement, for the time being, from France to Germany. In France, of course, years were required to recover from the bloodletting of May, 1871. In Germany, however, where industry fertilized by the French milliard indemnity was developed with hot-house rapidity, the Social Democracy grew still more rapidly and effectively. Thanks to the discernment with which the workers utilized the general franchise, introduced in 1866, the astonishing growth of the party lies in incontestable figures open before all the world. 1871: 102,000; 1874: 352,000; 1877: 493,000 Social Democratic votes. Then came the high governmental acknowledgment of this progress in the shape of the anti-Socialist law. For the moment, the party was dispersed, the vote sank to 312,000 in 1881. But that was soon overcome, and now, under pressure of the exceptional law, without a press, without a legal organization, without the right of assembly, began the most rapid growth in spite of all. 1884: 550,000; 1887: 763,000; 1890: 1,427,000 votes. Then the hand of the State was lamed. The anti-Socialist law vanished, the Socialist vote rose to 1,787,000, more than a quarter of the entire vote cast. The Government and the ruling classes had exhausted all their means—uselessly, purposelessly, unsuccessfully. The most palpable proofs of their own impotence which the authorities, from night watchman to chancellor, had been made to swallow—and from the despised workers, at

that—these proofs could be counted by the million. The State had got to the end of its resources, the workers were but at the beginning of theirs.

The German workers had, moreover, rendered to their cause a second great service, besides the first of their mere existence as the strongest, the best disciplined and the most rapidly growing Socialist party; they had furnished their comrades in all countries with a new and one of the sharpest weapons, by showing them how to utilize the general franchise.

The general franchise had for a long time existed in France, but had there fallen into bad repute through the misuse it had been put to by the Bonapartist Government. After the Commune, there was no labor party in existence to use it. In Spain, too, it had existed since the republic, but in Spain abstention from voting on the part of all serious opposition parties had ever been the rule. Even the Swiss experience with the general franchise had been anything but encouraging to a labor party. The revolutionary workers of the Latin countries had got into the habit of looking upon the franchise as a pitfall, as an instrument for governmental chicane. In Germany it was otherwise. The Communist Manifesto had already proclaimed the struggle for the general franchise, for democracy, as one of the first and most important tasks of the militant proletariat, and Lassalle had again taken up this point. And when Bismarck was forced to introduce the franchise as the sole means to interest the masses of the people in his plans, our workers immediately took it up in earnest and sent August Bebel to the first constituent Reichstag. From that day on they have utilized the franchise in a manner that has repaid them a thousandfold and has served the workers of all countries as an example. They have used the franchise and, in the words of the French Marxian program, transformé de moyen de duperie qu'il a eté jusqu'ici, en instrument d'émancipation, i.e., have changed it from a means of duping into an instrument of emancipation. Even if the general franchise had offered no other advantage than to permit us to count our numbers once every three years;—that through the regularly demonstrated, unexpectedly rapid growth of the vote, it increased the certainty of victory on the part of the workers in the same measure that it increased the panic of the foe, and thereby became our best means of propaganda; that it informed us, accurately, of our own strength as well as of that of all opposing parties, and gave us thereby a gauge for proportioning our action such as cannot be duplicated, restrained us from untimely hesitation as well as from untimely daring—if that were the sole gain derived from the general franchise, it would be more than enough. But it has done much more. During the election agitation, it furnished us a means, such as there is no other, of getting in touch with the masses of the people that are still far removed from us, of forcing all parties to defend their views and actions against our attacks before all

the people; and, in addition, it made accessible to our representatives in the Reichstag a tribune from which they could speak to our opponents in Parliament, as well as to the masses without, with much greater authority and freedom than could be done in the press and at meetings. Of what use was the anti-Socialist law to the Government and to the bourgeoisie if the election agitation and the Socialist speeches in the Reichstag constantly broke through it?

With this successful utilization of the general franchise, an entirely new method of the proletarian struggle had come into being and had quickly been built up. It was found that the State institutions, wherein the rule of the bourgeoisie is organized, did furnish further opportunities by means of which the working class can oppose these same institutions. We participated in the elections to the Diets in the Federal States, Municipal Councillors, Industrial Courts; in short, we contested with the bourgeoisie every post in the filling of which a sufficiently large part of the proletariat had a say. And so it came about that bourgeoisie and Government feared far more the legal than the illegal action of the workers' party, more the successes of the elections than those of rebellion.

For here too the conditions of the struggle have essentially been altered. The rebellion of the old style, the street fight behind barricades, which up to 1848 gave the final decision, has become antiquated.

Let there be no illusions about this: a real victory over the military in a street battle, a victory as between two armies, belongs to the greatest rarities. But the insurgents had seldom planned it that way. For them it had been a matter of disintegrating the troops through moral influences which, in the case of a fight between the armies of two warring countries, either did not come into play at all or, if so, in only minor degree. In case this succeeds, then the troops fail their commanders, these lose their heads and the insurrection wins. But if this does not succeed, then, even in case of numerical inferiority on the part of the military, the advantage of better equipment and training, the unity of command, the well-planned application of the forces at hand, discipline—all that comes into play. The utmost the insurrection can accomplish in a tactical action is the proper erection and defense of a single barricade. Mutual support, the disposition and the use of reserves, in short, that which is needed for the mere defense of a section of a city, to say nothing of the whole of it, the indispensable cooperation and dovetailing of the separate commands can be attained in but small measure, often not at all. The concentration of battle forces upon one decisive point is thereby made impossible. Thus, passive resistance becomes the prevailing form of the struggle. The offensive will here and there rise to occasional attacks and flanking movements, but the rule will be to

confine itself to the occupation of positions abandoned by retreating troops. Added to this, there is on the side of the military the control of large ordnance and of fully equipped and thoroughly trained engineering troops, means of combat which the insurgents lack in most every case. No wonder that barricade fights conducted with the greatest heroism—Paris, June, 1848; Vienna, October, 1848; Dresden, May, 1849—ended with the defeat of the insurrection, as soon as the attacking leaders, unhampered by political considerations, proceeded from purely military points of view and their soldiers remained dependable.

The numerous successes of the insurgents of 1848 are due to many reasons. In Paris, July, 1830, and February, 1848, as well as in most Spanish street battles, there stood between the insurgents and the military a citizens' guard, which either went directly over to the side of the uprising, or through a lukewarm indecisive attitude caused the troops to waver and, on top of that, furnished arms to the insurrection. Wherever this citizens' guard at the very outset took a stand against the insurrection, as in Paris, June, 1848, the latter was quelled. In Berlin, 1848, the people won, partly because of the accretion of considerable new forces during the night and the morning of the 19th of March, partly because of the exhaustion and the poor provisioning of the troops, and, finally, because of the lamed command. In every instance, the victory was won because the troops failed, because the commanders lacked decision, or because their hands were tied.

Therefore, even during the classic period of street battles, the barricade had a moral rather than a material effect. It was a means to shake the solidity of the military. If it held until that had been accomplished, the victory was won; if not, it meant defeat.

Already in 1849 the chances of success were rather poor. Everywhere had the bourgeoisie gone over to the side of the governments, "culture and possessions" greeted and feted the military marching out against the insurrections. The barricade had lost its charm; the soldier saw behind it no longer "the people," but rebels, agitators, plunderers, dividers, the dregs of society; the officer had in the course of time become familiar with the tactical forms of the street battle; no longer did he march in direct line and without cover upon the improvised breastworks, but outflanked them through gardens, courts and houses; and that succeeded now with some skill in nine cases out of ten.

Since then, much more has been changed, all in favor of the military. If the cities have become larger, so have the armies. Paris and Berlin, since 1848, have quadrupled, but their garrisons have grown more than that. These garrisons, by means of the railroads, may be doubled inside of twenty-four hours, and in

forty-eight hours may swell to gigantic armies. The armament of these enormously augmented troops has become incomparably more effective. In 1848 the smoothbore, muzzle-loaded percussion rifle, today the small-caliber, magazine breech loader, shooting four times as far, ten times as accurately and ten times as quickly as the former. At that time the solid projectiles and case shot of the artillery with relatively weak effect, today the percussion shell, one of which suffices to shatter the best barricade. Then the pickaxe of the pioneer to break through the fire walls, today the dynamite cartridge.

On the side of the insurgents, however, all the conditions have become worse. An uprising wherewith all layers of the population sympathize will hardly come again; in the class struggle the middle layers will hardly ever group themselves around the proletariat so fully that the party of reaction, gathering around the bourgeoisie, will be almost eclipsed by comparison. The “people” will for that reason always appear divided, and thus a powerful lever, so effective in 1848, will be missing. Even if on the side of the insurrection there be more trained soldiers, it will become more difficult to arm them. The hunting and sporting rifles of the warehouses—even if the police has not rendered them useless by the removal of a part of the mechanism—are no match for the magazine rifle of the soldier even at close quarters. Up to 1848 one could make his own ammunition out of powder and lead, today the cartridge for each rifle model varies, being similar only in that all of them are the product of large industry and not to be extemporized, which renders most rifles useless unless one has the special ammunition made for them. And, finally, the newly-built quarters of the large cities, erected since 1848, have been laid out in long, straight and wide streets as though made to order for the effective use of the new cannon and rifles. The revolutionary, who would himself select the new working class districts in the north and east of Berlin for a barricade battle, would have to be a lunatic.

Does the reader now understand why the ruling classes, by hook or by crook, would get us where the rifle pops and the sabre slashes? Why, today, do they charge us with cowardice because we will not, without further ado, get down into the street where we are sure of our defeat in advance? Why are we so persistently importuned to play the role of cannon fodder?

The gentlemen are wasting their importunities as well as their provocations all in vain. We are not quite so silly. They might as well ask of their enemies in the next war to face them in the line formation of Frederick II, or in the columns of whole divisions a la Wagram and Waterloo, and with the old flint-and-pan gun in hand, at that. The time is past for revolutions carried through by small minorities at the head

of unconscious masses. When it gets to be a matter of the complete transformation of the social organization, the masses themselves must participate, must understand what is at stake and why they are to act. That much the history of the last fifty years has taught us. But so that the masses may understand what is to be done, long and persistent work is required, and it is this work that we are now performing with results that drive our enemies to despair.

In the Latin countries, too, it is being realized that the old tactics must be revised. Everywhere, the German example of the utilization of the franchise and of the conquest of all possible positions has been imitated. In France, where the soil has been raked up for more than a hundred years by revolution after revolution, where not a single party exists that has not done its part in conspiracies, insurrections and in all other revolutionary actions; in France, where because thereof the army is by no means certain for the government, and where, generally speaking, the conditions for an insurrectionary coup de main are much more favorable than in Germany—even in France the Socialists realize more and more that no durable success is possible unless they win over in advance the great mass of the people, which, in this case, means the peasants. The slow work of propaganda and parliamentary activity are here also recognized as the next task of the party. Success did not fail to come. Not only has a whole series of Municipal Councils been conquered, but in the Chamber there are fifty Socialists, and these have already overthrown three Ministries and one President of the Republic. In Belgium, the workers have last year conquered the franchise, and have won in one quarter of the election districts. In Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, aye, even in Bulgaria and Rumania, the Socialists are represented in the respective Parliaments. In Austria all parties are agreed that access to the Reichsrat can no longer be denied us. That we shall gain access is certain, and the only question at issue is through which door. Even in Russia, when the celebrated Zemskij Sobor is assembled—the National Assembly against which the young Nicholas has so vainly balked—even there we may reckon with certainty that we shall be represented.

Of course, our comrades abroad have not abandoned the right to revolution. The right to revolution is, in the last analysis, the only real “historic right” upon which all modern States rest without exception, including even Mecklenburg where the revolution of the nobility was terminated in 1758 through the “inheritance agreement,” the glorious confirmation of feudalism valid this very day. The right to revolution is so thoroughly recognized in the inner consciousness of man, that even General von Boguslawski deduces from this popular right alone the coup d’état whereby to vindicate his Kaiser.

However, happen what may in other countries, the German Social Democracy holds a specific position and, for that reason and for the time being, faces a specific task. The 2,000,000 voters whom it sends to the hustings, plus the young men and women non-voters standing behind them, these form the most numerous, the most compact “shock troops” of the international proletarian army. This mass already furnishes more than 25 per cent. of the total vote cast; and, as shown by the special election for the Reichstag, the Diet elections in the several States, the Municipal Council and the Industrial Court elections, it is growing apace uninterruptedly. Its growth is so spontaneous, so steady, so irresistible and yet at the same time as quiet as that of a natural process. All governmental interference with it has proved futile. Today, we may figure with 2,225,000 voters. If this goes on, we shall at the close of the century win over the greater part of the middle social layers, petty bourgeoisie as well as small peasants, and we shall come to be the decisive power in the land, before which all other powers must bow whether they like it or not. To keep going this growth without interruption until it swamps the ruling governmental system, that is our main task. And there is but one means whereby the steadily swelling growth of the militant Socialist forces in Germany could for the moment be stemmed, or could even for a time be thrown back: a collision on a large scale with the military, a bloodletting like that of 1871 in Paris. In the long run, that too would be overcome. To shoot out of existence a party numbering millions, that is not possible with all the magazine rifles in Europe and America. But normal development would be hindered, the decision delayed, prolonged and coupled with heavy sacrifices.

The irony of history turns everything upside down. We, the “revolutionists,” the “upsetters,” we thrive much better with legal than with illegal means in forcing an overthrow. The parties of order, as they call themselves, perish because of the legal conditions set up by themselves. With Odilon Barrot they cry out in despair: la légalité nous tue—legality is our death—while we with this same legality acquire swelling muscles and red cheeks and look the picture of health. And if we are not insane enough to favor them by letting them drive us into street battles, nothing will in the end be left to them but themselves to break through the legality that is so fatal to them.

Meantime, they are grinding out new laws against the revolution. Again, everything has been set up head down. The fanatics of anti-revolution of today, are not they themselves the revolutionists of yesterday? Did we perchance bring about the civil war of 1866? Did we depose and drive away from their ancestral legitimate realms the King of Hanover, the Elector of Hesse, the Duke of Nassau and annex their patrimonial dominions? And these destroyers of the German Bund

and of three crowns bestowed by the Grace of God complain about revolution?! —Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?—Who could permit the worshippers of Bismarck to revile the revolution?

Let them force through their anti-revolutionary legislation, make it even worse and transform the entire penal code into caoutchouc, they will accomplish naught but a new demonstration of their impotence. Seriously to assail the Social Democracy, they will have to have recourse to entirely different measures. The Social Democratic revolution, which is getting on first rate while abiding by the law, they can only get at by means of a revolution made by the law and order party, which cannot live without breaking the law. Herr Rossler, the Prussian bureaucrat, and Herr von Boguslawski, the Prussian general, have shown them the only way to get at the workers, who refuse to be lured into a street battle,—violation of the constitution, dictatorship, back to absolutism, regis voluntas, suprema lex! Take heart, gentlemen, here no pursing of the lips will do, here you must whistle!

But do not forget that the German Reich, like all smaller German States, and, indeed, like all modern States, is the product of a covenant; first, of a covenant among the rulers themselves, and, second, of a covenant of the ruler with the people. If one party breaks the agreement, the whole of it falls, the other party being no longer bound by it.

Now almost 1,600 years ago, there was at work in the Roman empire a dangerous revolutionary party. It undermined religion and all the foundations of the State; it denied point blank that the emperor’s will was the highest law, it was without a fatherland, international, it spread out over the entire realm from Gaul to Asia, and even beyond the borders of the empire. It had long worked underground and in secrecy, but had, for some time, felt strong enough to come out openly in the light of day. This revolutionary party, known under the name of Christians, also had strong representation in the army; entire legions were composed of Christians. When they were commanded to attend the sacrificial ceremonies of the Pagan established church, there to serve as a guard of honor, the revolutionary soldiers went so far in their insolence as to fasten special symbols—crosses—on their helmets. The customary disciplinary barrack measures of their officers proved fruitless. The emperor, Diocletian, could no longer quietly look on and see how order, obedience and discipline were undermined in his army. He acted energetically while there was yet time. He promulgated an anti-Socialist—beg pardon—an anti-Christian law. The meetings of the revolutionaries were prohibited, their meeting places were closed or even demolished, the Christian symbols, crosses, etc., were forbidden as in Saxony they forbid red pocket

handkerchiefs. The Christians were declared unfit to hold office in the State, they could not even become corporals. Inasmuch as they did not at that time have judges well drilled as to the “reputation of a person,” such as Herr Koller’s anti-Socialist law presupposes, the Christians were simply forbidden to seek their rights in a court of law. But this exceptional law, too, remained ineffective. In defiance, the Christians tore it from the walls, yea, it is said that at Nikomedia they fired the emperor’s palace over his head. Then the latter revenged himself by means of a great persecution of Christians in the year 303 A.D. This was the last persecution of its kind. It was so effective that, seventeen years later, the army was composed largely of Christians, and that the next autocratic ruler of the entire Roman empire, Constantine, called “the Great” by the clericals, proclaimed Christianity as the religion of the State.

F. ENGELS. London, March 6, 1895.

I. From February to June,1848

With the exception of but a few chapters, the more important sections of the revolutionary annals from 1848 to 1849 bear the caption: Defeat of the Revolution!

What was vanquished in these defeats was not the revolution. It was the pre-revolutionary traditional appendicles, the result of social conditions, which had not yet come to the point of sharp class opposites—persons, illusions, conceptions, projects, from which the revolutionary party prior to the February revolution was not free, and from which not the February victory but only a series of defeats could free it.

In one word: Not with its direct tragi-comic gains did revolutionary progress break its way, but, contrariwise, through the generation of a closely-knit, powerful counter-revolution, the generation of a foe in the struggle, with whom the party ripened to the status of a truly revolutionary body.

To prove this is the purpose of these lines.

The Defeat of June, 1848.

After the July revolution, when the liberal banker, Lafitte, conducted his compeer, the Duke of Orleans, in triumph to the Hotel de Ville, the former uttered the words: “From now on the bankers will rule.” Lafitte had revealed the secret of the revolution.

Not the French bourgeoisie ruled under Louis Philippe, but only a faction of the same, bankers, kings of the stock exchange, railroad kings, owners of coal and iron mines and of forests, a part of the land-owning element allied with them—the so-called aristocracy of finance. It sat upon the throne, dictated laws to the Chambers and handed out the political jobs from the Ministry down to the Tobacco Bureau.

The real industrial bourgeoisie formed a part of the official opposition, that is, it was represented in the Chambers only as a minority. Its opposition came to the front all the more sharply, the more clearly the sole rule of the financial aristocracy developed, and the more the latter felt secure in its power over the working class after the insurrections of 1832, 1834 and 1839 had been drowned in blood. Grandin, manufacturer of Rouen, who in the Constituent, as well as in the Legislative National Assembly, was the most fanatic upholder of bourgeois reaction, was in the Chamber of Deputies the most violent opponent of Guizot. Leon Faucher, later become known through his futile efforts to raise himself to the

heights of a Guizot of the French counter-revolution, during the last phase of Louis Phillippe's regime conducted a pen war for industry and against speculation, as well as against its train-bearer, the Government. Bastiat agitated in the name of Bordeaux and of the whole of wine-producing France against the dominant system.

The petty bourgeoisie in all its gradations, also the peasant class, were wholly excluded from the exercise of political power. And, finally, there were to be found among the official opposition, or even entirely outside the pays légal, the ideologic representatives and spokesmen of the said classes, their scientists, lawyers, doctors, etc., in one word: their so-called capacities.

Because of financial tribulations, the July monarchy was dependent upon big business to begin with, and its dependence became an inexhaustible source of ever growing financial needs. Impossible, therefore, to subordinate the administration of the State to the interests of national production without balancing the budget, the balance between State expenditures and State income. But how was the budget to be balanced without restricting State expenditures, i.e., without injuring interests that were so many props of the ruling system, without regulating taxes anew, that is, without shifting a good part of the tax burden upon the shoulders of the upper bourgeoisie itself?

The indebtedness of the State was rather in the direct interest of the bourgeois faction that ruled and legislated through the Chambers. The State deficit was the very object of its speculations and the chief means of its enrichment. After the expiration of each year a new deficit. In the course of four or five years a new loan. And every new loan offered to the aristocracy of finance a new opportunity to mulct the State, artificially held on the brink of bankruptcy—it had to contract with the bankers under the most unfavorable conditions.

Each new loan furnished a second opportunity, this time to plunder the public which invests its capital in States rentes, by means of stock exchange operations in the secrets of which both the Government and the Chambers' majorities had been let in. In general, the fluctuations of State credit, and the possession of State secrets, offered to the bankers and their affiliates in the Chambers and on the throne a chance to bring about violent and sudden fluctuations in the quotations of State securities, the inevitable result of which had to be the ruin of the smaller capitalists and the fabulously rapid enrichment of the big gamblers. Since the State deficit was in the direct interest of the ruling bourgeois faction, it becomes clear why the extraordinary State expenditures, during the last years of the Louis Philippe regime, exceeded the extraordinary State expenditures under Napoleon by more than double, aye, why they reached annually the sum of 400 million francs, while

the annual export figures of France, on an average, seldom rose to the height of 750 million francs. The enormous sums, which thus flowed through the channels of the State, also produced opportunities for thieving contracts, bribery, defalcations and all kinds of pilfering. This plundering of the State, conducted on a large scale in the case of loans, was repeated in detail in the case of State work to be done. The relation between the Chambers and the Government, multiplied itself in the relations between the different administrations and the contractors.

As with State expenditures and State loans in general, so did the ruling class exploit railroad construction. The Chambers shifted the main burdens upon the State, and secured to the speculating financial aristocracy the golden fruits. One remembers the scandals in the Chamber of Deputies when, occasionally, it came to light that all the members of the majority, a part of the Ministers included, were stockholders in the same railway construction undertakings which, later on, and al in their capacity of lawmakers, they made the State pay for.

Even the smallest financial reform suffered shipwreck against the influence of the bankers. So, for instance, the postal reform. Rothschild protested. Could the State diminish sources of income from which the interest on an ever growing debt was to be drawn?

The July monarchy was nothing but a stock company for the exploitation of the French national wealth, the dividends of which were divided among Ministers, the Chambers and 240,000 voters and their hangers-on. Louis Philippe was the director of the company—Robert Macaire on the throne. Commerce, industry, agriculture, shipping, the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie—all these were constantly menaced and injured under this system. Cheap Government—government à bon marché—they had in the July days put upon their banner.

While the financial aristocracy made the laws, managed the administration, dominated the organized public powers, shaped public opinion and ruled it through the facts and the press, there was repeated in all spheres, from the Court to the Cafe-Borgne, the same prostitution, the same shameless deception, the same urge for enrichment, not through production but through the theft of other peoples' wealth already in existence. There broke loose, notably at the very top of bourgeois society, the unrestricted accentuation of unwholesome and dissolute desires, every minute colliding with the very bourgeois laws, wherein wealth acquired by gambling naturally seeks satiety, where enjoyment becomes crapuleux [insatiate debauchery], where money, filth and blood flow into one. The financial aristocracy, in its methods of acquisition as well as in its enjoyments, is nothing but the reborn Lumpenproletariat, the rabble on the heights of bourgeois society.

The non-ruling factions of the French bourgeoisie cried “corruption!” The people cried: à bas les grands voleurs à bas les assassins! [down with the big thieves! down with the murderers!] when, in 1847, upon the most exalted podiums of bourgeois society, the same scenes were enacted which send the Lumpenproletariat regularly to the brothels, the poorhouses, the insane asylums, before the judges, to the bagnios and upon the scaffold. The industrial bourgeoisie saw their interests menaced, the petty bourgeoisie was morally shocked, popular sentiment was in revolt, Paris was flooded with pamphlets—“la dynastie Rothschild,” “le juifs rois de l’époque,” and the like—wherein the rule of the financial aristocracy was denounced and branded more or less aptly.

Rien pour la gloire!—glory does not pay! La paix partout et toujours!—war depresses the three and four per cent securities!—this is what the France of the stock exchange Jews had written upon her banner. Her foreign policy therefore lost itself in a series of affronts to French national sentiment, which flared up all the more when, with the incorporation of Cracow into Austria, the despoliation of Poland was completed and Guizot, during the Swiss Separatist war, went over to the side of the Holy Alliance. The victory of the Swiss Liberals in this sham war raised the self-confidence of the bourgeois opposition in France; the bloody insurrection of the people of Palermo acted like an electric shock upon the paralyzed popular masses and awakened their great revolutionary memories and passions.1

The eruption of the general disaffection was finally accelerated, and discontent ripened to revolt by two economic world events.

The potato blight and crop failures of 1845 and 1846 intensified the general ferment among the people. The rise of prices in 1847 caused bloody conflicts in France and the rest of the continent. Contrasted with the shameless orgies of the financial aristocracy was the struggle of the people for the primary means of existence! At Buzancais, the

1 Annexation of Cracow by Austria in agreement with Russia and Prussia, November 11, 1846.—Swiss Separatist war (Sonderbundskrieg), November 4–28, 1847.—Insurrection at Palermo, January 12, 1848. At the end of January a nine-day bombardment of the city by the Neapolitans. (These, as well as all other footnotes, proceed from the publisher. rioters of famine executed; in Paris, the over-satiated Escrocs [sharpers, swindlers] snatched from the courts by the royal family!

The second great economic event, which accelerated the outbreak of the revolution, was a general commercial and industrial crisis in England, already signalled in the

fall of 1848 by a mass liquidation of speculators in railway shares. Postponed during 1846 by a series of incidental points, such as the imminent abolition of the corn laws, it proclaimed itself in the fall of 1847 in the bankruptcy of great London colonial merchants, followed immediately by the failure of the country banks and the closing down of the factories in the British industrial regions. On the continent, the aftermath of this crisis had not yet been overcome when the February revolution broke forth.

The ravages of commerce and industry caused by the economic epidemic made the domination of the financial aristocracy still more intolerable. Throughout France, the oppositional bourgeoisie set on foot a banquet agitation for an electoral reform which was to gain for it a majority in the Chambers and therewith overthrow the Ministry of the stock exchange. In Paris the industrial crisis had specifically this result: a mass of manufacturers and wholesale merchants, unable to do business in foreign markets under the conditions prevailing, threw themselves upon the domestic market. They erected great establishments, the competition of which ruined epiciers and boutiquiers en masse. There was therefore a large number of failures among that part of the Paris bourgeoisie; hence their revolutionary attitude in February. It is known how Guizot and the Chambers met the reform propositions with an unmistakable provocation, how Louis Philippe resorted to the Barrot Ministry too late, how it came to a hand-to-hand fight between the people and the army, how the army was disarmed by the passive attitude of the National Guard, how the July monarchy had to make way for the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government, rising on the February barricades, necessarily reflected in its composition the different parties that shared in the victory. It could be naught but a compromise among the different classes that had jointly overthrown the July throne, but whose interests were antagonistic. Its great majority was composed of representatives of the bourgeoisie. The republican petty bourgeoisie represented by Ledru-Rollin and Flocon, the republican big bourgeoisie by the men of the National, the dynastic opposition by Cremieux, Dupont de l’Eure, etc. The working class had only two representatives, Louis Blanc and Albert. Finally, Lamartine, a member of the Provisional Government; that was no real interest, no definite class, that was the February revolution itself, the joint insurrection with its illusions, its poetry, its imaginary content and its phrases. Moreover, this spokesman of the February revolution, by his position and his sentiments, belonged to the bourgeoisie.

If Paris, because of political centralization, dominates France, so do the workers dominate Paris in moments of revolutionary earthquakes. The first vital act of the

Provisional Government was an attempt to escape this overwhelming influence by an appeal from Paris drunk to France sober. Lamartine denied to the barricade fighters the right to proclaim the republic; to do that was a function of the majority of Frenchmen whose decision by vote must be awaited; the Paris proletariat must not mar its victory by usurpation,—the usurpation of the struggle.

On February 25, at the hour of noon, the republic had not yet been proclaimed, but all the Ministries had been parceled out among the bourgeois elements of the Provisional Government and among the generals, bankers and lawyers of the National. But the workers were determined not to tolerate a thimble-rig this time, as in July, 1830. They were ready to take up the struggle anew and to enforce the republic arms in hand. With this message Raspail proceeded to the Hotel de Ville. In the name of the Paris proletariat he commanded the Provisional Government to proclaim the republic; in case this command of the people be not complied with inside of two hours, he would return at the head of 200,000 men. The corpses of the fallen had scarcely grown cold, the barricades had not yet been removed, the workers not disarmed, and the only force that could be ranged against them was the National Guard. Under these conditions vanished suddenly the statesmen-like hesitancy and juridic conscientious scruples of the Provisional Government. The two hours of grace had not yet expired and already all the walls of Paris displayed the historic gigantic letters: République française! Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité!

With the proclamation of the republic upon the basis of the general franchise there was erased even the memory of the limited purposes and motives that had driven the bourgeoisie into the February revolution. In place of but a few factions of the bourgeoisie, all the classes of French society were suddenly projected within the circle of political power, were forced to vacate the boxes, the orchestra, the gallery, and, in persona, to take their parts upon the revolutionary stage. With the constitutional kingdom vanished also the pretense of a State power seemingly sovereign toward bourgeois society, as well as all the minor conflicts called forth by this pretense!

The proletariat, by dictating the republic to the Provisional Government, and through the Provisional Government to the whole of France, immediately came to the front as an independent party, but also challenged to combat the whole of bourgeois France. What it conquered was the basis of the struggle for its revolutionary emancipation, by no means emancipation itself.

The February republic, first of all, had to complete the rule of the bourgeoisie, by admitting, side by side with the financial aristocracy, all the propertied classes into the circle of political power. The majority of the great landowners and the

Legitimists were emancipated from the state of political nullity to which the July revolution had condemned them. Not in vain had the Gazette de France agitated jointly with the press organs of the opposition, not in vain had Larochejaquelin, at the session of the Chamber of Deputies, on February 24, taken the part of the revolution. By means of the general franchise were the nominal property owners, who form the great majority of all Frenchmen, the peasant proprietors, installed as umpires over the fate of France. Finally, the February revolution permitted bourgeois rule to come to the fore plainly and clearly by knocking off the crown behind which capital had concealed itself.

As the workers, in the days of July, had achieved the bourgeois monarchy, so in the days of February had they achieved the bourgeois republic. As the July monarchy had been forced to proclaim itself a monarchy surrounded by republican institutions, so did the February republic proclaim itself a republic surrounded by social institutions. The Paris proletariat also enforced this concession.

Marche, a workingman, dictated the decree wherein the Provisional Government, that had just been formed, agreed to secure the livelihood of the workers through labor, that is, to provide work for all citizens, etc. And when, a few days later, it forgot its promises and appeared to have lost sight of the proletariat, a mass of 20,000 workingmen marched to the Hotel de Ville with the slogan: Organization of work! Formation of a special Ministry of Labor! Reluctantly, and after protracted debates, the Provisional Government named a permanent special commission, charged with the task to ascertain means for improving the condition of the working classes! This commission was composed of delegates of the Paris trades corporations and presided over by Louis Blanc and Albert. The Luxembourg was assigned to it for its sessions. Thus were the representatives of the workers eliminated from the seat of the Provisional Government, the bourgeois part thereof retaining the real State power, keeping the reins of the administration well in hand, and, beside the Ministries of Finance, of Commerce, of Public Works, alongside of banks and the stock exchange, arose a Socialist synagogue, whose high priests, Louis Blanc and Albert, had the mission to discover the promised land, proclaim the new evangel and to keep the Paris proletariat busy. In contradistinction of the profane State power, they had at their disposal no budget and no executive power. They were to ram the foundation pillars of bourgeois society with their heads. While the Luxembourg was looking for the philosopher’s stone, the Hotel de Ville minted the current coins.

And yet, the aspirations of the Paris proletariat, in so far as they went beyond the bourgeois republic, could not attain an existence other than the nebulous one of the Luxembourg.

Jointly with the bourgeoisie the workers had made the February revolution, at the side of the bourgeoisie they sought to enforce their interests, as in the Provisional Government itself they had installed a workingman side by side with the bourgeois majority. Organization of labor! But wage labor, that is, the prevailing, the bourgeois organization of labor. Without it, no capital, no bourgeoisie, no bourgeois society. A special Ministry of Labor! But the Ministries of Finance, of Commerce, of Public Works, are not they the bourgeois Ministries of Labor? And, beside them, a proletarian Ministry of Labor would have to be a Ministry of Impotence, a Ministry of Pious Wishes, a Commission of the Luxembourg. When the workers believed that they could emancipate themselves at the side of the bourgeoisie, they meant that they could, side by side with the other bourgeois nations within the national walls of France, accomplish a social revolution. But the French conditions of production are governed by the foreign commerce of France, her position in the world market and the laws of same; how could France break these without a European revolutionary war, which would react upon England, the despot of the world market?

A class wherein the revolutionary interests of society are concentrated, as soon as it has risen, immediately finds in its own condition the content and the material for its revolutionary activity: to strike down enemies, to resort to measures dictated by the struggle—the consequences of its own deeds drive it ahead. It does not indulge in theoretic investigations of its own task. The French working class did not take this position; it was still unable to carry through its own revolution.

The development of the industrial proletariat is upon the whole predicated upon the development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Under its rule alone does it attain the extended national existence which can raise its revolution to a national one, and itself bring into being the modern means of production which then become so many means of its revolutionary liberation. Its rule first tears up the material roots of feudal society, and levels the field upon which alone a proletarian revolution becomes possible. French industry is more highly developed and the French bourgeoisie is, on revolutionary lines, more fully evolved than is the case on the rest of the continent. But the February revolution, was it not aimed directly at the financial aristocracy? This fact proved that the industrial bourgeoisie did not rule France. The industrial bourgeoisie can rule only where modern industry has shaped all property relations to suit, and, accordingly, only there can industry attain this

power where it has conquered the world market, because the national boundaries do not suffice for its development. But the industry of France, for the most part, maintains itself in the domestic market only by a more or less modified system of prohibition. If, therefore, the French proletariat at the moment of a revolution in Paris possesses actual power and an influence that spurs it to an effort beyond its means, it is in the rest of France congested in single scattered industrial centers, almost disappearing among the superior numbers of peasants and petty bourgeoisie. The struggle against capital in its developed and modern form, in its essential point, the struggle of the industrial wage worker against the industrial bourgeois, is in France but a partial fact, which, after the days of February, could all the less form the national content of the revolution, since the struggle against the minor methods of capitalist exploitation, that of the peasants against mortgage sharks, of the petty trader against the wholesaler, banker and manufacturer, against bankruptcy in other words, was still veiled in the general insurrection against the financial aristocracy. Nothing more plausible therefore than that the Paris proletariat sought to enforce its interests side by side with those of the bourgeoisie; that it let fall the Red Flag before the Tricolor, instead of bringing them to the fore as the revolutionary interest of society itself. The French workers could not advance a step, could not turn a hair of the bourgeois order, before the course of the revolution had aroused the mass of the nation standing between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the peasants and petty bourgeoisie, against this order and against the rule of capital, and had forced them to attach themselves to the proletariat as the leader in the fight. Only through the overwhelming defeat in June could the workers purchase this victory.

To the commission at the Luxembourg, this creation of the Paris workers, is due the merit of having revealed the secret of the revolution of the 19th century from a European tribune: the emancipation of the proletariat. The Moniteur raged when, officially, it had to propagate these “wild visions,” hitherto buried in the apocryphal writings of the Socialists, and which had assailed the ear of the bourgeoisie from time to time only as half-terrifying, half-ridiculous legends. According to the idea of the proletarians, who confused the financial aristocracy with the bourgeoisie as such; in the imagination of republican respectabilities, who denied even the existence of the classes, or, at best, admitted the same only as a consequence of the constitutional monarchy; in the hypocritical phrases of the bourgeois factions hitherto excluded from power, the rule of the bourgeoisie had been abolished with the erection of the republic. At that time, all royalists transformed themselves into republicans, and all the millionaires of Paris into workingmen. The phrase, expressing this imaginary abolition of class relations,

was fraternity,—general fraternization and brotherhood. This comfortable abstraction of class opposites, this sentimental adjustment of class antagonisms, this visionary rising above the class struggle, fraternité, it was the real cue of the February revolution. The classes had been split by what was purely a misunderstanding; and hence Lamartine christened the Provisional Government, on February 24, “un gouvernement qui suspende ce malentendu terrible qui existe entre les différentes classes” [a government that suspends the misunderstanding that exists between the different classes.] The Parts proletariat reveled in this magnanimous fraternity intoxication.

The Provisional Government itself, once it had been formed to proclaim the republic, did everything to make it palatable to the bourgeoisie and the provinces. The bloody horrors of the first French republic were disavowed by the abolition of the death penalty for political offences, the press was made free for all opinions, the army, the courts, the administrations, with few exceptions, remained in the hands of the old dignitaries, none of the great sinners of the July monarchy was called to account. The bourgeois republicans of the National amused themselves by changing monarchist names and costumes into old republican ones. To them the republic was naught but a new ball costume for the old bourgeois society. For its chief merit the young republic, rather than be repellent, itself sought to be constantly startled, and by soft yielding and lack of resistance to gain ground for its existence and disarm opposition. To the privileged classes within, and to the despotic powers without, it was loudly made known that the republic was of a peaceful disposition. To live and to let live was its motto. On top of that came this: shortly after the February revolution, Germans, Poles, Austrians, Hungarians, Italians revolted, each people according to its respective situation. Russia and England were unprepared, the latter herself shaken, the former intimidated. Hence, the republic was not confronted by a national foe. Therefore, there were no large-scale external complications which might kindle forceful action, accelerate the revolutionary process and either drive forward or throw overboard the Provisional Government. The Paris proletariat, which recognized in the republic its own creation, naturally acclaimed every act of the Provisional Government that enabled it more easily to make a place for itself within bourgeois society. It permitted itself to be used for police service by Caussidiére, in order to protect property in Paris, just as it permitted settlement of wage disputes between masters and men by Louis Blanc. It was its point of honor to maintain without blemish before the eyes of Europe the bourgeois honor of the republic.

The republic met with no opposition, neither without nor within. And, therewith, it was disarmed. Its mission was no longer to transform the world by revolution, it

was to adapt itself to the conditions of bourgeois society. With what fanaticism the Provisional Government undertook this mission, there can be no more articulate witnesses than its financial measures.

Public as well as private credit was, of course, shaky. Public credit rests upon the confident assumption that the State will permit itself to be exploited by the Jews of finance. But the old State had vanished and the revolution was, first of all, directed against the financial aristocracy. The tremors of the last European commercial crisis had not yet subsided. Bankruptcies still followed bankruptcies.

Private credit also was paralyzed, circulation hampered, production stagnant, before the February revolution broke out. The revolutionary crisis augmented the commercial one. And if private credit is based upon the confidence of bourgeois production within the entire scope of its existence, that bourgeois order is unviolated and inviolable, what must be the effect of a revolution which questioned the economic slavery of the proletariat, the very foundation of bourgeois production, and which erected toward the stock exchange the sphinx of the Luxembourg? The rise of the proletariat means the abolition of bourgeois credit, because it implies the abolition of bourgeois production and order. Public and private credit are the economic thermometer wherewith one can measure the intensity of a revolution. In the same measure that these fall, rises, on the other hand, the glow-heat and the generative power of the revolution.

The Provisional Government sought to strip the republic of its anti-bourgeois appearance. To do so it had to secure, first of all, the exchange value of this new form of State, its rating on the stock exchange. With the price quotations of the republic on the stock exchange, private credit would necessarily be advanced.

In order to eliminate even the suspicion that the republic would not or could not meet the obligations taken over from the monarchy, and in order to induce confidence in bourgeois morals and solvency, the Provisional Government resorted to boastfulness as undignified as it was childish. In advance of the legal date of payment, it paid to the creditors of the State the interest on the 5, 41/2 and 4 per cent securities. Bourgeois aplomb, the self-reliance of the capitalists, was suddenly awakened when they observed the fearsome haste with which it was sought to purchase their confidence.

The financial embarrassment of the Provisional Government naturally was not reduced by a theatrical coup that deprived it of the funds in hand. The financial difficulty could no longer be concealed, and petty bourgeoisie, servants and workers had to pay for the pleasant surprise that had been provided for the State’s creditors.

Savings bankbooks, exceeding the amount of 100 francs, were declared non-convertible into cash. The funds deposited in the savings banks were confiscated and by a decree converted into a non-repayable public debt. Thereby the petty bourgeois, already hard pressed, was embittered against the republic. Receiving State loan certificates in place of his savings accounts, he was forced to go to the stock exchange and sell them, thus delivering himself directly into the hands of the stock exchange Jews against whom he had made the revolution.

The financial aristocracy which ruled under the July monarchy, had its high church in the bank. And as the stock exchange governs State credit, so does the bank govern commercial credit.

Directly menaced by the February revolution, not only in its rule but in its very existence, the bank, to begin with, sought to discredit the republic by making the credit famine universal. Credit was suddenly withdrawn from the bankers, the manufacturers, the merchants. This maneuver, in case it did not at once cause a counter-revolution, necessarily reacted upon the bank itself. The capitalists withdrew the money they had deposited in the vaults of the bank. The holders of bank notes stormed the cash window to exchange them for gold or silver.

Without forcible interference, in a purely legal manner, the Provisional Government could force the bank into bankruptcy; it had but to remain passive and leave the bank to its fate. The bankruptcy of the bank—that was the deluge that would sweep the financial aristocracy, the most powerful and most dangerous enemy of the republic, the golden pedestal of the July monarchy, in one fell swoop from French soil. The bank once bankrupt, the bourgeoisie would have to regard it as a last desperate attempt at rescue for the Government to create a national bank and subject the national credit to the control of the nation.

The Provisional Government, however, gave compulsory currency to the notes of the bank. It did more. It transformed all provincial banks into branch institutions of the Banque de France and permitted it to throw its net over the whole of France. Later, it pawned the State forests with the bank as security for a loan it contracted. Thus did the February revolution directly solidify and extend the “bankocracy” that it wanted to overthrow.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government squirmed under the alp of an ever growing deficit. In vain did it beg for patriotic sacrifices. Only the workers threw it some alms. Heroic measures had to be resorted to—the levy of a new tax. But whom to tax? The wolves of the stock exchange, the banking kings, the State’s creditors, the rentiers, the industrialists? That was no way to insinuate the republic with the bourgeoisie. That meant, on the one hand, to jeopardize State and

commercial credit, which, on the other hand, it had cost such great sacrifice and humiliation to purchase. But somebody would have to pay. Who, then, was sacrificed to bourgeois credit? Jacques le bonhomme—the peasant proprietor.

The Provisional Government decreed an additional levy of four centimes per franc upon the four direct taxes. The governmental press bamboozled the Paris workers by telling them that this tax would fall chiefly upon the large estates, upon the possessors of the milliard imposed by the restoration. In reality it hit above all the farmers, i.e., the great majority of the French people. They had to pay the costs of the February revolution, and from them the counter-revolution derived its chief material. The 45-centimes tax, that was a vital question for the French farmer, and he made it a vital question for the republic. From that moment on, the republic was for the French farmer the 45-centimes tax, and in the Paris proletariat he saw the profligate spender who took the world easy at his expense.

While the revolution of 1789 began with shaking the feudal burdens from the farmers, the revolution of 1848, in order not to endanger capital and to keep its State machinery in running order, proclaimed itself to the rural population through a new tax.

By only one means could the Provisional Government brush aside all these tribulations and pull the State out of its old rut—by a declaration of State bankruptcy. It will be remembered how Ledru-Rollin, in the National Assembly, subsequently recited the virtuous indignation with which he had rejected this proposition of the stock-exchange Jew Fould, the present Minister of Finance. Fould had handed to him the apple of the Tree of Knowledge.

Since the Provisional Government had honored the draft, which the old bourgeois society had presented to the State, it had become forfeit. It had been transformed into a harassed debtor of bourgeois society, instead of facing it in the role of a pressing creditor come to collect the revolutionary claims of many years. It had to prop up the shaky bourgeois conditions, so as to meet obligations which can only be met within these conditions. Credit becomes one of the conditions of existence, and the concessions to the proletariat, the promises made become so many fetters that must be broken. The emancipation of the workers—even as a phrase—grew into an intolerable danger to the new republic, being a constant protestation against the rehabilitation of credit which rested upon the undisturbed and untroubled recognition of the prevailing economic class relations. Therefore, an end must be made with the workers.

The February revolution had thrown the army out of Paris. The National Guard, that is, the bourgeoisie in its various gradations, formed the only power. But alone

it did not feel a match for the proletariat. Moreover, it had been forced, although only after the most tenacious resistance, advancing a hundred different obstacles, gradually and fractionally to open its ranks and to admit armed proletarians to the Guard. Only one way out was left: to set one part of the proletarians against the other part.

For this purpose, the Provisional Government formed 24 battalions of a Mobile Guard, each of a thousand men, composed of youngsters between 15 and 20 years. Most of these belonged to the Lumpenproletariat which, in all large cities, forms a mass sharply distinct from the industrial proletariat, a recruiting place for thieves and criminals of all sorts, living upon the offal of society, people without a definite mode of making a living, loafers, gens sans feu et sans aven [people without a hearth and without a home], different according to the degree of culture of the nation to which they belong, but never denying the lazzaroni character; at the youthful age the Provisional Government recruited them thoroughly impressionable, capable of the greatest deeds of heroism and the most exalted sacrifices, as well as of the meanest banditry and subject to the vilest bribery. The Provisional Government paid them fr. 1.50 per day, i.e., it bought them. It gave them a distinct uniform, that is, it differentiated them from the blouse. For commanders, officers of the standing army were assigned in part, and in part they themselves elected young bourgeois scions whose rodomontades about death for the fatherland and devotion to the republic captivated them.

Thus the Paris proletariat was confronted with an army of 24,000 youthfully vigorous daredevils drawn from its own midst. It cried: vivat! at the Mobile Guard in its marches through Paris. It recognized in them its leading barricade fighters. It regarded them as a proletarian guard in contradistinction to the bourgeois National Guard. Its error was excusable.

Side by side with the Mobile Guard, the Government decided to gather around itself also an industrial labor army. One hundred thousand workingmen, rendered unemployed by the crisis and the revolution, were enrolled by the Minister Marie in so-called national “ateliers” [workshops]. Behind this pretentious name was hidden nothing else but the employment of workers at long drawn-out, tedious, unproductive excavation work at a wage of 23 sous. English workhouses in the open air—that and nothing else were these national ateliers. With these the Provisional Government believed that it had formed a second proletarian army against the workers themselves. This time the bourgeoisie erred in the matter of the national ateliers, just as the workers had erred in the matter of the Mobile Guard. They had created an army for a mutiny.

But one purpose was accomplished. National ateliers—that was the name of the people's workshops for which Louis Blanc had preached at the Luxembourg. The ateliers of Marie, planned in direct contrast to those of the Luxembourg, because of their common designation gave rise to an intrigue of errors worthy of the Spanish servants' comedy. The Provisional Government itself surreptitiously spread the rumor that these national ateliers were the invention of Louis Blanc, and this seemed the more plausible because Louis Blanc, the prophet of the national ateliers, was a member of the Provisional Government. And in the half-naive, half-purposeful confusion of the Paris bourgeoisie, in the artificially maintained opinion of France and of Europe, these workhouses were the first realization of Socialism which, together with them, was thus put in the pillory.

Not through their content but through their name were these national ateliers the incarnated protestation of the proletariat against bourgeois industry, bourgeois credit, and the bourgeois republic. Upon them rolled the full hatred of the bourgeoisie. In them it had also found the point upon which to direct its attack, as soon as it had grown strong enough openly to break with the February illusions. All the displeasure, all the ill humor of the petty bourgeoisie also centered upon these national ateliers, the common target. With real wrath they figured up the sums swallowed up by the proletarian idlers, while their own condition became daily more intolerable. "A State pension for the mere pretense of work, that is Socialism," they muttered to themselves. The national ateliers, the declamations of the Luxembourg, the marches of the workers through Paris—in these they sought the reason for their misery. And nobody fanaticized himself more against the alleged machinations of the Communists than the small bourgeois, himself hopelessly dangling on the brink of bankruptcy. Thus, for the prospective clash between bourgeoisie and proletariat, all the advantages, all decisive posts, all the middle layers of society were in the hands of the bourgeoisie at the very time when the waves of the February revolution dashed high over the entire continent, when every mail brought a new revolutionary bulletin, now from Italy, now from Germany, now from the farthest southeastern corner of Europe, maintaining the general delirium of the people by bringing constantly tokens of a victory it had already lost.

March 17 and April 16 were the days of the first skirmishes in the great class war which the bourgeois republic concealed under its wings. March 17 laid bare the ambiguous situation of the proletariat which made impossible decisive action. Its demonstration originally intended to throw the Provisional Government back upon the road of the revolution, according to circumstances to bring about the elimination of its bourgeois members, and to enforce postponement of the elections

for the National Assembly and the National Guard, made a hostile demonstration against the Provisional Government. With the cry: à bas Ledru-Rollin [down with Ledru-Rollin!], they pressed upon the Hotel de Ville. And on March 17 the people were forced to cry: Long live Ledru-Rollin! Long live the Provisional Government! The proletariat was forced to take a stand against the bourgeoisie, and yet for the bourgeois republic, which appeared endangered. It stabilized the Provisional Government instead of subjecting it. March 17 detonized in a melodramatic scene and if, on that day, the Paris proletariat once more paraded its gigantic body, the bourgeoisie within and without the Provisional Government was all the more determined to break it.

April 16 was a "misunderstanding," arranged for by the Provisional Government with the bourgeoisie. The workers had gathered en masse on the Field of Mars, and at the Hippodrome, in order to prepare for their elections of the General Staff of the National Guard. Suddenly there was spread throughout Paris, from one end to the other and with lightning speed, the rumor that the workers had gathered at the Field of Mars fully armed, and, under the leadership of Louis Blanc, Blanqui, Cabet and Raspail, were about to march to the Hotel de Ville to overthrow the Provisional Government and proclaim a Communist government. The general alarm was sounded—Ledru-Rollin, Marrast and Lamartine later squabbled as to who had taken the initiative—and in an hour 100,000 men are under arms, at all points of the Hotel de Ville National Guards are stationed, the cry: Down with the Communists! Down with Louis Blanc, with Blanqui, with Raspail, with Cabet! thunders throughout Paris and the Provisional Government receives the homage of innumerable delegations, all of them ready to save the fatherland and society. When the workers finally appear before the Hotel de Ville in order to tender to the Provisional Government a patriotic collection, gathered on the Field of Mars, they learn, much to their astonishment, that bourgeois Paris, in a carefully planned battle, has defeated their shadow. This terrible attempt of April 16 furnished the pretext for the recall of the army to Paris—the real purpose of the clumsily-staged comedy—and for the reactionary federalist demonstrations of the provinces.

On May 4 was convened the National Assembly chosen by the direct and general elections. The general franchise did not possess the magic power ascribed to it by the old style republicans. Throughout France, at least in the majority of Frenchmen, they saw citizens with the same interests, the same understanding, etc. It was their cult of the people. In place of their imaginary people, the elections brought to light the real people, that is, representatives of the different classes into which it is divided. We have seen how the peasant proprietors and the petty bourgeoisie had to vote under the leadership of the militant bourgeoisie and the great landowners

aching for restoration. But if the general franchise was not the magic wand the republican innocents mistook it for, it did possess the far greater merit of unfettering the class struggle, to enable the different middle layers of petty bourgeois society quickly to live through their illusions and disappointments, to pitch all the factions of the exploiting class with one heave into the possession of the powers of State, and thus to tear from them the deceiving mask, while the monarchy, with its census, permitted only certain factions of the bourgeoisie to show their hand and to compromise themselves, leaving all the others hidden behind the scenery and bestowing upon them the halo of a common opposition.

In the Constituent Assembly, which met on May 4, the bourgeois republicans, the republicans of the National, had the upper hand. Legitimists and Orleanists at first dared to show themselves only under the mask of bourgeois republicanism. Only in the name of the republic could the fight be started against the proletariat.

From May 4, not from February 25, the republic is dated, that is, the republic recognized by the French people; it is not the republic which the Paris proletariat forced upon the Provisional Government, not the republic with social institutions, not the dream picture that was envisioned by the barricade fighters. The republic proclaimed by the National Assembly, the only legitimate republic, is the republic that does not constitute a revolutionary weapon against the bourgeois social order, but rather aims at its political reconstruction, the political re-enforcement of bourgeois society, with one word, the bourgeois republic. From the tribune of the National Assembly this claim went forth, and in the entire bourgeois and anti-bourgeois press it found an echo.

We have seen how the February republic in reality was nothing else, and could be nothing else, but a bourgeois republic, how the Provisional Government, under the direct pressure of the proletariat, was forced to proclaim it a republic with social institutions, how the Paris proletariat was incapable itself to go beyond the bourgeois republic, except in conception and imagination, how it acted everywhere in its service when it came to real action, how the promises made to it came to be an intolerable danger for the new republic, and how the entire vital processes of the Provisional Government condensed themselves in a continuous struggle against the demands of the proletariat.

In the National Assembly the whole of France sat in judgment over the Paris proletariat. Breaking at once with the social illusions of the February revolution, it proclaimed without equivocation the bourgeois republic, and nothing but the bourgeois republic. At once did it exclude, from the Executive Commission that was chosen, the representatives of the proletariat: Louis Blanc and Albert; it

rejected the proposal of a special Ministry of Labor; it received with stormy applause the declaration of Minister Trélat: “It is only a matter of leading labor back to its former conditions.”

But all that did not suffice. The February republic had been fought for and gained by the workers with the passive assistance of the bourgeoisie. The proletarians justly considered themselves the victors of February, and they made the haughty demands of the victor. They had to be defeated upon the streets, had to be shown that they would lose as soon as they fought not with but against the bourgeoisie. As the February republic, with its Socialist concessions, required a battle of the proletariat allied with the bourgeoisie against the monarchy, so a second battle was needed to separate the republic from these Socialist concessions, and to work out the bourgeois republic as the official and dominating one. Arms in hand, the bourgeoisie had to counter the demands of the proletariat. And the real natal day of the bourgeois republic is not the February victory, it is the June defeat.

The proletariat accelerated the decision when, on May 15, it invaded the National Assembly, sought without success to regain its revolutionary influence, and only delivered its energetic leaders to the jailers of the bourgeoisie. Il faut en finir!—this situation must be ended! With this cry the National Assembly gave vent to its determination to force the proletariat into decisive battle. The Executive Commission issued a series of provocative decrees, such as the prohibition of popular gatherings, etc. Directly from the tribune of the National Assembly were the workers provoked, maligned, mocked. But the real point of attack, as we have seen, was furnished by the national ateliers. To them the Constituent Assembly had imperatively directed the attention of the Executive Commission, which was only waiting to hear its own plan pronounced as an order of the National Assembly.

The Executive Commission began by making access to the national ateliers more difficult, to change time wages into piece wages, to exile workers not born in Paris to the Sologne, ostensibly for excavation work. But this work was only a rhetorical formula to gloss over the deportation, as the returned and disappointed workers informed their comrades. Finally, on June 21, a decree appeared in the Moniteur ordering the forcible elimination of all unmarried workers from the national ateliers, or their enrollment in the army.

No choice was left to the workers, they had to starve or fight. They answered, on June 22, with an insurrection of great magnitude, wherein the first great battle was fought between the two classes that split modern society. It was a struggle for the preservation or the destruction of the bourgeois order. The veil that had concealed the republic was torn asunder.

It is known how the workers, with unexampled bravery and genius, without a common plan, without leaders and without means, most of them without arms, held in check for five days the army, the Mobile Guard, the Paris National Guard and the National Guard drawn from the provinces. It is known how the bourgeoisie, to compensate itself for the deadly scare it experienced, massacred more than 3,000 prisoners with unheard-of brutality.

So much were the official representatives of the French democracy blinded by the republican ideology, that only a few weeks later did they begin to sense the meaning of the June battle. They were as though benumbed by the smoke of gunpowder wherein their fantastic republic was dissipated.

The direct impression, which the news of the June defeat made upon us, the reader will permit us to depict in the words of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (June 29, 1848):

“The last official remnant of the February revolution, the Executive Commission, has been dissolved like a nebulous picture before the seriousness of events. Lamartine’s luminous rockets have changed themselves into the fire-balls of Cavaignac. The fraternity, the brotherhood of antagonistic classes, wherein one exploits the other, this fraternity, proclaimed in February, written with big letters upon the brow of Paris, upon every prison and every barracks—has its true, unadulterated, its prosaic expression in the civil war, civil war in its most terrible form, the war between capital and labor. This fraternity flamed from every Paris window, on the evening of June 25, when the Paris of the bourgeoisie sparkled and glowed, while the Paris of the proletariat gasped in the throes of death, burnt and bleeding. Fraternity endured just so long as the interests of the bourgeoisie were allied to those of the proletariat.—Pedants of the old revolutionary tradition of 1793; Socialist systematicians, who went to the bourgeoisie begging for the people, who were permitted to preach long sermons and to compromise themselves so long as was needed to lull the proletarian lion to sleep; republicans, who demanded the entire old bourgeois order minus the crowned head; dynastic oppositionists, to whom accident, instead of a change of Ministry, had given the fall of a dynasty; Legitimists, who, though they did not want to doff their livery, did want to change its style and cut,—these were the allies with whom the people made its ‘February.’—The February revolution was a nice revolution, a revolution of general sympathy, because the antagonisms that within it acted jointly against royalty, still undeveloped slumbered peacefully side by side, because the social struggle that formed its background had gained but an airy existence, the existence of the phrase, of the word. The June revolution is the ugly revolution, the repellant

revolution, because the phrase has been supplanted by the cause, because the republic itself bared the head of the monster when it struck off the shielding and concealing crown.—Order! was the battle cry of Guizot. Order! cried Sebastiani, the Guizotin, when Warsaw became Russian. Order! cries Cavaignac, the brutal echo of the French National Assembly and of the republican bourgeoisie. Order! thundered his canister-shot when it mangled the body of the proletariat. None of the many revolutions of the French bourgeoisie since 1789 was an attack upon order, because it preserved the rule of class, preserved the slavery of labor, preserved the bourgeois order no matter how often the political form of this rule and this slavery was changed. The June revolution has laid hands upon this order. Woe to the June revolution!"

The Paris proletariat was forced by the bourgeoisie into the June insurrection. Therein alone lies the judgment of condemnation. Its immediate and admitted requirements did not urge it forcibly to bring about the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, nor was it equal to the task. The Moniteur had officially to inform the workers that the time was past for the republic to honor their illusions, and only their defeat convinced them of the truth that the slightest improvement of their condition remains a utopia within the bourgeois republic, a utopia which becomes a crime when it seeks realization. In place of demands exalted in point of form, but petty and even bourgeois in essence, the concession of which the proletariat wanted to pry from the February revolution, came the bold revolutionary watchword: Overthrow of the Bourgeoisie! Dictatorship of the Working Class!

While the proletariat made its field of death into the birthplace of the bourgeois republic, it compelled the latter to stand forth at once in its true form—as the State—the avowed purpose of which is to perpetuate the rule of capital and the slavery of labor. In sight of this battle-scarred, irreconcilable, unconquerable foe—unconquerable, because its existence is the sine qua non of its own life—bourgeois rule, freed from all trammels, was bound at once to turn into bourgeois terrorism. The proletariat temporarily swept from the stage, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie officially recognized, the middle layers, in the measure that their condition became more intolerable and their opposition to the bourgeoisie more pronounced, had to line up more and more with the proletariat. As, formerly, in its rise, they had now in its defeat to find the cause of their own misery.

If the June insurrection, everywhere upon the continent, raised the self-confidence of the bourgeoisie and caused it openly to enter into an alliance with the feudal kingdom against the people, who was the first victim of this alliance?—the

continental bourgeoisie itself. The June defeat prevented it from solidifying its rule and causing the people to stand stock-still upon the lowest rung of the bourgeois revolution, half content and half disgruntled.

Finally, the June defeat revealed to the despotic powers of Europe the secret that France, under any and all conditions, must maintain peace without in order to carry on the civil war within. And thus were the people, who had entered upon the struggle for national independence, delivered to the overwhelming power of Russia, Austria and Prussia, but at the same time was the fate of these nationalist revolutions subordinated to the fate of the proletarian revolution, deprived of their seeming self-existence, their independence of the great social transformation. The Hungarian shall not be free, nor the Pole, nor the Italian, so long as the worker remains a slave!

Finally, Europe, through the victories of the Holy Alliance, took on such shape that every new proletarian insurrection in France would at once become coincident with a world war. The new French revolution would be forced at once to go beyond the national confines, and to conquer the European terrain upon which alone the social revolution of the 19th century can establish itself.

Only through the June defeat were created all the conditions within which France can take the initiative in the European revolution. Only when dipped in the blood of the June insurgents did the Tricolor become the banner of the European revolution—the Red Flag.

And we exclaim: The revolution is dead!—Long live the revolution!

II. From June,1848,to June13,1849

The 25th of February, 1848, had imposed upon France the republic, the 25th of June thrust upon her the revolution. And revolution, after June, meant transformation of bourgeois society; while, prior to February, it had meant transformation of the form of the State.

The struggle of June had been led by the republican faction of the bourgeoisie, and, with the victory, the powers of State necessarily fell to that element. The state of siege laid Paris resistlessly at its feet, while in the provinces reigned a moral state of siege, the brutally threatening arrogance of the bourgeois victor, and the unchained property fanaticism of the farmers. Therefore, no danger from below.

With the revolutionary power of the workers broke also the political influence of the democratic republicans, that is, of the republicans in the sense of the petty bourgeoisie, represented in the Executive Commission by Ledru-Rollin, in the Constituent National Assembly by the party of the Montagne [the Mountain], in the press by the Réforme. Jointly with the bourgeois republicans they had, on April 16, conspired against the proletariat, and in the days of June had jointly with them warred upon it. Thus, they themselves blasted the background from which their party had stood forth as a power, because the petty bourgeoisie can maintain a revolutionary attitude against the upper bourgeoisie only so long as the proletariat stands behind it. They were dismissed. The sham alliance, into which the bourgeois republicans entered with them, reluctantly and with mental reservations during the period of the Provisional Government and the Executive Commission, was openly broken. Rejected and repelled as allies, they sank to a position of subordinate satellites of the Tricolor, from whom they could wring no concession but whose rule they were forced to support each time it, and with it the republic itself, was called into question by the anti-republican bourgeois factions. These factions, finally,—Legitimists and Orleanists—found themselves right at the start in a minority within the Constituent National Assembly. Prior to the June days, they dared to assert themselves only under the mask of bourgeois republicanism, but the June victory for the moment caused the whole of bourgeois France to hail Cavaignac as its Messiah, and when, shortly after the June days, the anti-republican party again began to gain its self-reliance, the military dictatorship and the state of siege permitted it to put out its feelers only very timidly and with great care.

Since 1830, the bourgeois republican faction, with its journalists, its spokesmen, its capacities, its deputies, generals, bankers and lawyers, had been grouped around a Paris journal, the National. In the provinces, this paper had its branches. The

coterie of the National constituted the dynasty of the Tricolor republic. At once it took unto itself all the powers of State, the Ministries, the Police Prefecture, the Post Office, the Prefect positions, the army positions of higher rank that had become vacant. At the head of the executive power stood its general, Cavaignac; its editor in chief, Marrast, was made the permanent President of the Constituent National Assembly. In his salons, as master of ceremonies, he made at the same time the honneurs for the virtuous republic.

Even revolutionary French writers, because of a kind of awe of the republican tradition, have strengthened the error as though the royalists had ruled in the Constituent National Assembly. The Constituent National Assembly, quite otherwise, remained since the June days the exclusive representative of bourgeois republicanism, and all the more markedly did it show this side, the more the influence of the Tricolor republicans collapsed outside of the Assembly. If it became a matter of maintaining the form of the bourgeois republic, it had the votes of the democratic republicans; if it became a matter of essence, then even their talk did not separate them from the royalist bourgeois factions, because the interests of the bourgeoisie, the material conditions of its class rule and class exploitation, form the very content of the bourgeois republic.

Not royalism but bourgeois republicanism found its realization in the life and the deeds of this Constituent Assembly, which, in the end, did not die, neither was it killed, but which simply rotted away.

During the entire duration of its rule, so long as it played the chief and State role before the scenes, there was enacted in the background an uninterrupted sacrificial feast—the continuous court-martial condemnation of captured June insurgents, or their deportation without trial. The Constituent Assembly had the tact to admit that, in the case of the June insurgents, it did not adjudge criminals, it crushed enemies.

The first deed of the Constituent National Assembly was the appointment of a commission to inquire into the events of June, of the 15th of May and into the participation of the Socialist and Democratic party chiefs in those days. The inquiry was directed against Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin and Caussidière. The bourgeois republicans burned with impatience to rid themselves of these rivals. The carrying through of their rancor they could not entrust to a better tool than Odilon Barrot, former chief of the dynastic opposition, liberalism become incarnate, the nullité grave [grave cipher] of thorough shallowness, who not only had to revenge a dynasty but who also had to ask of the revolutionaries an accounting for a frustrated presidency of the Ministry. A certain guaranty of his inexorability. This Barrot was made the president of the commission of inquiry and he built up a

complete case against the February revolution, summed up as follows: March 17, Manifestation; April 16, Plot; May 15, Attack; June 23, Civil War! Why did he not extend his learned and criminalist investigations to the 24th of February? The Journal des Débats answered: The 24th of February, that means the founding of Rome. The origin of States runs back to a myth, in which one may believe, but which one must not discuss. Louis Blanc and Caussidière were abandoned to the courts. The National Assembly completed the work of cleansing itself, which it had begun on May 15.

The plan of imposing a tax upon capital—in the shape of a tax upon mortgages—conceived by the Provisional Government and again taken up by Goudchaux, was rejected by the Constituent Assembly, the law limiting the hours of labor to ten was repealed, debtor imprisonment was reintroduced, and the greater part of the French population, because unable to read or write, was excluded from jury service. Why not also from the suffrage? The bond [of good behavior] for the press was again introduced and the right of association curtailed.

But in their haste to give back to the old bourgeois conditions the old guarantees, and to blot out every trace left behind by the waves of the revolution, the bourgeois republicans met with an obstacle threatening unexpected danger.

No one had, during the June days, fought more fanatically for the safety of property and the restoration of credit than the Paris petty bourgeoisie—cafétiers, restaurateurs, wine merchants, small merchants and traders, professionals, etc. The boutique [small shop] had roused itself and had marched against the barricade in order to restore circulation that leads from the street to the boutique. But behind the barricade stood the customers and debtors, before it stood the creditors of the boutique. And after the barricades had been smashed and the workers crushed, and the shopkeepers, victory-drunk, had rushed back to their shops, they found the entrance barricaded by a savior of property, an official agent of credit, who held before them some menacing documents: Overdue notes! Overdue house rent! Overdue obligations!—and, therefore, a foreclosed boutique! a foreclosed boutiquier!

Safety of property? But the house wherein they dwelled was not their property; the shop which they tended was not their property; the goods they dealt in were not their property. Not their business, not the plate from which they ate, not the bed wherein they slept, still belonged to them. As against themselves, it was a case of saving that very property for the house owner, who had rented them the house; the banker, who had discounted the note; the capitalist, who had made cash advances; the manufacturer, who had consigned merchandise to these petty traders; the

wholesaler, who had given raw material to the professionals on credit. Restoration of credit? But credit, again grown stronger, proved itself a lively and diligent God, who threw the non-paying debtor with wife and child out of his four walls, abandoned his imaginary property to the capitalist, and confined the debtor himself in the debtor's prison, which had again been threateningly re-erected upon the corpses of the June insurgents.

The petty bourgeoisie perceived with dread that, after they had knocked down the workers, they had delivered themselves, without chance of resistance, into the hands of their creditors. Their dragged-out and seemingly overlooked bankruptcy, become chronic since the days of February, was after the June days openly announced.

Their nominal property had been left unchallenged when it was a case of driving them upon the scene of battle in the name of property. But now, after the great settlement with the proletariat had been attended to, the little business with the epicerie [grocery] could also be settled. In Paris, the mass of protested notes, etc., amounted to more than 21 million francs, in the provinces to over 11 millions. Occupants of places of business in more than 7,000 houses in Paris had not paid rent since February.

The National Assembly having extended its inquiry into the political debt up to the borders of February, the small traders now demanded an inquiry into the civil debts up to February 24. They gathered en masse in the hall of the stock exchange and threateningly demanded for every merchant who could prove that he had failed only because of the crisis caused by the revolution, and that his business was in good shape on February 24, an extension of time for payment by decree of the commercial court, and to compel the creditor to liquidate his claim on payment of a moderate percentage. In the National Assembly this question came up as proposed legislation in the form of the concordat à l’amiable [amiable agreement]. The Assembly hesitated; suddenly it learned that, at the Porte St. Denis, thousands of wives and children of the insurgents were preparing an amnesty petition.

In the presence of the resurrected June ghost the petty bourgeoisie trembled, and the Assembly regained its inexorableness. The concordat à l’amiable, the friendly agreement between creditor and debtor, was rejected as to its essential points.

After the democratic representatives of the petty bourgeoisie had, within the National Assembly, been thus repulsed by the republican representatives of the bourgeoisie, this parliamentary breach of relations received its bourgeois, concrete economic interpretation by the abandonment of the indebted small trader to his bourgeois creditors. A great part of the former was utterly ruined, and the rest were

permitted to continue business only under conditions that made them the unquestioning serfs of capital. On August 22, 1848, the National Assembly rejected the concordat à l'amiable; on September 19, 1848, in the midst of the state of siege, Prince Louis Bonaparte and the prisoner of Vincennes, the Communist Raspail, were elected as representatives in Paris. But the bourgeoisie elected the Jewish money-changer and Orleanist Fould. Therefore, on all sides sudden declarations of war against the Constituent National Assembly, against bourgeois republicanism, against Cavaignac.

It requires no explanation to show how the mass-bankruptcy of the Paris petty bourgeoisie, in its after effects, rolled far beyond those immediately affected, again interrupted bourgeois commerce, while the State deficit, due to the June insurrection, increased anew, and the State income, because of the stoppage of production, restricted consumption and lowered imports, declined continuously. Cavaignac and the National Assembly could have recourse to no other means than that of a new loan, which forced them still more under the yoke of the financial aristocracy.

If the small traders had harvested bankruptcy and juridical liquidation as the fruit of the June victory, the Janissaries of Cavaignac, the Mobile Guard, on the other hand, found their reward in the soft arms of the Lorettes, and they also received, as the "youthful saviors of society," homage of all sorts in the salons of Marrast, the gentilhomme of the Tricolor, who also served as the amphitryon [host] and troubadour of the virtuous republic. Meanwhile, this social preferment and, more yet, the much higher pay of the Mobile Guard embittered the army, while, at the same time, vanished all the national illusions whereby bourgeois republicanism, through its journal, the National, had managed to attach to itself in the time of Louis Philippe a part of the army and the farmer class. The go-between role which Cavaignac and the National Assembly had played in North Italy, only to betray it to Austria conjointly with England—this one day of domination annihilated eighteen years of opposition of the National. No government was less national than that of the National, none more dependent upon England, and under Louis Philippe it lived on the daily circumscription of the Catonic: Carthaginem esse delendam [Carthage must be destroyed]; none more servile toward the Holy Alliance, and from a Guizot it had demanded that he tear up the Vienna treaties. The irony of history made Bastide, former editor of the National, France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, so that he might contradict every one of his articles in every one of his despatches.

For a moment both the army and the farmers had believed that, with the military dictatorship, external war and glory had been put on France's order of the day. But

Cavaignac, that was not the dictatorship of the sabre over bourgeois society—it was the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie via the sabre. Of the soldier they now needed only the gendarme. Cavaignac concealed under the stern features of anti-republican resignation the insipid submissiveness to the humiliating conditions of his bourgeois office. L'argent n'a pas de maître!—money has no master! This old motto of the tiers-état [third estate] he idealized, as did the Constituent Assembly, by translating it into political parlance: The bourgeoisie has no king, the true form of its rule is the republic.

To work out this form, to fashion a republican constitution, therein consisted the "great organic labor" of the Constituent National Assembly. The rebaptism of the Christian calendar into a republican one, of St. Bartholomew into St. Robespierre, made no more change in wind and weather than this constitution changed or was to have changed bourgeois society. Wherever it went beyond a change of costume, it made existing facts part of the record. And so it solemnly registered the fact of the republic, the fact of the general suffrage, the fact of a single sovereign National Assembly in place of the two restricted constitutional Chambers. Thus it registered and regulated the fact of the Cavaignac dictatorship, by substituting for the stationary, non-responsible, hereditary kingship, an ambulant, responsible, elective kingship, by means of a quadrennial presidency. And thus, none the less, it raised to the dignity of constitutional law the fact of the extraordinary powers wherewith the National Assembly, after the terrors of May 15 and of June 25, had providentially invested its President in the interest of its own security. The balance of the constitution was a matter of terminology. From the works of the old monarchist machine the royalist labels were torn off and republican labels put up instead. Marrast, former chief editor of the National, but now chief editor of the constitution, discharged this academic task not without talent.

The Constituent Assembly resembled the Chilean official, who wanted better to regulate the conditions of property in realty by means of a cadastral survey, at the very moment when subterranean rumblings had already announced the volcanic eruption that was to sweep the real estate from under his feet. While in theory it advanced the precise form wherein the rule of the bourgeoisie was to be expressed in republican fashion, in reality it maintained itself only through the suspension of all formulas, through force sans phrase, through the state of siege. Two days prior to its taking up the work on the constitution, it proclaimed continuance of the state of siege. Formerly, constitutions were made and adopted after the process of social transformation had arrived at a point of repose, when the newly-formed class relations had had time to set, and the warring factions of the ruling class had sought refuge in a compromise which permitted continuance of the fight among

themselves while at the same time excluding therefrom the tired-out popular mass. This constitution, however, sanctioned no social revolution, it sanctioned the momentary victory of the old society over the revolution.

In the first draft of the constitution, made after the June days, there was yet the droit au travail—the right to work—the first awkward formula wherein the revolutionary aspirations of the proletariat are condensed. It was transferred into the droit à l'assistance—the right to public alms—but which modern State does not, in one form or another, feed its paupers? The right to work, in the bourgeois sense, is a contradiction, a miserable pious wish, but behind the right to work looms up the power over capital, behind the power over capital the expropriation of the means of production, their subjection to the organized working class, therefore, the abolition of wage labor, of capital and of their mutual relations. Behind the "right to work" stood the June insurrection. The Constituent Assembly, which practically had placed the proletariat hors la lois—outside of the law—had to throw out of the constitution, the law of laws, as a matter of principle this formula, had to pronounce anathema the "right to work." But it did not stop there. Just as Plato banned the poets from his Republic, so did it ban from its republic forever and evermore—the progressive tax. The progressive tax is not only a bourgeois measure, applicable within the existing conditions of production in greater or lesser degree; it was the only means to attach the middle layers of bourgeois society to the "virtuous" republic, to reduce the public debt, to checkmate the anti-republican majority of the bourgeoisie.

At the time of the concordat à l'amiable, the Tricolor republicans had actually sacrificed the petty bourgeoisie to the upper bourgeoisie. This isolated fact they raised to the level of a principle by the legal interdiction of the progressive tax. They put a bourgeois reform on the same plane with the proletarian revolution. But which class did then remain as the mainstay of their republic? The upper bourgeoisie. But they, in the mass, were anti-republican. When they exploited the republicans of the National, in order again to strengthen the conditions of the old economic life, they meant, on the other hand, to exploit the reestablished social conditions in order to restore the political forms most suiting them. Even at the beginning of October, Cavaignac was forced to make Dufaure and Vivien, former Ministers of Louis Philippe, into Ministers of the republic, no matter how much the headless puritans of his own party grumbled and blustered.

While the Tricolor constitution rejected all compromise with the petty bourgeoisie, without knowing what new element of society could be attached to the new form of State, it hastened, on the other hand, to restore the traditional immunity of a body

wherein the old State found its most obstinate and fanatical defenders. It made the indeposability of judges, called in question by the Provisional Government, part of the fundamental law. The one king, whom they had deposed, rerose by the scores in these indeposable inquisitors of legality.

The French press has in many ways explained the contradictions in the constitution of Monsieur Marrast as, for instance, the co-existence of two sovereigns, the National Assembly, the President, etc., etc.

The most comprehensive contradiction of the constitution consists in this: The classes, whose social slavery it is to perpetuate, proletariat, farmers and the petty bourgeoisie, it puts by means of the general suffrage in possession of political power. And from the class whose old social power it sanctions, the bourgeoisie, it withdraws the political guarantees of this power. It crams its political rule into democratic conditions, which at any moment may help the hostile classes to victory and may call in question the very foundation of bourgeois society itself. From the one it demands that they shall not, from the political emancipation, go forward to social emancipation; and from the others it demands that they shall not, from the social restoration, go back to the political.

These contradictions trouble the bourgeois republicans but little. In the same measure that they ceased to be indispensable—and indispensable they were only as leaders in the fight of the old society against the revolutionary proletariat—a few short weeks after their victory, they sank from the status of a party down to that of a coterie. And the constitution—they treated it as a great intrigue. What above all was to be constituted in it, was the rule of the coterie. The President was to have been the prolonged Cavaignac, the Legislative Assembly a prolonged Constituent Assembly. The political power of the popular masses they hoped to reduce to a sham, and yet to play upon this sham power in a measure sufficient to keep hanging, permanently, over the majority of the bourgeoisie, the dilemma of the June days: rule of the National, or the rule of Anarchy.

The work on the constitution, begun on September 4, was finished on October 23. On September 2, the Constituent Assembly had decided not to adjourn until the organic laws, supplementing the constitution, had been passed. Notwithstanding this, it now decided to call into being its very own creature, the President, on December 10, long before the circle of its own labors had been closed. It felt confident to be able to greet in the constitution Homunculus, the son of his mother. As a matter of precaution it had been arranged that in case neither of the candidates drew two million votes, the election would pass from the nation to the Constituent Assembly.

Vain precautions! The first day of the realization of the constitution was the last day of the rule of the Constituent Assembly. In the abyss of the ballot box lay its sentence of death. It sought the “son of his mother” and found the “nephew of his uncle.” Saulus Cavaignac struck one million votes, but David Napoleon struck six millions. Six times was Saulus Cavaignac defeated.

December 10, 1848, was the day of the peasant insurrection. Only from this day dates the “February” for the French farmers. The symbol which expressed their entrance into the revolutionary movement, awkwardly-cunning, rascally-naive, lumberingly-sublime, a premeditated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, an ingeniously-silly anachronism, a world-historic waggish trick, an undecipherable hieroglyphic for the mental powers of the civilized—this symbol carried unmistakably the physiognomy of the class which, within civilization, represents barbarism. The republic had announced itself to it via the tax collector, it announced itself to the republic via the Emperor. Napoleon was the only man who had completely represented the interests and the imagination of the peasant class created anew in 1789. By writing his name upon the frontispiece of the republic, it declared for war without, and for the assertion of its class interests within. Napoleon, he was for the peasants not a person, but a program. With flying banners and sounding brass they marched to the hustings with the cry: plus d’impôts! à bas les riches! à bas la république! vive l’Empereur!—No more taxes! Down with the rich! Down with the republic! Long live the Emperor! Behind the Emperor was hidden the peasant war. The republic, which they had voted down, was the republic of the rich.

December 10 registered the coup d’état of the peasants, which overthrew the existing government. From this day on, when they took from France one government and gave it another, they kept their eyes inflexibly fixed upon Paris. For a moment the active heroes of the revolutionary drama, they could no longer be forced back into the inactive, will-less role of supernumeraries.

The other classes contributed to complete the electoral victory of the peasants. The election of Napoleon meant to the proletariat the deposition of Cavaignac, the overthrow of the Constituent Assembly, the abdication of bourgeois republicanism, the cashiering of the June victory. To the petty bourgeoisie, Napoleon meant the rule of the debtor over the creditor. To the majority of the upper bourgeoisie, the election of Napoleon meant an open breach with the faction it had been compelled to make use of for the moment and against the revolution, but which became intolerable to it as soon as the latter sought to fortify the position of the moment as a constitutional position. Napoleon in place of Cavaignac; it was to them the

monarchy in place of the republic, the beginning of a royalist restoration, Orleans timidly indicated, the lilly hidden under the violets. The army, finally, voted through Napoleon against the Mobile Guard, against the peace idyl, and for war.

And so it happened, as stated by the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, that the most simple man in France attained the most multiplied importance. Just because he was nothing, he might mean everything except himself. However diverse the meaning of the name Napoleon might be in the mouths of the different classes, each one of them wrote with this name upon its bulletin: Down with the party of the National! Down with Cavaignac! Down with the Constituent Assembly! Down with the bourgeois republic! One Minister, Dufaure, openly declared in the Constituent Assembly: The 10th of December is a second February 24.

Petty bourgeoisie and proletariat had voted en bloc for Napoleon in order to vote against Cavaignac, and by this pooling of votes to wrest from the Constituent Assembly the final decision. True, the most progressive part of both classes did put up its own candidates. Napoleon was the collective designation for all the parties coalesced against the bourgeois republic, Ledru-Rollin and Raspail were the surnames, the former for the democratic small bourgeoisie, the latter for the revolutionary proletariat. The votes cast for Raspail—as was openly declared by the proletarians and their Socialist spokesmen—were to be but a demonstration, just so many protests against any kind of presidency, that is, against the constitution itself, so many votes against Ledru-Rollin, the first act whereby the proletariat, as an independent political party, cut loose from the democratic party. This party however—the democratic petty bourgeoisie and its parliamentary representative the Montagne—treated the candidacy of Ledru-Rollin in all seriousness, having always had the solemn habit of duping themselves. This was, however, its last attempt to appear as an independent party against the proletariat. Not only the republican bourgeois party, but also the democratic petty bourgeoisie and its Montagne were defeated on December 10.

France now had, besides a Montagne, a Napoleon; proof that both were only the inanimate caricatures of the great realities whose names they bore. Louis Napoleon, with the imperial hat and eagle, parodied the old Napoleon no less miserably than the Montagne with its phrases borrowed from 1793, and its demagogic poses, parodied the old “Mountain.” The traditional superstition in regard to 1793 was thus simultaneously stripped off with the superstition about Napoleon. The revolution had only arrived at itself, as soon as it had gained its own original name, and it could do that only as soon as the modern revolutionary class, the industrial proletariat, stepped dominantly to the front. It may be said that the

10th of December nonplussed the Montagne, and caused it to doubt its own judgment, for the reason that it laughingly broke off the classic analogy with the old revolution by means of a vile peasant's jest.

On December 20, Cavaignac resigned his office, and the Constituent Assembly proclaimed Louis Napoleon President of the Republic. On December 19, the last day of its exclusive rule, it rejected a motion of amnesty for the June insurgents. To recall the decree of June 27, whereby it had condemned 15,000 insurgents to deportation with evasion of judicial procedure, did not that mean to recall the June battle itself?

Odilon Barrot, the last Minister of Louis Philippe, became the first Minister of Louis Napoleon. Just as Louis Napoleon did not date the day of his rule from December 10, but from a Senate consultation in 1806, so did he find a Minister-President who dated his Ministry not from December 2o, but from a royal decree of February 24. As the legitimate heir of Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon mitigated the governmental change by the retention of the old Ministry, which, moreover, had not had time to wear off because it had not found time to come into life.

The chiefs of the royalist bourgeois factions advised this selection. The head of the old dynastic opposition, who had insensibly formed the bridge to the republicans of the National, was even better qualified to form, in full consciousness, the bridge from the bourgeois republic to the monarchy.

Odilon Barrot was the chief of the only old opposition party, which, ever and vainly striving for the Minister's portfolio, had not worn itself seedy. In rapid succession, the revolution pitched all the old opposition parties to the heights of State power, so that not only in point of action, but with the phrase itself they had themselves to disown and renounce their old phrases, until, finally, united in a disgusting admixture, they were flung by the people upon the flaying-ground of history. No apostasy was spared this Barrot, this incarnation of bourgeois liberalism, who, for eighteen long years, had concealed the rascally hollowness of his mind behind a serious demeanor of his body. If, at certain moments, the too glaring contrast between the thistles of the present and the laurels of the past disconcerted even him, a look in the mirror would restore the ministerial composure and human self-admiration. What the mirror reflected back at him was Guizot, whom he had always envied and who had always mastered him, Guizot himself, but Guizot with Odilon's olymplan brow. What he overlooked were the Midas ears.

The Barrot of February 24 was revealed only in the Barrot of December 20. He, the Orleanist Voltairian, was joined in the capacity of Minister of Education by—the Legitimist and Jesuit Falloux.

A few days later, the Ministry of the Interior was bestowed upon Leon Faucher, the Malthusian. The law, religion, political economy! The Barrot Ministry contained all these and, in addition, a union of the Legitimists and Orleanists. The Bonapartist alone was missing. As yet, Bonaparte concealed the longing to signify Napoleon, because Soulouque did not as yet play Toussaint l'Overture.

At once the party of the National was ousted from all the higher posts wherein it had nested. Police Prefecture, General Procurator, Mayoralty of Paris—all this was manned by the old creatures of the monarchy. Changarnier, the Legitimist, received the combined high command of the National Guard of the Seine Department, of the Mobile Guard, and of the line troops of the first military division; Bugeaud, the Orleanist, was made the commander in chief of the Army of the Alps. This change of officials continued uninterruptedly under the Barrot administration. The first act of his Ministry was the restoration of the old royalist administration. In a trice the official scenery became transformed—curtain, costumes, speech, actors, figurants, supernumeraries, prompters, the position of the parties, motifs of the drama, content of the collision, the entire situation. Only the antemundane Constituent Assembly still held its place. But from the moment the National Assembly had installed Bonaparte, when Bonaparte had installed Barrot and Barrot in turn Changarnier, France emerged from the formative period into the new era of the constitutional republic. And in the constituted republic, what use is there for a Constituent Assembly? After the earth had been created, nothing was left for the creator but to flee to heaven. The Constituent Assembly was determined not to follow his example, the National Assembly being the last asylum of the bourgeois republican party. If all the holds upon the executive power had been wrested away, was there not left to it constituent omnipotence? To maintain under all circumstances the sovereign post that it held, and from there reconquer the lost ground, that was its first thought. The Barrot Ministry crowded out by a Ministry of the National, the royalist personnel would triumphantly reenter. The National Assembly decided upon the overthrow of the Ministry, and the Ministry itself presented an opportunity for attack such as the Assembly could not have better invented for itself.

It will be recalled that, to the peasants, Louis Bonaparte meant: No more taxes! Six days did he sit on the presidential chair and on the seventh day, December 27, his Ministry proposed the retention of the salt tax, the abolition of which had been

decreed by the Provisional Government. The salt tax shares with the wine tax the privilege of serving, particularly in the eyes of the rural population, as the scapegoat of the old French system of finance. The Barrot Ministry could not put into the mouth of the peasants' chosen idol a more biting epigram against his electors than the words: Restoration of the salt tax!—With the salt tax, Bonaparte lost his revolutionary salt,—the Napoleon of the peasants' insurrection faded like a nebulous picture and nothing remained behind but the Great Unknown of the royalist bourgeois intrigue. Not without purpose did the Barrot Ministry make this act of rude disenchantment the first official act of the President.

The Constituent Assembly, on its part, seized with avidity upon the twin opportunity to overthrow the Ministry and, as against the chosen one of the peasantry, itself to pose as the representative of peasant interests. It rejected the proposal of the Minister of Finance, reduced the salt tax to one-third of its former amount, increased thereby by 60 millions a State deficit of 560 millions, and, after this vote of misconfidence, calmly awaited the retirement of the Ministry. So little did it comprehend the new world by which it was surrounded and its own changed position. Behind the Ministry stood the President, and behind the President stood 6 million voters, who had deposited in the ballot box so many votes of lack of confidence against the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly returned to the nation its vote of lack of confidence. Ridiculous exchange! It forgot that its decisions had lost their compelling currency. The rejection of the salt tax only ripened the determination of Bonaparte and his Ministry to make an end of the Constituent Assembly. Then began the long duel which filled entirely one-half of the life of the Constituent Assembly; January 29, March 31, May 3, are the journées, the great days of this crisis, so many forerunners of June 13.

Frenchmen, Louis Blanc, for instance, have conceived the 29th of January as the emergence of a constitutional contradiction, the contradiction between a sovereign, indispersable National Assembly emanating from the general suffrage, and a President, literally responsible to it, in reality not only also sanctioned by the general suffrage, but uniting in his person all the votes cast which, distributed among the individual members of the National Assembly, are split up a hundredfold, and who is, moreover, in full possession of the entire executive power, above which the National Assembly soars only as a moral force. This interpretation of the 29th of January mistakes the language of the struggle on the tribune, through the press, in the clubs, with its real content. Louis Bonaparte, in juxtaposition to the National Assembly—that was not a constitutional power on the one side as compared with another, it was not the executive power as compared with the legislative, but it was the constituted bourgeois republic itself as compared

with the tools that fashioned it, as compared with the ambitious intrigues and ideologic demands of the revolutionary bourgeois faction that had founded it, and now found to its astonishment that its constituted republic looked like a restored monarchy, and which would now forcibly hold fast the formative period with its conditions, its illusions, its language and its persons and prevent the ripened bourgeois republic from coming forth in its complete and proper form. Just as the Constituent National Assembly represented Cavaignac, who had fallen back into it, so did Bonaparte represent the Legislative National Assembly, not yet separated from him, i.e., the National Assembly of the constituted bourgeois republic.

The election of Bonaparte could be interpreted only by putting in place of the one name its manifold significations, by repeating itself in the election of a new National Assembly. The mandate of the old had been cashiered by the 10th of December. What on January 29 faced each other was not the President and the National Assembly of the republic to be, and the President of the republic in being, two powers that embodied entirely different periods of the life process of the republic, it was the small republican faction of the bourgeoisie which alone could proclaim the republic, wrest it from the proletariat through the street battle and the reign of terror and, in the constitution, draft its ideal fundamental features; and, on the other side, the entire royalist mass of the bourgeoisie, which alone could rule in this constituted bourgeois republic, strip the constitution of its ideologic frills and realize the unavoidable condition for the subjugation of the proletariat through its legislation and its administration.

The thunder cloud, which broke on January 29, had gathered its elements during the entire month of January. The Constituent Assembly, by its vote of lack of confidence, wanted to drive the Barrot Ministry to abdication. The Barrot Ministry, on the other hand, proposed to the Constituent Assembly that it give to itself a vote of lack of confidence, that it resolve upon its suicide and decree its own dissolution. Rateau, one of the most obscure Deputies, at the behest of the Ministry, made this motion in the Assembly on January 6, the same Constituent Assembly which already in August had decided not to adjourn until a whole series of organic laws had been passed that were to round out the constitution. The ministerial Fould told it point-blank that its dissolution was needed “for the restoration of the disturbed credit.” And would it not disturb credit by prolonging the provisorium and calling in question Bonaparte through Barrot, and through Bonaparte again calling in question the constituted republic? Barrot, the Olympian, become a raging Roland at the prospect of seeing the scarcely captured Minister-Presidency, after only two weeks’ enjoyment, snatched from him by the same republicans who had once before withheld it from him for a decennium, that is, for ten months, this

Barrot out-tyrannized the tyrant toward this miserable gathering. The mildest of his words were that "with it no future is possible." And, in truth, it represented only the past. "It was incapable," he added ironically, "of surrounding the republic with institutions that were needed for its solidification." Indeed! With the exclusive counterpose against the proletariat, bourgeois energy had been broken, and with the counterpose against the royalists their republican exaltation had been revived. Thus were they doubly incapable of solidifying the bourgeois republic, which they no longer understood, by means of suitable institutions.

With the proposition of Rateau, the Ministry at the same time unloosened a storm of petitions throughout the country, and daily and from all corners of France there came flying at the head of the Constituent Assembly bales of billet-doux wherein it was called upon in more or less categoric fashion to dissolve and to make its last will and testament. The Constituent Assembly, on the other hand, caused counter-petitions to be issued, wherein it let itself be called upon to continue life. The electoral battle between Bonaparte and Cavaignac renewed itself as a petition battle for and against the dissolution of the National Assembly. The petitions were to be the supplemental commentaries of the 10th of December. During the entire month of January this agitation was continued.

In the conflict between the Constituent Assembly and the President, the former could not go back to the general election for its origin, because the appeal was from it to the general suffrage. It could not lean upon a legal power, because it was a case of struggle against the legal power. It could not overthrow the Ministry by voting a lack of confidence, as again it tried on January 6 and 26, because the Ministry did not ask for its confidence. There remained only one possibility, that of insurrection. The fighting forces for an insurrection were the republican part of the National Guard, the Mobile Guard and the centers of the revolutionary proletariat, the clubs. The Mobile Guard, the heroes of the June days, formed also in December the organized fighting force of the republican bourgeois faction, as before the June days the national ateliers had formed the fighting force of the revolutionary proletariat. Just as the Executive Commission of the Constituent Assembly directed its brutal attack upon the national ateliers when it had to make an end of the demands of the proletariat which had become intolerable, so did the Bonaparte Ministry direct its attack upon the Mobile Guard when it had to make an end of the demands, become intolerable, of the republican bourgeois faction. It decreed dissolution of the Mobile Guard. One half of the same was dismissed and thrown upon the street, the other half received a monarchist organization in place of its democratic one, and its pay was reduced to that of the level of the line troops. The Mobile Guard found itself in the position of the June insurgents, and daily did the

press print public confessions, acknowledging their guilt of June and begging the proletariat for forgiveness.

And the clubs? From the moment when the Constituent Assembly called in question the President via Barrot, and through the President the constituted bourgeois republic, and within the constituted bourgeois republic the latter as such, all the constituent elements of the February republic necessarily rallied around it all the parties that would overthrow the existing republic and by means of a forcible process of retrogression would transform it into the republic of their class interests and principles. That which had taken place was again undone, the crystallizations of the revolutionary movement had again come into flux, the republic that was fought over was again the indefinite republic of the days of February, the definition of which each party reserved for itself. For a moment, the parties occupied again the old February positions, without sharing the illusions of February. The Tricolor republicans of the National again leaned upon the democratic republicans of the Réforme and pushed them as front rank fighters into the foreground of the parliamentary struggle. The democratic republicans again leaned upon the socialistic republicans—a manifesto, published on January 27, announced their reconciliation and alliance—and these prepared for themselves in the clubs their insurrectional background. The ministerial press, justly so, treated the Tricolor republicans of the National as the resurrected insurgents of the June days. In order to maintain themselves at the head of the bourgeois republic, they called in question the bourgeois republic itself. On January 26, Minister Faucher proposed a law governing the right of association, the first paragraph of which read: “The clubs are prohibited.” He made a motion at once to bring this bill to discussion as urgent. The Constituent Assembly rejected the motion of urgency and, on January 27, Ledru-Rollin submitted a motion, bearing 230 signatures, to indict the Ministry for violation of the constitution. The indictment of the Ministry at a moment when such an act implied the tactless admission of the impotence of the judge, that is, the Chamber majority, or a futile protest of the accuser against the majority itself, that was the great revolutionary trump which from now on the Montagne, born too late and to no purpose, played at every culmination of the crisis. Poor Montagne, crushed by the weight of its own name!

Blanqui, Barbès, Raspail, etc., had on May 15 tried to disperse the Constituent Assembly by forcing an entrance into its session at the head of the Paris proletariat. Barrot prepared for the Assembly a moral “May 15” in that he would dictate its self-dissolution and close its place of meeting. The Assembly had charged Barrot with the investigation against the May attackers and now, at this moment, when he appeared to it as a royalist Blanqui, when it sought allies against him in the clubs,

with the revolutionary proletarians and in the party of Blanqui, at this very moment the pitiless Barrot tormented the Assembly with the motion to deprive the May prisoners of a jury trial and to have them tried by the High Court invented by the party of the National. Strange how the whipped-up fear about a Minister's portfolio could strike from the head of a Barrot points worthy of a Beaumarchais! After much hesitation, the National Assembly adopted his motion. As against the May prisoners, it reassumed its normal character.

As the Constituent Assembly in the case of the President and the Ministers, so were the President and the Ministry in the case of the Constituent Assembly driven toward a coup d'état, because they possessed no legal means to dissolve it. But the Constituent Assembly was the mother of the constitution, and the constitution was the mother of the President. With a coup d'état, the President would tear up the constitution and would wipe out his republican legal title. He would then be forced to draw forth the imperial legal title; but the imperialist legal title would awaken the Orleanist one, and both would pale before the Legitimist one. The downfall of the legal republic could only cause the extreme opposite pole to be jerked up, the Legitimist monarchy, at a moment when the Orleanist party was only the vanquished one of February and Bonaparte only the victor of December 10, when both could oppose the republican usurpation only by presenting their equally usurped monarchist titles. The Legitimists were conscious of the favor of the moment, and they conspired in broad daylight. In General Changarnier they could hope to find their Monk. The advent of the white monarchy was in their clubs proclaimed as openly as was the red republic in the proletarian clubs.

By means of a happily suppressed riot the Ministry would have escaped all difficulties. "Legality is killing us," cried Odilon Barrot. A riot would have made possible, under the pretext of the salut public, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the violation of the constitution in its own behalf. The brutal attitude of Odilon Barrot, the motion aiming at the dissolution of the clubs, the noisy deposition of 50 Tricolor Prefects and their substitution by royalists, the demobilization of the Mobile Guard and the mistreatment of their chiefs by Changarnier, the rehabilitation of Lherminiers, the professor impossible even under Guizot, the toleration of the Legitimist boisterousness—all that constituted so many provocations to riot. But Riot remained silent. It awaited its signal from the Constituent Assembly, not from the Ministry.

Finally came the 29th of January, the day on which there was to be a decision as to the motion of Mathieu (de la Drôme) aiming at the unconditional rejection of the Rateau resolution. Legitimists, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Mobile Guards, Montagne,

clubs, they all conspired on this day, each against the pretended foe as well as against the pretended ally. Bonaparte, high on horseback, inspected a part of the troops at the Concordia Place, Changarnier performed with quite a display of strategic maneuvers, the Constituent Assembly found its meeting place occupied by the military. The Assembly, central point of all the crisscrossing hopes, fears, expectations, ferments, tensions, conspiracies, this lion-hearted Assembly hesitated not a moment when it approached the world spirit closer than ever. It resembled the warrior who not only fears to use his own weapons, but who also feels obligated to preserve the weapons of his foe. With utter contempt of death it signed its own death warrant and voted against the unconditional rejection of the Rateau resolution. Even under the state of siege it set a limit to a constituent activity the necessary framework of which had been the Paris state of siege. It revenged itself, quite worthily, in that, on the next day, it started an inquiry into the fright which the Ministry, on January 29, had given it. The Montagne proved its lack of revolutionary energy and political understanding by permitting itself to be used by the party of the National as a speaking-trumpet in this great comedy of intrigues. The party of the National had made a last effort to retain in the constituted republic the monopoly of rule which it had possessed during the formative period of the bourgeois republic. It had suffered shipwreck.

If, during the January crisis, there was at stake the existence of the Constituent Assembly, during the crisis of March 21 it was a case of the existence of the constitution; there it was about the personnel of the National party, here about its ideal. It requires no intimation that the honest republicans more readily abandoned the exaltation of their ideology than the mundane enjoyment of governmental power.

On March 2l, there was on the order of business of the National Assembly the Faucher bill against the right of association—the suppression of the clubs. Article 8 of the constitution guarantees to all Frenchmen the right to organize. Prohibition of the clubs was, therefore, a plain violation of the constitution, and the Constituent Assembly itself was to canonize the ravishment of its saints. But the clubs, these were the gathering points, the conspiracy centers of the revolutionary proletariat. The National Assembly itself had forbidden the coalition of the workers against the bourgeoisie. And the clubs, what were they but a coalition of the entire working class against the entire bourgeois class, the formation of a workers' State against the bourgeois State? Were they not just so many constituent assemblies of the proletariat, and as many detachments of an army of revolt ready for action? What the constitution, first of all, was to have constituted was the rule of the bourgeoisie. Evidently, the constitution could therefore mean by the right of association only

such associations as were in harmony with the rule of the bourgeoisie, i.e., with the bourgeois order. If, for reasons of theoretical decorum, it expressed itself in general terms, was not the government and the National Assembly there to interpret and apply it in specific cases? If, during the antediluvian epoch of the republic, the clubs were actually inhibited through the state of siege, must they not, in the regulated, constituted republic be inhibited by law? The Tricolor republicans could oppose this prosaic interpretation of the constitution with naught but the exalted phrase of the constitution itself. Some of them, Pagnerre, Duclerc and others, voted for the Ministry and so gave it a majority. Others, the arch-angel Cavaignac and the church warden Marrast at the head, after the article about the inhibition of the clubs had gone through, retired in union with Ledru-Rollin and the Montagne to a separate room of the bureau—and "held a council."—The National Assembly was lamed, it did no longer have a quorum. In the nick of time, M. Cremieux reminded those gathered in council that from there the way led directly to the street, and that it was no longer February 1848 but March 1849. The party of the National, suddenly enlightened, returned to the session of the National Assembly, trailed by the once more duped Montagne, which, constantly tormented by revolutionary desires, with equal constancy snatched at constitutional possibilities and always felt itself in the right place behind the bourgeois republicans rather than in front of the revolutionary proletariat. Thus, the comedy was played. And the Constituent Assembly itself had decreed that the violation of the text of the constitution was the only adequate realization of its literal sense.

Only one point remained to be regulated, the relation of the constituted republic to the European revolution, its foreign policy. On May 8,1849, an unusual stir prevailed in the Constituent Assembly, the term of which was to expire in a few days. The attack of the French army upon Rome, its repulse by the Romans, its political infamy and military disgrace, the assassination of the Roman republic by the French republic, the first Italian campaign of the second Bonaparte—all that was on the order of the day. The Montagne had again played its great trump, Ledru-Rollin had deposited on the President's table the inevitable accusation against the Ministry for violation of the constitution and had this time also included Bonaparte.

The motif of May 8 later repeated itself as the motif of June 13. Let us get clear about that Roman expedition.

Cavaignac, as early as the middle of November, 1848, had despatched a war fleet to Civita Vecchia to protect the Pope, take him on board and sail back to France. The Pope was to have blessed the virtuous republic and make certain the election

of Cavaignac as President. With the Pope, Cavaignac would fish for the clerics, with the clerics for the peasants, and with the peasants for the presidency. An election maneuver in its immediate purpose, the Cavaignac expedition was at the same time a protest and a threat against the Roman revolution. It contained in embryo the intervention of France in favor of the Pope.

This intervention for the Pope, in conjunction with Austria and Naples and against the Roman republic, was decided upon at the first session of the Bonaparte ministerial council on December 23. Falloux in the Ministry,—that was the Pope in Rome, in the Rome of the Pope. Bonaparte no longer needed the Pope to become the President of the peasants, but he needed the conservation of the Pope in order to conserve the peasants of the President. Their credulity had made him President. With their faith they lost their credulity, and with the Pope their faith. And the coalesced Orleanists and Legitimists who ruled in Bonaparte's name! Before the king was restored, it was needful to restore the power that consecrates the kings. Aside from their royalism—without the old Rome, subject to Papal secular rule, there could be no Pope, without the Pope, no catholicism, without catholicism no French religion, and without religion what would become of the old French society? The mortgage, held by the peasant on the heavenly estates, guarantees the mortgage held by the bourgeoisie on the peasant estates. The Roman revolution was, therefore, an attack upon property, upon the bourgeois order, terrible like the June revolution. Reconstructed bourgeois rule in France required the restoration of Papal rule in Rome. Finally, by striking at the Roman revolutionaries, one could strike at the allies of the French revolutionaries; the alliance of the counter-revolutionary classes in the constituted French republic, necessarily was supplemented by the alliance of the French republic with the Holy Alliance—with Austria and Naples. The decision of the ministerial council of December 23 was no secret to the Constituent Assembly. Already on January 8 Ledru-Rollin had interpellated the Ministry about it; the Ministry had denied it and the National Assembly had proceeded with the order of business. Did it trust the words of the Ministry? We know that it spent the whole month of January with passing votes of lack of confidence. But if it was within its role to lie, was it within its role to feign a belief in its lie and therewith to save the republican déhor [appearances]?

Meanwhile, Piedmont had been defeated, Carl Albert had abdicated, and the Austrian army pounded at the gates of France. Ledru-Rollin interpellated strenuously. The Ministry proved that in Northern Italy it had but continued the policy of Cavaignac, and that Cavaignac had only continued the policy of the Provisional Government, i.e., the policy of Ledru-Rollin. This time the Ministry obtained even a vote of confidence and was authorized temporarily to occupy a

suitable point in Upper Italy in order to provide a basis for the peaceful negotiations with Austria about the integrity of the Sardinian territory and the Roman question. It is known that the fate of Italy is determined upon the battlefields of Northern Italy. With the fall of Lombardy and Piedmont, Rome had fallen, or France would have to declare war against Austria and, therewith, against the European counter-revolution. Did the National Assembly suddenly mistake the Barrot Ministry for the old Committee of Safety? Or itself for the old Convention? Why, therefore, the military occupation of a point in Upper Italy? Under this transparent veil was concealed the expedition against Rome.

On April 14, 14,000 men sailed under Oudinot to Civita Vecchia; on April 16, the National Assembly appropriated for the Ministry a credit of 1,200,000 francs to maintain for three months the intervention fleet in the Mediterranean. Thus it gave to the Ministry all the means to intervene against Rome, while it pretended to intervene against Austria. It did not see what the Ministry did, it only heard what it said. Such faith was not found in Israel; the Constituent Assembly had got into the position not to be permitted to know what the constituted republic had to do.

Finally, on May 8, was played the last act of the comedy. The Constituent Assembly demanded of the Ministry swift measures to bring back the Italian expedition to the aim that had been set it. Bonaparte, on the same evening, inserted a letter in the Moniteur, wherein he bestowed upon Oudinot the highest praise. On May 11, the National Assembly rejected the impeachment of the same Bonaparte and his Ministry. And the Montagne, which, instead of tearing asunder this web of deceit, takes seriously this parliamentary comedy in order that itself might play therein the role of Fouquier Tinville, did it not, under the borrowed lion’s skin of the Convention, betray the congenital petty bourgeois calfskin?

The latter half of the life of the Constituent Assembly may be summed up this way: On January 29, it admits that the royalist bourgeois factions are the natural superiors of the republic constituted by it; on March 21, that the violation of the constitution means its realization; and, on May 11, that the bombastically announced passive alliance of the French republic with the struggling peoples means its active alliance with the European counter-revolution.

This infamous Assembly made its exit from the stage after it had, two days before the anniversary of its natal day, May 4, given itself the satisfaction of rejecting the resolution of amnesty for the June insurgents. Its power broken, hated by the people with a deadly hate, repelled, manhandled, contemptuously thrown aside by the bourgeoisie whose tool it had been, forced in the second half of its life-epoch to disavow the first, bereft of its republican illusions, without great creative work in

the past, without hope for the future, dying piecemeal, it could galvanize its own corpse only by constantly recalling to itself the June victory, by again living through it, and by attesting itself through the ever repeated condemnation of the condemned. A vampire, living upon the blood of the June insurgents.

It left behind a State deficit, increased by the cost of the June insurrection, by the elimination of the salt tax, by the indemnities granted to the plantation owners at the abolition of negro slavery, by the cost of the Roman expedition, by the elimination of the wine tax, the abolition of which it decided upon when drawing its dying breath, a malicious old man, happy to be able to burden his laughing heirs with a compromising debt of honor.

Since the beginning of March, the electoral agitation for the Legislative National Assembly had started. Two main groups faced each other, the party of order and the Democratic-Socialist or Red party, and between them stood the “friends of the constitution” under which name the Tricolor republicans of the National endeavored to impersonate a party. The party of order formed itself immediately after the June days; only after the 10th of December had permitted it to shed the coterie of the National, the bourgeois republicans, did the secret of its existence reveal itself—the coalition of Orleanists and Legitimists in one party. The bourgeois class was divided into two great factions, which, successively, had exercised the monopoly of rule—the large landowners under the restored monarchy, the financial aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie under the July monarchy. Bourbon was the royal name for the predominant influence of the interests of the one faction, Orleans the royal name for the predominant influence of the interests of the other faction—the nameless realm of the republic was the only one wherein both factions could, in equally balanced rule, maintain the common class interest without giving up their mutual rivalry. If the bourgeois republic could be nothing else but the complete, clearly developed rule of the entire bourgeois class, could it be anything else but the rule of the Orleanists supplemented by the Legitimists, and of the Legitimists supplemented by the Orleanists, the synthesis of restoration and of the July monarchy? The bourgeois republicans of the National did not represent a large faction of their class resting upon an economic foundation. They possessed only the significance and the historic title of having asserted, under the monarchy and against the two bourgeois factions which could only comprehend their specific regime, the general regime of the bourgeois class, the nameless realm of the republic which they idealized and ornamented with antique arabesques, but wherein they hailed, above all, the rule of their coterie. If the party of the National became confused as to its own reason when, on the summit of the republic it had founded, it discovered the coalesced

royalists, the latter deceived themselves no less as to the fact of their joint rule. They did not comprehend that, if each of their factions taken by itself was royalist, the product of the chemical combination necessarily had to be republican, that the white and the blue monarchy had to be neutralized in the Tricolor republic. Forced by their counter-position to the proletariat and to the transitory classes gathering more and ever more around the proletarian center to exert their joint power, and to conserve the organization of this joint power, each faction of the party of order, as against the restoration and vainglorious inclinations of the other, had to assert the general mastery, i.e., the republican form of bourgeois rule. And so we find these royalists, at first believing in an imminent restoration, later conserving the republican form, though foaming at the mouth and with deadly invective against it, and, finally, admitting that only within the republic can they endure each other, and postponing the restoration indefinitely. The enjoyment of their joint domination itself strengthened each of the two factions and made them still more incapable and unwilling to subordinate themselves one to the other, that is, to restore the monarchy.

The party of order proclaimed directly in its election program the rule of the bourgeoisie, that is, the maintenance of the vital conditions of its rule, of property, the family, religion, order! Naturally, it presented its class rule and the conditions of the same as the rule of civilization and as the necessary condition of material production, as well as of the conditions of social intercourse emanating therefrom. The party of order commanded immense financial resources, it organized in the whole of France its branches, it had all the ideologists of the old society on its payroll, it disposed of the influence of the prevailing governmental power, it possessed an army of unpaid vassals in the great mass of petty bourgeoisie and peasants, who, standing as yet aloof from the revolutionary movement, saw in the grand dignitaries of property the defenders of their small property and of their petty prejudices. Represented throughout rural France by an immense number of diminutive kings, the party of order could punish the rejection of its candidates as an insurrection, discharge the rebellious workers, the reluctant agricultural laborers, servants, clerks, railway officials, copyists—all the functionaries subordinated to its bourgeois rule. Finally, it could here and there maintain the fiction that the republican Constituent Assembly had prevented the Bonaparte of the 10th of December from a revelation of his miraculous powers. We have not, in considering the party of order, thought of the Bonapartists. These formed no serious faction of the bourgeois class, but rather an assortment of old, superstitious, disabled veterans and of young, unbelieving knights of fortune.—The party of order won the election; it sent the great majority to the Legislative Assembly.

As against the coalesced counter-revolutionary bourgeois class, the already revolutionized portions of the petty bourgeoisie and of the peasants necessarily had to attach themselves to the grand dignitary of revolutionary interests, the revolutionary proletariat. We have seen how the democratic spokesmen of the petty bourgeoisie in the Parliament, that is, the Montagne, by the parliamentary defeats that it suffered, was driven toward the Socialist spokesmen of the proletariat; and how the real petty bourgeoisie, outside of Parliament, through the concordats à l'amiable, through the brutal assertion of bourgeois interests, and through its own bankruptcy was driven toward the real proletarians. On January 27, the Montagne and the Socialists had celebrated their reconciliation; at the great February banquet, in 1849, they repeated their act of union. The social and the democratic, the party of the workers and that of the petty bourgeoisie, united as the Social Democratic, that is, as the Red party.

Lamed for a moment by the agony that had followed the days of June, the French republic, ever since the raising of the state of siege, on October 14, had experienced a running series of feverish excitements. First the struggle for the presidency; then the conflict between the President and the Constituent Assembly; the struggle about the clubs; the trial at Bourges, which, as compared with the puny statures of the President, the coalesced royalists, the virtuous republicans, the democratic Montagne, the Socialist doctrinaires of the proletariat, made the real revolutionists of the latter look like antediluvian monsters, such as only a deluge could leave behind on the social surface, or such as would only precede a social deluge; the election agitation; the execution of the Bréa murderers; the continuous prosecutions of the press; the forcible police interferences of the government with the banquets; the insolent royalist provocations; the exhibition in the pillory of the portraits of Louis Blanc and Caussidière; the incessant struggle between the constituted republic and the Constituent Assembly, which might at any moment force the revolution back to its point of inception, which might at any moment turn victor into vanquished and vanquished into victor, and in a trice turn upside down the position of parties and classes, their divisions and their ties; the rapid course of the European counter-revolution, the glorious Hungarian fight; the German armed risings; the Roman expedition; the disgraceful defeat of the French army before Rome—in this whirl of movement, this pain of historic unrest, this dramatic high and low tide of revolutionary passions, hopes and disappointments, the different classes of French society had to reckon their epochs of development by weeks, as, formerly, they had reckoned them by half-centuries. A considerable portion of the peasants and of the provinces had been revolutionized. Not only that they were disappointed about Napoleon, but the Red party offered them in place of the name

a content, in place of the illusory freedom from taxation the repayment of the milliard paid to Legitimists, the regulation of mortgages and the abolition of usury.

The army itself had become infected by the revolutionary fever. In voting for Bonaparte it had voted for victory, and he had given it defeat. It had in him voted for the "little corporal," behind whom is concealed the great revolutionary captain, and he gave back to it the great generals behind whom is hidden the pipe-clay drill sergeant. No doubt that the Red party, that is, the coalesced democratic party would gain, if not the victory, at least great triumphs; that Paris, the army and a great part of the provinces would vote for it. Ledru-Rollin, chief of the Montagne, was elected in five departements; no chief of the party of order gained such a victory, and no candidate of the real proletarian party. This election reveals the secret of the Democratic-Socialist party. If the Montagne, the parliamentary champion of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, was forced, on the one hand, to unite with the Socialist doctrinaires of the proletariat—the proletariat, compelled by the terrible material defeat of June again to raise itself through intellectual victories, not yet able, because of the backward development of the other classes, to seize the revolutionary dictatorship, perforce had to throw itself into the arms of the doctrinaires of its emancipation, the Socialist founders of sects—then, on the other hand, there stood behind the Montagne the revolutionary peasants, the army, the provinces, and thus it became the commander in the revolutionary camp after its agreement with the Socialists had removed every contraposition within the revolutionary party. During the latter half of the life of the Constituent Assembly, the Montagne represented its republican pathos; its sins, during the Provisional Government, the Executive Commission and the June days, it had allowed to sink into oblivion. In the same measure that the party of the National, in keeping with its hybrid character, permitted itself to be held down by the royalist Ministry, the party of the "Mountain," eliminated during the days of dominance of the National, rose up and asserted itself as the parliamentary representative of the revolution. Indeed, the party of the National, as against the other royalist factions, had no objections to offer but those of ambitious persons and idealistic pretensions. The party of the "Mountain," however, represented a mass suspended between bourgeoisie and proletariat, whose material interests demanded democratic institutions. As compared with the Cavaignacs and the Marrasts, Ledru-Rollin and the Montagne stood for the verity of the revolution, and from the consciousness of so weighty a situation they derived all the greater courage, the more the expression of revolutionary energy was confined to parliamentary sallies, the deposition of impeachment charges, threats, increase of votes, thundering speeches and extremes which were driven only up to the phrase. The peasants found themselves in about

the same position as the petty bourgeoisie, and they made about the same social demands. All the middle layers of society, in so far as they had been driven into the revolutionary movement, had to find their hero in Ledru-Rollin. Ledru-Rollin was THE personage of the democratic petty bourgeoisie. As against the party of order, these half conservative, half revolutionary and wholly utopian reformers of that same order had first to be forced to the front.

The party of the National, “the friends of the constitution quand même” [even so], the républicains purs et simples [republicans pure and simple], was thoroughly beaten in the elections. A tiny minority of the same was sent to the Legislative Chamber, their most notorious chiefs vanished from the stage; even Marrast, the editor in chief and Orpheus of the virtuous republic.

On May 29, the Legislative Assembly convened; on June 11 was renewed the collision of May 8. Ledru-Rollin, in the name of the Montagne, deposited a demand for impeachment against the President and the Ministry for violation of the constitution and the bombardment of Rome. On June 12, the Legislative Assembly rejected the demand for impeachment, just as the Constituent Assembly had rejected it on May 11, but this time the proletariat drove the Montagne out on the street, not for battle but only for a street procession. To say that the Montagne stood at the head of this movement is sufficient to know that it met with defeat and that June 1849 was as ridiculous a caricature of June 1848 as it was vile. The great retreat of June 13 was obscured only by the still greater battle report of Changarnier, the great man whom the party of order had improvised. Every social epoch needs its great men, and if it does not find them, then, as Helvetius says, it invents them.

On December 20, there existed only one-half of the constituted bourgeois republic, the President; on May 29 it was completed by the other half, the Legislative Assembly. In June 1848, the constituting bourgeois republic, by an unspeakable battle against the proletariat, and in June 1849, the constituted bourgeois republic, by an unnameable comedy with the petty bourgeoisie, had engraved themselves upon the natal register of history. June 1849 was the Nemesis for June 1848. In June 1849, not the workers were defeated, but the petty bourgeoisie was felled, who stood between them and the revolution. June 1849 was not the bloody tragedy between wage labor and capital, but the prison-filled, lamentable spectacle between creditor and debtor. The party of order had been victorious. It was omnipotent. It must now show what it was.

III. From June13,1849,to March10,1850

On December 20, the Janus head of the constitutional republic had shown but one face, the executive face, with the confused, flat features of Louis Bonaparte; on May 20, 1849, it showed its second face, the legislative one, sown all over with the scars the orgies of the restoration and the July monarchy had left behind. With the advent of the Legislative National Assembly, the phenomenon of the constitutional republic had been completed, that is, the republican form of State wherein the rule of the bourgeois class is constituted, therefore, the joint rule of the two great royalist factions which form the French bourgeoisie, the coalesced Legitimists and Orleanists—the party of order. While thus the French republic, like a piece of property, fell to the coalition of the royalist parties, the European coalition of the counter-revolutionary powers undertook at the same time a general crusade against the last places of refuge of the March revolutions. Russia invaded Hungary, Prussia marched against the army of constitutional Germany and Oudinot bombarded Rome. The European crisis obviously was developing toward a decisive turning point, the eyes of all Europe were centered upon Paris and the eyes of all Paris upon the Legislative Assembly.

On June 11, Ledru-Rollin mounted the tribune. He made no speech, he formulated a requisitorium against the Ministers, naked, without display, actual, concentrated, violent.

The attack upon Rome is an attack upon the constitution, the attack upon the Roman republic an attack upon the French republic. Article V of the constitution reads: “The French republic never employs its armed forces against the freedom of any one people”—and the President employed the French army against Roman freedom. Article IV of the constitution forbids the executive power to declare any kind of war without the consent of the National Assembly. An act of the Constituent Assembly, of May 8, expressly ordered the Ministry to bring the Roman expedition back to its original aim, and, therefore, it inhibited just as expressly the war against Rome—and Oudinot bombarded Rome. Thus did Ledru-Rollin call upon the constitution itself as a witness for the prosecution and against Bonaparte and his Ministers. At the royalist majority of the National Assembly he, the tribune of the people, hurled the threatening declaration: “The republicans will know how to compel respect for the constitution by all and any means, if need be by force of arms!” “By force of arms!” repeated the hundredfold echo of the Montagne. The majority answered with a terrible tumult, the President of the National Assembly called Ledru-Rollin to order, the latter repeated his

provocative declaration and, finally, deposited upon the President's table the resolution calling for the impeachment of Bonaparte and his Ministers. The National Assembly, by a vote of 361 against 203, decided to proceed from the bombardment of Rome to the order of business.

Did Ledru-Rollin believe that he could beat the National Assembly by means of the constitution, and by means of the National Assembly beat the President?

The constitution, indeed, does prohibit every attack upon the freedom of foreign peoples, but what the French army attacked at Rome was, according to the Ministry, not "freedom," but the "despotism of anarchy." Had not the Montagne, despite all experience in the Constituent Assembly, perceived that the interpretation of the constitution does not fall to those who made it, but rather to those who accepted it? That its text must be elucidated in its vital sense, and that the bourgeois sense is its only vital sense? That Bonaparte and the royalist majority in the National Assembly were the only authentic interpreters of the constitution, just as the priest is the authentic interpreter of the Bible, and the judge the authentic interpreter of the law? Should the National Assembly, just fresh from the lap of a general election, feel itself bound by the testamentary dispositions of the dead Constituent Assembly whose living will had been broken by an Odilon Barrot? While Ledru-Rollin took his stand upon the action of the Constituent Assembly of May 8, he had forgotten that the same Constituent Assembly had rejected his first resolution aiming at the impeachment of Bonaparte and his Ministers, that the body had exonerated the President and his Ministers, that it had thus sanctioned the attack upon Rome as "constitutional," and that now he only appealed from a judgment already rendered, and that, finally, his appeal was one from the republican Constituent Assembly to the royalist Legislative Assembly. The constitution itself calls insurrection to its aid in that, in a special article, it calls upon every citizen for its protection. Ledru-Rollin banked on this article. But are not the public powers simultaneously organized for the protection of the constitution, and does not the violation of the constitution begin the moment one of the public constitutional powers rebels against the other? And the President of the republic, the Ministers of the republic, the National Assembly of the Republic, all these found themselves in the most harmonious accord.

What the Montagne tried to do on June 11, was "an insurrection within the boundaries of pure reason," that is, a purely parliamentary insurrection. The majority of the Assembly, intimidated by the prospect of an armed uprising of the popular mass, was to break in Bonaparte and his Ministers its own power and the import of its own election. Had not the Constituent Assembly, in like manner,

attempted to cashier the election of Bonaparte when it insisted so stubbornly upon the dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux Ministry?

Neither were there lacking, from the time of the Convention, instances of parliamentary insurrections which had suddenly and from the bottom upward transformed the relation between majority and minority—and should not the young Montagne succeed where the old one had been successful?—nor did the conditions of the moment appear unfavorable for such an undertaking. Popular excitement in Paris had reached a critically high point; the army, judging by the way it had cast its vote during the election, did not seem to favor the government; the legislative majority itself was yet too young to have been consolidated, and, moreover, it was composed of old men. If the Montagne should succeed in a parliamentary insurrection, the helm of the State would immediately fall into its hands. The democratic petty bourgeoisie, on its part and as always, desired nothing more ardently than to see the struggle between the departed spirits of the Parliament fought to a finish above its head and up in the clouds. Finally, both the democratic petty bourgeoisie and its representative, the Montagne, would have attained their great purpose of breaking the power of the bourgeoisie without unfettering Parliament, or to make it appear other than in perspective; the proletariat would have been utilized without becoming dangerous.

After the vote of the National Assembly of June 13, a conference took place between some members of the Montagne and delegates of secret workers' organizations. The latter insisted upon militant action on that self-same evening. The Montagne decisively rejected this plan. At no price did it want to surrender leadership; its allies were as suspicious of it as its foes; rightly so. The recollection of June, 1848, pervaded the ranks of the Paris proletariat more vividly than ever. Nevertheless, it was bound by the alliance with the Montagne. The latter represented the greater part of the departements, exaggerated its influence with the army, controlled the democratic part of the National Guard and had behind it the moral influence of the boutique. To begin the insurrection at this moment and against its will, meant for the proletariat, already decimated by cholera and driven out of Paris in great numbers by lack of employment, uselessly to repeat the June days of 1848, without the situation that had then precipitated the desperate struggle. The proletarian delegates did the only rational thing. They obligated the Montagne to compromise itself, i.e., to come out from the boundaries of the parliamentary struggle in the event that its impeachment proceeding be rejected. During the whole of June 13 the proletariat maintained the same sceptically observant position, awaiting a serious engagement, an irrevocable hand-to-hand fight between the democratic National Guard and the army, in order then to enter the

struggle and to push the revolution beyond the petty bourgeois purpose. In the event of victory, the proletarian Commune had already been formed that was to take its place beside the official government. The Paris workers had learned something in the bloody school of June 1848.

On June 12, the Minister Lacrosse himself made the motion at once to proceed to the discussion of the impeachment resolution. During the night the government had made all preparations for defense and attack; the majority in the National Assembly was determined to drive the rebellious majority out upon the streets; the minority itself could no longer back out; the die had been cast; 377 votes against 8 rejected the impeachment resolution, and the "Mountain," which had refrained from voting, descended thunderingly to the propaganda halls of the "peaceful democracy," the newspaper offices of the Démocratic pacifique.

The removal from the Parliament building broke its power, just as the loss of contact with the earth broke the strength of Antaeus, its giant son. A Samson at the sessions of the Legislative Assembly, it was only a Philistine in the abodes of the "peaceful democracy." A long, vociferous, yet infirm debate ensued. The Montagne was determined to enforce respect for the constitution with all means "except by force of arms." In this determination it was supported by a manifesto and by a deputation of the "friends of the constitution." "Friends of the constitution"—thus did the remnants of the coterie of the National, the bourgeois republican party, designate themselves. While of their remaining parliamentary representatives six had voted against, and all the others for the rejection of the resolution of impeachment, while Cavaignac had placed his sabre at the disposition of the party of order, the larger part of the coterie outside of Parliament eagerly seized upon the occasion to come out from its political parish position and to filter into the ranks of the democratic party. Did not they appear as the natural shield-holders of a party which itself was hidden under its shield, under its principle, under the constitution?

Until the break of day the "Mountain" labored. It gave birth to "a proclamation to the people" which, on the morning of June 13, found a more or less bashful place in two socialistic journals. It declared the President, the Ministers and the majority of the Legislative Assembly "outside of the constitution" (hors la constitution) and called upon the National Guard, the army and also the people "to rise." "Long live the constitution!"—was the watchword it gave out, a watchword that meant naught else but "Down with the revolution!"

In keeping with this constitutional proclamation of the Mountain was a so-called friendly demonstration of the petty bourgeoisie on June 13, i.e., a street procession

from the Chateâu d'Eau through the boulevards, 30,000 in line, mostly National Guards—men, intermingled with members of the secret workers' sections, moving along with the cry: "Long live the constitution!" uttered mechanically, icily, and with a bad conscience by the participants in the procession, ironically cast back by the echo of the people that lined the sidewalks, instead of swelling up thunderously. The many-voiced song lacked the resonant chest-notes. And as the procession swayed past the building where the "friends of the constitution" were in session, and a hired herald of the constitution appeared at the attic of the house, vigorously sawing the air with his claqueur hat, and letting free out of his lusty lungs the watchword "Long live the constitution!" as thick as hail upon the heads of the pilgrims, these themselves seemed for the moment overcome with the comedy of the situation. It is known how the procession, arrived at the mouth ot the rue de la Paix, was received at the boulevards by the dragoons and chasseurs of Changarnier in a thoroughly unparliamentary manner, was scattered in a trice on all sides and only threw behind it the sparse call "to arms" so that the parliamentary call to arms of June 11 would be vindicated.

The bulk of the Montagne, gathered at the rue du Hazard, dispersed when this violent breaking up of the peaceful procession, vague rumors of the murder of unarmed citizens at the boulevards, and the growing street tumult, seemed to herald the coming of a riot. Ledru-Rollin, at the head of a small number of deputies, saved the honor of the Mountain. Under the protection of the Paris artillery, which had gathered at the Palais National, they proceeded to the Conservatoire des arts et métiers, where the fifth and sixth legions of the National Guard were to have assembled. But the Montagnards waited in vain for the fifth and sixth legions; these cautious National Guardsmen left their representatives in the lurch, the Paris artillery itself prevented the people from erecting barricades, a chaotic confusion made any decision impossible, the troops of the line advanced with bayonets fixed, a part of the representatives was arrested, the other part escaped. Thus ended the 13th of June.

If June 23, 1848, stands for the insurrection of the proletariat, June 13, 1849, stands for the insurrection of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, and each of the two insurrections is the classically pure expression of the class that carried it.

Only at Lyon things came to a stubborn, bloody conflict. Here, where the industrial bourgeoisie and the industrial proletariat meet directly face to face, where the labor movement, unlike that of Paris, is not confined and determined by the general movement, the 13th of June, in its recoil, lost its original character. Wherever else in the provinces it struck, it did not catch fire—like cold lightning.

The 13th of June terminates the first life period of the constitutional republic which, on May 29, 1849, had attained its normal existence. The entire duration of this prologue is filled with the noisy struggle between the party of order and the Montagne, between the upper bourgeoisie and the lower bourgeoisie, which latter vainly strove against the fixation of the bourgeois republic in favor of which it had uninterruptedly conspired in the Provisional Government and in the Executive Commission, and in behalf of which it had fanatically battled against the proletariat. The 13th of June breaks its resistance and makes the legislative dictatorship of the united royalists an accomplished fact. From this moment onward, the National Assembly is but a Committee of Safety for the party of order.

Paris had put the President, the Ministers and the majority of the National Assembly in a “state of impeachment”; the latter put Paris in a “state of siege.” The Montagne had declared the majority of the Legislative Assembly as “outside of the constitution,” and for violation of the constitution the said majority handed over the majority of the Montagne to the High Court and proscribed everything in it that still had a Spark of vitality. It was reduced to a headless and heartless trunk. The minority had gone as far as an attempt at a parliamentary insurrection; the majority elevated its parliamentary despotism into law. It decreed a new order of business which destroyed the freedom of the tribune and authorized the President of the National Assembly to punish the representatives for a breach of order with censure, with monetary fines, with deprivation of indemnity moneys, with temporary expulsion and with incarceration. Over the trunk of the Montagne, instead of the sword, it hung the rod. The balance of the deputies of the Montagne should, in honor, have resigned en masse. By such an act the dissolution of the party of order would have been accelerated. It would have to fall apart into its original elements, the moment when not even the semblance of an opposition would hold it together.

Simultaneously with their parliamentary power, the democratic petty bourgeoisie were deprived of their armed forces by the dissolution of the Paris artillery, as well as of the eighth, the ninth and the twelfth legions of the National Guard. The legion of high finance, however, which on June 13 had raided the printing plants of Boulé and Roux, had smashed the presses and had devastated the bureaus of the republican journals, arbitrarily arresting editors, compositors, mailers and errand boys, received from the tribune of the National Assembly encouraging commendation. The dissolution of the National Guard suspected of republican tendencies was repeated throughout the entire confines of France.

A new law governing the press, another to regulate associations, a new law to define the state of siege, the prisons of Paris overcrowded, the political exiles

scattered, all journals that went beyond the boundaries of the National suspended, Lyon and the five adjoining departements abandoned to the brutal chicanery of military despotism, the “parquets” [office of public prosecutor] omnipresent, the army of officials, so often cleansed and now once more purified—these were the inevitable and ever recurring commonplaces of the victorious reaction, and, after the massacres and deportations of June 1848, worthy of mention only because this time they were directed not only against Paris, but also against the departements, not only against the proletariat, but, first of all, against the middle classes.

The laws of repression, whereby the imposition of a state of siege was made optional with the government, the press gagged and the right of association destroyed, absorbed the entire legislative activity of the National Assembly during the months of June, July and August.

But for all that, this epoch is characterized, not by the actual but by the theoretical exploitation of the victory, not by the enactments of the National Assembly but by the motivation of these enactments, not by the matter itself but by the phrase, not by the phrase but by the accent and by the gestures which enliven the phrase. The recklessly insolent expression of royalist sentiments, the contemptuously haughty insults of the republic, the coquettishly frivolous chatter about the purpose of restoration, in one word, the boisterous breaches of republican decorum give to this period a peculiar tone and color. “Long live the constitution!”—that was the battle cry of the vanquished of June 13. The victors were therefore released of the hypocrisy of holding constitutional, that is, republican language. The counter-revolution subjected Hungary, Italy, Germany, and the restoration was already believed to be at the gates of France. Among the fuglemen of the factions of order a veritable competition ensued to document their royalism in the Moniteur, to confess their liberal sins, if any, under the republic, to repent the same and to be absolved of them before God and man. Not a day passed but what the February revolution, from the tribune of the National Assembly, was pronounced a public calamity; or that some provincial clod-hopping Junker solemnly declared never to have recognized the republic; or that one of the cowardly deserters and betrayers of the July monarchy told of intended deeds of heroism, the consummation of which had only been prevented by the philanthropy of Louis Philippe or some other misunderstanding. What was to be admired of the February days was not the magnanimity of the people in victory, but the self-immolation and moderation of the royalists, who had permitted the people to win. One representative proposed that a part of the moneys intended for the support of the wounded of February be turned over to the Municipal Guards, who alone in those days had served the fatherland well. Another wanted an equestrian statue of the Duke of Orleans to be

erected on the caroussel place. Thiers designated the constitution a dirty piece of paper. One after another, there appeared upon the tribune Orleanists who regretted their conspiracy against the legitimate kingdom, Legitimists who accused themselves of having hastened the fall of royalty as such by their opposition to the illegitimate kingdom, Thiers who regretted having intrigued against Molé, Molé who regretted having intrigued against Guizot, and Barrot who repented of having done the same thing against all three. The cry: "Long live the social-democratic republic!" was declared unconstitutional; the cry: "Long live the republic!" was prosecuted for being social-democratic. On the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo a representative declared: "I fear less the invasion of the Prussians, than the influx of the revolutionary exiles into France." To complaints about the terror, organized in Lyon and the adjoining departements, Baraguay d'Hilliers answered: "I prefer the pale terror to the red terror." And the Assembly frantically applauded each time an epigram against the republic, against the revolution, against the constitution, for the kingdom, and for the Holy Alliance, fell from the lips of its speakers. Every omission of the smallest republican formalities, such as the salutation of the representatives with "Citoyen," enthused the knights of order.

The Paris supplementary elections (held under the state of siege and with the abstention of a large part of the proletariat from the ballot box), the taking of Rome by the French army, the entrance of the red "Eminences" and in their train the inquisition and the monkish terror in Rome, all this added new victories to the victory of June and augmented the intoxication of the party of order.

Finally, toward the middle of August, partly because they wanted to attend the departmental councils just convened, partly because fatigued by the veritable debauch of many months' indulgence in their political tendencies, the royalists decreed a two-months' adjournment of the National Assembly. With transparent irony they left behind, as the proxy of the National Assembly and guardian of the republic, a commission of twenty-five representatives, the cream of the Legitimists and Orleanists with a Molé and a Changarnier. The irony was deeper than they anticipated. They, condemned by history to help destroy the kingdom which they loved, were destined by history to conserve the republic which they hated.

With the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly closes the second life period of the constitutional republic, its period of royalist insolence.

The state of siege in Paris had again been raised, the action of the press had again begun. During the suspension of the social-democratic papers, the period of repressive legislation and of royalist blustering, the Siècle, the old literary representative of the monarchist-constitutional petty bourgeoisie, republicanized

itself, the Presse, the old literary expression of the bourgeois reformers, turned democratic, and the National, the old classic organ of the republican bourgeois, socialized itself.

The secret societies grew in extent and intensity in the measure that public clubs became impossible. The industrial workers' associations, tolerated as purely commercial companies, economic ciphers, suddenly became politically so many means of binding the proletariat together. The 13th of June had struck off the official heads of the different half-revolutionary parties and the remaining masses gained their own head. The knights of order had intimidated by means of the predicted terror of the red republic, but the base excesses, the hyperborean atrocities of the triumphant counter-revolution in Hungary, in Baden, in Rome, washed the "Red Republic" white. And the malcontented middle classes of French society began to prefer the promises of the red republic with its problematical terror to the terror of the red monarchy with its actual hopelessness. No Socialist made in France more revolutionary propaganda than Haynau. A chaque capacité selon ses oeuvres! [To each according to his deeds.]

Meanwhile, Louis Napoleon took advantage of the vacation of the National Assembly to make princely journeys to the provinces, the most hot-blooded Legitimists made pilgrimages to Ems to the grandson of St. Louis, and the mass of the pro-order representatives of the people intrigued in the departmental councils which had just been convened. It was a case of making them express that which the majority of the National Assembly did not yet dare to express—a resolution of urgency for the immediate revision of the constitution. According to the constitution, that instrument could be revised only in 1852 by a National Assembly called for that specific purpose. But if the majority of the departmental councils did express themselves in this sense, must not then the National Assembly sacrifice the virginity of the constitution to the voice of France? The National Assembly entertained in regard to these provincial gatherings the same hopes which the nuns in Voltaire's "Henriade" entertained of the Pandoors. But the Potiphars of the National Assembly, barring a few exceptions, had to deal with as many Josephs in the provinces. The overwhelming majority did not want to understand the importunate insinuation. The revision of the constitution was frustrated by the very tools that were to have brought it to life through the vote-taking in the departmental councils. The voice of France, that is of bourgeois France, had spoken, and it had spoken against revision.

At the beginning of October the Legislative National Assembly was reconvened, but tantum mutatus ab illo—its physiognomy had been thoroughly changed. The

unexpected rejection of revision on the part of the departmental councils had forced the Assembly back within the boundaries of the constitution and had pointed out to it the limits of its term of life. The Orleanists had become distrustful because of the pilgrimages of the Legitimists to Ems, the Legitimists, on the other hand, had become suspicious because of the negotiations of the Orleanists with London, the journals of both factions had added fuel to the fire and had weighed the respective claims of their respective pretenders. Orleanists and Legitimists jointly grumbled about the intrigues of the Bonapartists, brought to the fore by the princely journeys of the President, by his more or less transparent attempts at emancipation and by the arrogant language of the Bonapartist press; Louis Napoleon grumbled about the National Assembly which considered proper only the Orleanist-Legitimist conspiracy, and about a Ministry which constantly betrayed him to the National Assembly. The Ministry, finally, was split within itself about the Roman policy and about the income tax, proposed by Minister Passy and denounced as socialistic by the conservatives.

One of the first measures, submitted by the Barrot Ministry to the reconvened Legislative Assembly, was a credit demand in the amount of 300,000 francs for the payment of the widow's allowance of the Duchess of Orleans. The National Assembly granted this and added to the debt register of the French nation the sum of seven million francs. While thus Louis Philippe continued to play with success the role of the pauvre honteux—of the abashed beggar—the Ministry dared not to propose an increase of salary for Bonaparte, nor did the Assembly seem inclined to grant it. And Louis Napoleon, just as ever, swayed in the dilemma: Aut Caesar aut Clichy! [either Caesar or Clichy!]

The second credit demand of the Ministry in the amount of nine million francs for the expenses of the Roman expedition, increased the tension between Bonaparte and the Ministry, on the one hand, and between the Ministry and the National Assembly on the other. Louis Napoleon had published in the Moniteur a letter addressed to his orderly officer, Edgar Ney, wherein he sought to bind the Papal Government to constitutional guarantees. The Pope, on his part, had issued an address "motu proprio" [of his own free will], wherein he rejected every restriction of his restored rule. The letter of Bonaparte, with intentional indiscretion, lifted the curtain of his Cabinet in order to expose himself to the gaze of the gallery as a well-meaning but misunderstood and hampered genius. He did not for the first time coquet with the "furtive wing-beats of a free soul." Thiers, the reporter of the commission, completely ignored Bonaparte's wing flutterings and confined himself to translating the Papal allocution into French. Not the Ministry, but Victor Hugo endeavored to save the President by means of a point of order wherein the

National Assembly was to have expressed its consent to the letter of Napoleon. Allons donc! Allons donc! [Let us go, then! Let us go!] With this irreverently flippant interjection did the majority bury the motion of Hugo. The policy of the President? The letter of the President? The President himself ? Allons donc! Allons donc! Who the devil takes Monsieur Bonaparte au serieux? Do you, Monsieur Victor Hugo, believe that we believe you, that you believe in the President? Allons donc! Allons donc!

Finally the breach between Bonaparte and the National Assembly was accelerated by the discussion over the recall of the Orleanists and Bourbons. The Ministry failing to do so, the cousin of the President, son of the ex-king of Westphalia, had made this motion, which had no purpose other than to force the Legitimist and Orleanist pretenders down to or rather below the level of the Bonapartist pretender, who, at least in point of fact, stood at the head of the State.

Napoleon Bonaparte was irreverent enough to link together, in one and the same motion, the recall of the exiled royal families and the amnesty of the June insurgents. The indignation of the majority at once forced him to apologize for this nefarious interlinking of the holy and the heinous, of the kingly races and the proletarian brood, of the fixed stars of society and its jack o' lanterns, and to assign to each of the two motions its proper rank. It rejected energetically the recall of the royal families, and Berryer, the Demosthenes of the Legitimists, left no manner of doubt as to the significance of this vote. The bourgeois degradation of the pretenders, that is what is aimed at! It is intended to rob them of their halos, of the last remnant of majesty left to them, the majesty of exile! "What," exclaimed Berryer, "would one think of any one of the pretenders who, forgetting about his illustrious origin, would come here to live as a simple private citizen?" More plainly Louis Bonaparte could not have been told that he had gained nothing by his presence, and that, if the coalesced royalists needed him here in France as a neutral figure in the presidential chair, the real and serious pretenders to the crown must continue to be removed from the gaze of profane eyes in a nebulous exile.

On November 1, Louis Bonaparte answered the Legislative Assembly in a message which, in rather curt language, announced the dismissal of the Barrot Ministry and the formation of another. The Barrot-Falloux Ministry was the Ministry of the royalist coalition, the d'Hautpoul Ministry was the Ministry of Bonaparte as against the Legislative Assembly, the Ministry of the commis [clerks].

Bonaparte was no longer the mere neutral man of December 10, 1848. The possession of executive powers had grouped around him a number of interests, the struggle against anarchy forced the party of order itself to add to his influence, and

if he no longer was popular, the party itself was unpopular. And could he not hope to force the Orleanists and Legitimists, through their rivalry, as well as through the necessity of some kind of monarchist restoration, to a recognition of the neutral pretender?

From November 1, 1849, is dated the third life period of the constitutional republic, the period that closes on March 10, 1850. Now only begins the regulation play of the constitutional institutions, which Guizot so very much admired—the quarrel between the executive and the legislative authority. As against the restorational desires of the united Orleanists and Legitimists, Bonaparte represents the title of his de facto power, the republic; as against the restorational desires of Bonaparte, the party of order represents the title of its joint rule, the republic; as against the Orleanists, the Legitimists, and as against the Legitimists, the Orleanists, represent the status quo, the republic. All these factions of the party of order, each one of which has in reserve its own king and its own restoration, mutually assert, as against the usurpational and restorational desires of their rivals, the joint rule of the bourgeoisie, the form within which all the special claims are neutralized and deferred—the republic.

Just as Kant makes the republic, as the only rational form of State, a postulate of practical reason, the realization of which is never attained but the attainment of which must ever be striven for and held fast in purpose and in aim, so these royalists regard the kingdom.

And thus the constitutional republic, emanating from the hands of the bourgeois republicans as a hollow ideological formula, became in the hands of the coalesced royalists a substantial vital form. And Thiers spoke more truly than he guessed when he said: “We, the royalists, are the real pillars of the constitutional republic.”

The fall of the Ministry of the coalition, the appearance of the Ministry of the commis, had a second significance. Its Minister of Finance was Fould. Fould, Minister of Finance, that is the official surrender of the French national wealth to the stock exchange, the administration of the State treasury by the stock exchange in the interest of the stock exchange. With the appointment of Fould the financial aristocracy announced ITS restoration in the Moniteur. This restoration necessarily supplemented all the other restorations, which formed so many links in the chain of the constitutional republic.

Louis Philippe never had dared to make a real loup-cervier (stock exchange wolf) Minister of Finance. As his kingdom was but the ideal name for the rule of the upper bourgeoisie, the privileged interests must in his Ministries bear ideologically uninteresting names. The bourgeois republic forced everywhere into the

foreground what the different monarchies, Legitimist and Orleanist, kept hidden in the background. It made earthly what the others had made celestial. In place of the names of saints it put the bourgeois surnames of the ruling class interests.

Our entire presentation has shown how the republic, from the first day of its existence, did not overthrow but consolidated the financial aristocracy. But the concessions that were made to it were made as to a decree of fate, to which one bows without seeking to bring it about. With Fould, governmental initiative fell back to the financial aristocracy.

It may now be asked: How could the coalesced bourgeoisie endure and tolerate the rule of finance which, under Louis Philippe, was predicated upon the exclusion or the subordination of the other bourgeois factions?

The answer is simple. In the first place, the aristocracy of finance itself forms a decisive and weighty part of the royalist coalition whose joint governmental power is called the republic. Are not the spokesmen of the Orleanists the old allies and accomplices of the aristocracy of finance? And, itself, is it not the golden phalanx of Orleanism? As concerns the Legitimists, these had, already under Louis Philippe, practically participated in all the orgies of stock exchange, mine and railway speculations. Generally, the connection between large landed property and high finance is a normal state of affairs. Proof: England; proof: even Austria.

In a country like France, where the volume of national production occupies a relatively subordinate position as compared with the volume of the national debt, where the State rentes form the most important object of speculation, and the stock exchange offers the chief market for the investment of capital seeking to augment itself in unproductive channels, in such a country a numberless mass of people from all the bourgeois and half-bourgeois classes will be interested in the public debt, in stock exchange speculation and in finance generally. All these subaltern participants, do they not on the whole find their natural supports and directors in that faction which, in the most colossal outline, represents these interests?

And the surrender of the State treasury to high finance, upon what is that conditioned? Upon the ever growing indebtedness of the State. And the indebtedness of the State? Upon the constant excess of its expenditures over its income, a discrepancy which at the same time is cause and effect of the State loans.

In order to escape indebtedness, the State must either restrict expenditures, that is, simplify the governmental apparatus, curtailing and governing as little as possible, employing a smaller personnel and as little as possible getting into relationship with bourgeois society. But this way was impossible for the party of order whose

means of repression, whose official interference, and whose omnipresence through State organs had to be increased in the same measure that its rule and the vital conditions of its class were menaced on many sides. One cannot reduce the gendarmerie in the same measure that attacks upon persons and property increase.

Otherwise, the State must seek to circumvent the debts and bring about a momentary but transitory balance in the budget by piling extraordinary taxes upon the shoulders of the wealthiest classes. In order to withdraw the national wealth from the exploitation of the stock exchange, the party of order would have to offer its own riches upon the altar of the fatherland! Pas si bête!—They are not such fools.

Therefore, without a complete transformation of the French State, no transformation of French finances. With such State finances, necessarily State indebtedness, State creditors, bankers, money mongers and stock exchange wolves. Only one faction of the party of order was a direct participant in the overthrow of the aristocracy of finance—the manufacturers. We do not speak of the middle-sized or the smaller industrialists, we speak of the regents of the factory interests who, under Louis Philippe, had formed the broad basis of the dynastic opposition. Their interest, without question, lies in the reduction of production costs, therefore in the reduction of taxes which burden production, also in the reduction of the State indebtedness, the interest on which increases taxes, and, therefore, in the overthrow of the aristocracy of finance.

In England—the biggest French manufacturers are petty bourgeois compared with their British rivals—we really find manufacturers, a Cobden, a Bright, at the head of the crusade against the bank and the stock exchange aristocracy. Why not in France? In England, industry is dominant; in France, agriculture. In England, industry requires free trade, in France it needs protective tariffs, a national monopoly alongside of the other monopolies. French industry does not dominate French production, therefore the French industrialists do not dominate the French bourgeoisie. To enforce their interests against the remaining factions of the bourgeoisie, they cannot, like the British, walk at the head of the movement and at the same time drive their class interest to a point; they must become part of the following of the revolution and serve interests which are often contrary to the common interests of their class. During February they had misunderstood their position, but it was February that sharpened their wits. For who is more directly menaced by the workers than the employer, the industrial capitalist? The manufacturer, in France, necessarily became one of the most fanatical members of

the party of order. The impairment of his profit by high finance, what is that as compared with the elimination of profit by the proletariat?

In France, the petty bourgeois does what, normally, should be done by the industrial bourgeois; the worker does what, normally, should be the task of the petty bourgeois; and the task of the worker, who will solve that? Nobody. It will not be solved in France, it will be proclaimed there. It will nowhere be solved within the national walls, the class war within French society will turn into a world war wherein the nations will face each other. And the solution, it only begins when, through the world war, the proletariat will be driven to head that people which dominates the world market at the head of England. The revolution which does not find its end here, but only its organized beginning, is not a short-winded revolution. The present generation resembles the Jews, led by Moses through the desert. Not only must it conquer a new world, but it must perish in order to make way for the men who are equal to a new world.

But to get back to Fould. On November 14, 1849, Fould mounted the tribune of the National Assembly and explained his system of finance: apology for the old tax system! retention of the wine tax! revocation of the Passy income tax!

Passy, too, was no revolutionary, he was an old Minister of Louis Philippe. He belonged to the Puritans of the force of Dufaure and to the most intimate confidants of Teste, the scapegoat of the July monarchy.* Passy, too, had praised the old system of taxation, had advocated the retention of the wine tax, but he had also torn the veil from the State deficit. He had declared for the need of a new tax, the income tax, unless the bankruptcy of the State were aimed at. Fould, who had recommended to Ledru-Rollin State bankruptcy, recommended to the Legislative Assembly the State deficit. He promised economies, the secret of which was later revealed in that, for instance, expenditures were reduced by sixty millions, while the floating debt had increased by two hundred millions—sleight-of-hand tricks in the grouping of figures, in drawing a statement of accounts, all of which, in the end, tended toward new loans.

Under Fould, the aristocracy of finance, like the other jealous bourgeois faction, did not, of course, proceed in so shamelessly corrupt a manner as was done under Louis Philippe. But, for one thing, the system was the same, constant increase of the public debt, concealment of the deficit. In time, the old stock exchange swindle became more barefaced. Proof: the law about the railroad of Avignon, the mysterious fluctuations of government securities—for a brief moment the talk of all Paris—and, finally, the miscarried speculations of Fould and Bonaparte in the matter of the election of March 10.

*On June 8, 1849 {1847?}, before the Chamber of Peers in Paris, began the trial of Parmentier and General Cubieres, charged with bribery of public officials for the purpose of obtaining a concession for a salt works, and of the then Minister of Public Works, Teste, charged with having received such bribes. The latter, during the trial of the case, made an attempt at suicide. All were sentenced to pay heavy fines, and Teste received also a sentence of imprisonment for three years.—F.E.

With the restoration of the aristocracy of finance, the French people would soon have to arrive again at a “February 24.”

The Constituent Assembly, in a misanthropic fit against its heir, had abolished the wine tax for the year of our Lord, 1850. With the abolition of old taxes new debts could not be paid. Creton, a crétin [idiot] of the party of order, had moved the retention of the wine tax prior to the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly. Fould, in the name of the Bonapartist Ministry, took up this motion and, on December 20, 1849, the first anniversary of the proclamation of Bonaparte, the National Assembly decreed the restoration of the wine tax.

The chief advocate of this restoration was no financier, it was the Jesuit chief Montalembert. His deduction was strikingly simple: The tax, that the maternal bosom from which the government nurses. The government comprises the tools of repression, the organs of authority, the army, the police, the officials, the judges, the Ministers, the priests. An attack upon the tax, that is an attack of the anarchists upon the sentries of order, who protect the material and intellectual production of bourgeois society against the encroachments of the proletarian vandals. The tax, that is the fifth God, in line with property, the family, order and rellgion. And the wine tax unquestionably is a tax, moreover, not a common tax but a time-honored one, a tax of royalist sentiment, a respectable tax. Vive l’impôt des boissons! [Long live the tax on grape-juice.] Three cheers and one cheer more!

The French peasant, whenever he paints the devil on his wall, depicts him in the shape of a tax collector. From the moment that Montalembert raised the tax to the rank of godliness, the peasant became godless, an atheist, and threw himself into the arms of the devil—Socialism. The religion of order had lost him, the Jesuits had lost him, and so had Bonaparte. The 20th of December, 1849, has irreparably compromised the 20th of December, 1848. The “nephew of his uncle” was not the first of his family whom the wine tax vanquished, this tax which, according to Montalembert, scents the revolutionary storm. The real, the great Napoleon, declared at St. Helena that the reintroduction of the wine tax had contributed more to his fall than all else, because it had alienated the peasants of Southern France. Already under Louis XIV, the favorite of popular hatred (see the writings of

Boisguillebert and Vauban), abolished by the first revolution, it had been reestablished by Napoleon in 1808 in a modified form. When the restoration invaded France, there trotted before it not only the Cossacks, but also the promises regarding the abolition of the wine tax. The gentilhommerie did not, of course, have to keep faith with the gent taillable à merci et miséricorde [people without mercy and pity]. 1830 promised the abolition of the wine tax. It was not its way to do what it said and to say what it did. 1848 promised the abolition of the wine tax as it promised everything else. Finally, the Constituent Assembly, which promised nothing, made, as already pointed out, a testamentary disposition, according to which the wine tax was to vanish on January 1, 1850. And just ten days prior to January 1, 1850, the Legislative Assembly re-established it, so that the French people continuously chased that tax, and, having kicked it out of doors, saw it come back through the window.

The popular hatred of the wine tax is to be explained by the fact that it combined within itself all the invidiousness of the French system of taxation. The manner of its collection is malevolent, the manner of its assessment is aristocratic, for the tax rate is the same for the most common as for the most expensive wines, increasing, therefore, in geometric ratio as the capacity of the consumer declines—an inverted progressive tax. It provokes for that reason the direct poisoning of the working people, offering a premium for adulterated and imitation wines. It reduces consumption, in establishing tolls at the gates of all cities above 4,000 inhabitants, thereby transforming every city into a foreign country with a protective tariff against French wine. The big wine dealers, and more yet the little ones, the marchands de vins, the wine taps, whose profits are dependent most directly upon wine consumption, are just so many declared foes of the wine tax. And, finally, in that the wine tax reduces consumption, it cuts the market for wine production. While it renders the city worker incapable of buying the wine, it renders the peasant wine grower incapable of selling it. France contains a wine-growing population of about 12 millions. That makes it easy to understand the hatred of the people in general and, particularly, the fanaticism of the peasants against the wine tax. And, moreover, they saw in the reintroduction of the tax not an isolated, more or less accidental event. The peasants have a way of historic tradition that is all their own, handed down from father to son. In this historic school it is rumored that every government that wants to deceive the peasants will promise the abolition of the wine tax, and, as soon as it has deceived the peasants, will either retain or reintroduce the wine tax. The reintroduction of the wine tax, on December 20, meant: Louis Napoleon is like all the others. But he wasn’t like all the others, he was a peasant invention, and, in petitions against the wine tax, containing millions

of signatures, they took back the votes which only a year ago they had given to the "nephew of his uncle."

The rural population, more than two-thirds of the French total, consists for the most {part} of so-called free owners of the soil. The first generation, freed gratuitously by the revolution of 1789 from feudal imposts, had paid nothing for the land. But the succeeding generations did pay in the shape of land prices what their semi-serf ancestors had paid in the form of rents, tithes, forced labor, etc. The more the population grew, and the more, in consequence, the division of the land increased, all the higher went the price of each parcel, because with the decline of its size, the extent of the demand for it was augmented. In the measure, however, that the price which the peasant paid for his parcel rose, either if he bought it directly or it was charged to him as capital by his co-heirs, in that same measure rose, necessarily, the indebtedness of the peasant, the mortgage. The title of debt attached to the soil, the mortgage, is the pawn ticket for the property. As privileges accumulated upon the medieval property in realty, so do the mortgages upon the modern peasant's parcel. On the other hand, in the regime of parceling, the soil is purely an instrument of production to its owner. In the same measure that the land is divided does its fertility decline. The application of machinery in agriculture, the division of labor, the great means of improving the soil, such as drainage and irrigation, etc., become ever more impossible, while the overhead costs of cultivation grow in the same measure as the division of the instrument of production proceeds. All this aside from the fact whether the owner of the parcel possesses capital or not. But the more division increases, the more the property with its most wretched inventory constitutes the sole capital of the parcel-owning peasant, the more the investment of capital in realty property declines, the more the cottager lacks land, money, knowledge, in order to apply the progress of husbandry—all the more will soil cultivation become retrogressive. Finally the net yield will decline in the same measure that the gross consumption grows, as the entire family of the peasant is prevented by that very property from taking up other employments, and yet is not able to live upon it.

In the same measure, therefore, that the population grows, and with it the division of the land, in that same measure will the instrument of production, the earth, become dearer while its fertility declines, and in that same measure agriculture declines and the peasant runs into debt. What once was effect, now becomes cause. Each generation leaves the succeeding one in greater debt, each new generation begins under more unfavorable and more difficult conditions, hypothecation generates hypothecation, and when it becomes impossible for the peasant to find in his parcel a pledge for new loans, i.e., to burden it with a new mortgage, then will

he fall victim to the usurer and all the more enormous will be the usurer's rate of interest.

And so it came about that the French peasant, in the form of interest on mortgages attached to the soil, in the form of interest on unsecured loans of usury, yielded to the capitalist, in one word, not only his entire net profit, but also a part of the labor wages, and that he sank down to the level of the Irish tenant—all this on the pretext of being the owner of private property.

This process was accelerated in France by the ever growing burden of taxation and by the cost of litigation, caused partly by the formalities with which French legislation surrounds property in realty, and partly by the numberless conflicts growing out of the many boundaries of the everywhere crisscrossing parcels, and again by the litigiousness of the peasants themselves, whose enjoyment of property was confined to the fanatic assertion of the rights in their imaginary property.

According to a statistical compilation of 1840, the gross product of French soil amounted to 5,237,178,000 francs. Of this sum 3,552,000,000 must be deducted for labor costs, including the consumption of those who did the work. This leaves a net product of 1,685,178,000 francs from which must be deducted 550 millions for interest on mortgages, 100 millions for judicial officers, 350 millions for taxes and 107 millions for records, stamp and mortgage fees, etc. There remains but one-third of the net product, 338 millions, which, distributed per capita among the population, amounts to not quite 25 francs. In this calculation no account has been taken of the cost of usury nor of the expenses for lawyers, etc.

It will be perceived what the condition of the French peasant was when the republic added new burdens to the ones they already carried. It will be seen that their exploitation differs from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat only in point of form. The exploiter is the same: Capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury, and the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through State taxation. The title deed of the peasant is the talisman whereby capital hitherto held him enthralled, the pretext under which it incensed him against the industrial proletariat. Only the fall of capital will enable the peasant to rise, only an anti-capitalist, proletarian government will break his economic misery and social degradation. The constitutional republic, that is the dictatorship of his united exploiters; the social democratic, the red republic, that is the dictatorship of his allies. And the beam of the scale rises or falls, according to the votes which the peasant deposits in the ballot box. It is he himself who must determine his fate. Thus spoke the Socialists, in pamphlets, in almanacs, in calendars, in leaflets of all kinds. The language used became intelligible to the

peasant through the language used in the counter-publications of the party of order, which, addressing itself to him in its behalf, by means of gross exaggeration, by the brutal conception and presentation of the purposes and ideas of the Socialists, struck the true peasant tone and over-stimulated his covetousness for the forbidden fruit. But most intelligibly spoke the experience the peasant class had had in using the suffrage, and the disappointments which came to it, blow upon blow, with revolutionary rapidity. Revolutions—they are the locomotives of history.

The gradual transformation of the peasants manifested itself through different symptoms. It had already appeared in the elections to the Legislative Assembly, it showed itself in the state of siege imposed upon the five departements bordering upon Lyon, it showed itself, a few months after June 13, in the election of a Montagnard in place of the former President of the Chambre introuvable in the Departement du Gironde, it showed itself on December 20, 1849, in the election of a red deputy to fill the place of a deceased Legitimist deputy in the Departement du Gard, the promised land of the Legitimists, scene of the most terrible atrocities against the republicans in 1794–95,

Chambre introuvable—so does history designate the fanatically-ultra-royalist and reactionary Chamber of Deputies elected in 1815, immediately after the second deposition of the first Napoleon.

Introuvable—literally, “undiscoverable”—“not to be found.”—Translator. center of the white terror of 1815, when Liberals and Protestants were openly murdered. This revolutionizing of the most stationary class comes to the fore most strikingly after the reintroduction of the wine tax. Governmental measures and laws during January and February 1850 are directed almost exclusively against the departements and the peasants—a striking proof of their progress.

The circular of d’Hautpoul, whereby the gendarme was made the inquisitor of the prefect, of the under-prefect, and, above all, of the mayor, whereby espionage was organized way into the most secret recesses of the most distant villages; the law against the school teachers, whereby they, the spokesmen, the educators and interpreters of the peasant class were subjected to the capricious arbitrariness of the prefects, they, the proletarians of the literate class, were hunted like wild beasts from one community to another; the proposed law against the mayors, whereby deposition, like the sword of Damocles, was hung over their heads, and whereby they, the presidents of the peasant committees, were to be confronted at any moment by the President of the republic and the party of order; the order, whereby the seventeen military divisions of France were changed into four pashalics, and which imposed upon Frenchmen the barracks and the bivouac as the national salon;

the educational law, whereby the party of order proclaimed the insensibility and forcible stultification of France as a vital condition of its existence under the regime of the general suffrage—what were all these laws and measures? Desperate attempts to reconquer the departements and the peasants of the departements for the party of order.

Regarded as means of repression, these were wretched makeshifts that frustrated their own purpose. The big measures, such as the retention of the wine tax, the 45-centime tax, the scornful rejection of the peasant petitions for repayment of the milliard, etc., all these legislative thunderbolts struck the peasant class only once, in full, from the central seat of government; but the aforesaid laws and measures made attack and resistance the talk of the day in every hut, they inoculated the revolution in every village, they localized and "peasantized" the revolution.

On the other hand, did not these measures of Bonaparte, and their acceptance by the National Assembly, prove the concord of the two powers within the constitutional republic, in so far as it was a matter of repressing "anarchy"—that is, of all classes rebelling against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie? Had not Soulange, right after his harsh message, assured the Legislative Assembly of his devotion to order by means of the immediately following message of Carlier, that filthily-common caricature of Fouche, just as Louis Napoleon himself was the flattened-out caricature of the first Napoleon?

The educational law shows us the alliance between the young Catholics and the old Voltairians. Could the rule of the united bourgeoisie be aught else but the coalesced despotism of the pro-Jesuit restoration and the July monarchy pretending to free thought? Must not the weapons distributed among the people by one bourgeois faction against the other, in their struggle for dominance, be wrested again from the people as soon as it stood face to face with their united dictatorship? Nothing has more incensed the Paris boutiquier than this coquettish sell-out to Jesuitism, not even the rejection of the concordat à l'amiable.

Meanwhile the collisions between the different factions of the party of order continued, as they did between the National Assembly and Bonaparte. Little did it please the National Assembly that Bonaparte, right after his coup d'état, after the creation of his own Bonapartist Ministry, summoned before him the invalides [disabled veterans] of the monarchy, now made prefects, and made their anti-constitutional agitation for his reelection as President a condition for holding office; that Carlier celebrated his inauguration with the suppression of a Legitimist club; that Bonaparte founded his own journal, le Napoléon, which revealed to the public the secret desires of the President which his Ministers had to deny upon the

tribune of the Legislative Assembly. And little did the National Assembly relish the defiant retention of the Ministry, disregardful of its several votes of lack of confidence; little did it like the attempt to win the favor of the subaltern army officers by an increase of their daily pay in the amount of four sous, and the favor of the proletariat by means of a plagiarism from the Mysteries of Eugene Sue and by an honorable pawnshop; little, finally, the insolence with which the deportation of the remaining June insurgents to Algier was proposed by the Ministers in order to burden the Legislative Assembly with wholesale unpopularity, while the President reserved for himself popularity in retail by means of isolated acts of pardon. Thiers dropped some threatening words about coups d'état and coups de tète, and the Legislative Assembly revenged itself upon Bonaparte in that it rejected every law that he proposed for himself, and to examine with noisy suspicion every one that he proposed in the general interest in order to see whether the augmentation of the executive power would not profit the personal power of Bonaparte. In one word, it revenged itself through the conspiracy of contempt.

The Legitimist party on its part saw with displeasure how the more capable Orleanists recaptured nearly all the posts and how centralization grew, while they, as a matter of principle, sought their well-being in decentralization. And, really, the counter-revolution did forcibly centralize, that is, it prepared the mechanism of the revolution. By means of a compulsory currency rate of the bank notes, it even centralized the gold and silver in the Bank of Paris, and thus created a ready treasury for the revolution.

The Orleanists, finally, saw with displeasure how the rising principle of Legitimacy was held against their bastard principle and how they themselves were every moment slighted and maltreated like a bourgeois misalliance by a noble husband.

Little by little we saw how peasants, petty bourgeoisie, the middle layers generally, lined up with the proletariat, driven into open opposition against the official republic, and treated by it as opponents. Opposition to the bourgeois dictatorship, desire for a social change, holding fast to democratic-republican institutions as their organs of motion, grouping around the proletariat as the decisive revolutionary power—these are the common characteristics of the so-called party of the social democracy, the party of the red republic. This party of anarchy, as it was designated by its foes, is no less a coalition of different interests than the party of order. From the smallest reform of the old social disorder up to the transformation of the old social order, from bourgeois liberalism to revolutionary terrorism, so far apart lie the extremes which form the point of inception and the point of fulfillment of the party of "anarchy."

Abolition of protective tariffs?—that is Socialism, because it attacks the monopoly of the industrial faction of the party of order. Regulation of the State budget?—that too is Socialism, because it attacks the monopoly of the financial faction of the party of order. Free importation of foreign meat and grains?—Socialism again, because that attacks the monopoly of the third faction of the party of order, the large landowners. The demands of the Free Trade party, the most advanced British bourgeois party, appear in France like so many Socialist demands. Voltarianism?—that also is Socialism, because it attacks a fourth faction of the party of order, the Catholic one. Free press, right of association, general popular school instruction—Socialism! Socialism! All of these attack the collective monopoly of the party of order.

So swiftly had the course of the revolution ripened conditions, that the friends of reform of all shades, and even the most modest aspirations of the middle classes, were forced to group themselves about the banner of the most extreme party of revolution, about the Red Flag.

However diverse the Socialism of the different large groups of the party of anarchy might be, varying according to economic conditions and the joint revolutionary requirements of each class or class faction flowing therefrom, in one point all agreed: to proclaim themselves as the means of emancipation of the proletariat and to announce that emancipation as their aim; intentional deception on the part of some, self-deception on the part of others; to present a world remodeled according to their requirements as the best world for all, as the realization of all revolutionary aspirations and the abolition of all revolutionary collisions.

Below the rather consonant general socialistic phrases of the “party of anarchy,” there is hidden the Socialism of the National, of the Presse, and of the Siècle, which aims more or less consistently at overthrowing the rule of the financial aristocracy, and wants to free industry and commerce from the fetters that bind them. This is the Socialism of industry, of commerce and of agriculture, the regents of which deny these interests in the party of order in so far as they do no longer correspond with their private monopolies. From this bourgeois Socialism which, quite naturally, like every other variant of Socialism, rallies a part of the workers and petty bourgeoisie, the real petty bourgeois Socialism, the Socialism par excellence, differentiates itself. Capital harasses this class chiefly in the role of creditor, hence it demands credit institutions; it crushes it through competition, hence the demand for associations subsidized by the State; it overwhelms it through concentration, hence the call for progressive taxes, inheritance restrictions, the taking over of large enterprises by the State, and other measures that are to retard the expansion of

capital. Since this class dreams of the peaceful introduction of its Socialism—barring, perhaps, a brief second February revolution—the oncoming historic process naturally appears to it as the application of systems which the thinkers of society, working either in groups or as individual inventors, have evolved or are going to evolve. Thus these become the eclectics or adepts of the existing socialistic systems of doctrinaire Socialism, which remained as the theoretic expression of the proletariat only so long as the latter had not yet developed its free historic movement.

Thus, while utopia, the doctrinaire Socialism, which would subordinate the collective movement to one of its moments, and which puts in place of the cooperative social production the ratiocination of individual pedants, and, above all, removes by sheer fancy the revolutionary struggle of the classes with its requirements by means of petty tricks or large sentimentalities—while this doctrinaire Socialism, which, in the last analysis, only idealizes present society, takes a shadowless picture of it, and seeks to put through its ideal against the reality, while this Socialism is ceded by the proletariat to the petty bourgeoisie, while the struggle of the different Socialist chiefs among themselves reveals each of the so-called systems as a pretentious adherence to one of the transition points of the social transformation as against another—while all this goes on, the proletariat groups itself more and more around the revolutionary Socialism, around Communism, for which the bourgeoisie itself has invented the name Blanqui. This Socialism is the declaration in permanency of the revolution, the class dictation of the revolution, the class dictation of the proletariat as the needful transition point toward the abolition of class divisions as such, toward the abolition of all the conditions of production upon which they rest, toward the abolition of all the social relations conforming to these conditions of production, toward the transformation of all ideas that proceed from these social relations.

The space for this presentation does not permit entering more fully upon this matter.

We have seen that, just as in the party of order the financial aristocracy necessarily came to be the head, so the proletariat came to be the head in the party of “anarchy.” While the different classes bound together in one revolutionary league grouped themselves around the proletariat, while the departements became ever more unreliable and the Legislative Assembly itself grew ever more surly against the pretensions of the French Souloque, there approached the long postponed and deferred elections to fill the vacancies caused by the proscription of the Montagnards of June 13.

The government, despised by its foes, maltreated and daily humiliated by its professed friends, saw but one way to escape from this distasteful and untenable situation—a riot. A riot in Paris would have permitted the imposition of the state of siege in Paris and the departements, and would have made it possible to dominate the elections. On the other hand, the friends of order, toward a government that had won the victory over anarchy, would be forced to make concessions, unless they themselves would appear as anarchists.

The government went to work. Early in February, 1850, came provocations of the people through the chopping down of the liberty trees—in vain. When the liberty trees lost their place, the government lost its head and recoiled in fright before its own provocation. The National Assembly viewed this awkward attempt at emancipation on the part of Bonaparte with icy distrust. No more successful was the removal of the wreaths of immortelles from the July column. It gave to a part of the army occasion for revolutionary demonstrations and to the National Assembly a chance for a more or less concealed vote of lack of confidence against the Ministry. In vain also was the threat of the government press organs about the abolition of the general suffrage and the invasion of the Cossacks. And to no purpose was the direct invitation of d'Hautpoul, addressed right in the Legislative Assembly to the parties of the Left, to come out on the street where the government was ready to receive them. All that d'Hautpoul gained was a call to order by the President, and the party of order, with quiet but malignant joy, permitted a deputy of the Left to make persiflage of the usurpatory desires of Bonaparte. In vain, finally, was the prophecy of a revolution for the 24th of February. The government's action brought it about that the 24th of February was quietly ignored by the people.

The proletariat did not let itself be provoked into a riot, because it was just about ready to start a revolution.

Undeterred by the provocations of the government, which only added to the general irritation against existing conditions, the election committee, entirely under the influence of the workers, set up three candidates for Paris: Deflotte, Vidal and Carnot. Deflotte was a deported June insurgent, amnestied by one of the popularization whims of Bonaparte, a friend of Blanqui, and he had participated in the attack of May 15. Vidal was a Communist writer, known through his book About the Distribution of Wealth, and a former secretary of Louis Blanc in the commission of the Luxembourg. Carnot, son of the Carnot of the Convention who had organized the victory, was the least compromised member of the National party, Minister of Education in the Provisional Government, and, because of his

democratic bill aiming at popular instruction, a living protest against the educational law of the Jesuits. These three candidates represented the three associated classes; at the head the June insurgent, representative of the revolutionary proletariat; beside him the doctrinaire Socialist, representative of the socialistic petty bourgeoisie; the third, representative of the republican bourgeois party, whose democratic formulas, as against the party of order, had attained a socialistic sense, having long ago lost their own. This was a general coalition against the upper bourgeoisie and the government, just as in February. But this time the proletariat was the head of the revolutionary league.

In spite of all counter-efforts the Socialist candidates triumphed. The army itself voted for the June insurgent and against its own Minister of War, Lahitte. The party of order was thunderstruck. The elections in the departements gave it no solace—they resulted in a majority of Montagnards.

The election of March 10, 1850! It was the recall of June, 1848: the massacrers and deporters of the June insurgents did return to the National Assembly, but bowed and in the train of the deported and with their principles upon unwilling lips. It was the recall of June 13, 1849: the Montagne, proscribed by the National Assembly, returned to that body, but as advance heralds of the revolution, no longer as its commanders. It was the recall of December 10: Napoleon was defeated, together with his Minister, Lahitte. The parliamentary history of France knows but one analogy: the defeat of d'Haussy, Minister of Charles X, in 1830. The election of March 10, 1850, finally, was the cassation of the election of May 13, which had given a majority to the party of order. The election of March 10 protested against the majority of May 13. The 10th of March was a revolution. Behind the ballots lie the paving stones.

"The vote of March 10 means war," exclaimed Ségur d'Auguesseau, one of the most advanced members of the party of order.

With March 10, 1850, the constitutional republic enters upon a new phase, the phase of its dissolution. The different factions of the majority are again united among themselves and with Bonaparte; they are again the saviors of order, he is again their neutral man. If they still remember that they are royalists, it is only because of despair in the possibility of the bourgeois republic; if he remembers that he is President, it is only because he despairs of remaining such.

The election of Deflotte, the June insurgent, Bonaparte answers, at the command of the party of order, with the appointment of Baroche as Minister of the Interior, Baroche, the accuser of Blanqui and Barbès, of Ledru-Rollin and Guinard. The election of Carnot is answered by the Legislative Assembly with the adoption of

the educational law, and the election of Vidal with the suppression of the socialistic press. By means of a trumpet fanfare in its own press the party of order seeks to blare, away its fright. “The sword is holy,” exclaims one of its organs; “the defenders of order must take the offensive against the red party,” says another; “between Socialism and Society exists a duel to the death, an incessant pitiless war. In this desperate duel one or the other must go down, if society does not destroy Socialism, then Socialism will destroy Society,” crows a third cockerel of order. Erect the barricades of order, the barricades of religion, the barricades of the family! An end must be made with these 127,000 voters of Paris! Bartholomew night for the Socialists! And the party of order really did believe for a moment in its own assurance of victory.

Most fanatically do its organs declaim against the “boutiquiers of Paris.” The June insurgent of Paris elected as a representative by the boutiquiers of Paris—that means that a second June, 1848, is impossible; that a second June 13, 1849, is impossible; it means that the moral influence of capital has been broken, that the bourgeois Assembly only represents the upper bourgeoisie, and it means that big property is lost because little property, its feudatory vassal, seeks refuge in the camp of the propertiless.

The party of order naturally returns to the inevitable commonplace. “More repression!” it cries, “ten-fold repression! “—but its repressive power has been reduced to one-tenth, while the power of resistance has grown a hundredfold. The chief instrument of repression, the army, must it not be reproved? And the party of order again speaks the last word: “The iron ring of a strangling legality must be broken. The constitutional republic is impossible. We must battle with our true weapons. We have since February, 1848, fought the revolution with its weapons and upon its basis, we have accepted its institutions; the constitution is a fortress which only protects the besiegers, not the besieged! While we have smuggled ourselves into holy Ilion in the belly of a Trojan horse, we have, unlike the Grecs, our ancestors, not conquered the hostile city but have made prisoners of ourselves.”

But the foundation of the constitution is the general suffrage. The destruction of the general suffrage is the last word of the party of order, it is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

The general suffrage vindicated them on May 24, 1848, on December 20, 1848, on May, 13, 1849, on July 8, 1849. The general suffrage turned against itself on March 10, 1850. Bourgeois rule as an emanation and a result of the general suffrage, as an express act of the sovereign will of the people, that is the sense of the bourgeois constitution. But from the moment when the content of this right to vote, of this

sovereign will, is no longer the rule of the bourgeoisie, does the constitution still have a sense? Is it not the duty of the bourgeoisie so to regulate the right to vote that it always wants that which is reasonable—its rule? Does not the general suffrage, in that it constantly annuls the existing State power and then creates it anew out of itself, put an end to all stability, call in question at every moment all the existing powers, destroy authority, and does

Grecs—A French play of words, meaning “Greeks”; but also “fraudulent professional gamblers.” it not threaten to raise anarchy itself to the seat of authority? After March 10, 1850, who would still have a doubt?

The bourgeoisie, when it rejects the general suffrage with which it had hitherto draped itself, and from which it had sucked its omnipotence, admits candidly: “Our dictatorship has hitherto existed through the will of the people; it must now be consolidated against the will of the people.” And, consistently enough, it now seeks its support no longer in France, but abroad, in foreign lands, in invasion.

With the invasion it arouses against itself (a second Coblenz that has established its seat in France itself) all the national passions. With the attack upon the general suffrage it furnishes the new revolution with a general pretext, and the revolution needs such a pretext. Any specific pretext would tend to separate the factions of the revolutionary league and permit their differences to come to the fore. The general pretext benumbs the half-revolutionary classes, permits them to deceive themselves as to the definite character of the oncoming revolution and as to the consequences of their own deeds. Every revolution requires a question for discussion at banquets. The general suffrage is the banquet question of the new revolution.

The coalesced bourgeois factions have already been condemned when they flee from the only possible form of their collective power, from the most powerful and most complete form of their class rule, the constitutional republic, back to the subordinate, incomplete and weaker form of the monarchy. They resemble the old man who, to regain the strength of his youth, took out the garments of his childhood and sought to force his withered limbs into them. Their republic has but one merit, that of being the hothouse of the revolution.

The 10th of March, 1850, bears the inscription: Après moi le déluge—after me the deluge!

IV. The Abolition of the General Franchise in1850

(The continuation of the foregoing three chapters is to be found in the “Review” of the last, the fifth and sixth double number of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung. After the great commercial crisis, which broke out in England in 1847, has been described and, from its repercussions on the European continent the political complications, coming to a point in the revolutions of February and March, 1848, have been explained, it is then set forth how the prosperity of commerce and industry, recurrent in the course of 1848, and rising still higher in 1849, lamed the revolutionary upward swing and made possible the simultaneous victories of the reaction. Specifically in regard to France, it is then said:)

The same symptoms showed themselves in France since 1849, particularly since the beginning of 1850. The Paris industries are fully employed, and the cotton mills of Rouen and Mulhausen are fairly active, although there, just as in England, the high price of the raw material has had a retarding influence. The development of prosperity in France was also specifically advanced by the comprehensive custom reforms in Spain, and by the reduction of custom duties upon sundry articles of luxury in Mexico; to both markets the export of French goods has materially increased. The increase of capital led in France to a series of speculations, for which the exploitation of the California gold mines on a large scale served as a pretext. A mass of corporations appeared, whose low-priced shares and socialistically-colored prospectuses appealed directly to the purse of the petty bourgeoisie and to the workers, and which, one and all, meant nothing but the plain cheating that is so typical of Frenchmen and Chinese. One of these corporations was even the direct protégé of the government. The duties on imports, during the first nine months of 1848, amounted in France to 63 million francs; in 1849 to 95 million francs; and in 1850 to 93 million francs. They rose again in the month of September, 1850, by more than one million francs as compared with the same month in 1849. Exports also rose in 1849 and more so in 1850.

The most striking proof of the revamped prosperity is the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of France through the law of September 6, 1850. On March 15, 1848, the bank had been authorized to suspend cash payments. At that time its note circulation, including the provincial banks, amounted to 373 million francs, equal to 14,920,000 pounds sterling. On November 2, 1849, this circulation amounted to 482 million francs, or 19,280,000 pounds sterling, an increase of

4,360,000 pounds sterling, and on September 2, 1850, 496 million francs, or 19,840,000 pounds sterling, a total gain of about 5 million pounds sterling. No depreciation of the notes took place; on the contrary, the increased circulation of the notes was accompanied by a constantly growing accumulation of gold and silver in the vaults of the bank, so that, in the summer of 1850, the reserves amounted to about 14 million pounds sterling—an unheard-of sum for France. That the bank was thus put in a position to increase its active capital by 123 million francs, or 5 million pounds sterling, proves conclusively how correct was our assertion, made in a previous chapter, that the aristocracy of finance, so far from being overthrown by the revolution, was actually strengthened by it. Still more obvious does this result become by the following survey of French banking legislation of the last few years: On June 10, 1847, the bank was authorized to issue notes of 200 francs, the lowest note hitherto having been for 500 francs; a decree of March 15, 1848, declared the notes of the Bank of France legal tender and released the bank from the obligation to redeem them in cash; its note issue was restricted to 350 million francs and it was at the same time authorized to issue notes in the denomination of 100 francs. A decree of April 27 ordered the amalgamation of the departmental banks with the Bank of France; and another decree of May 2, 1848, increased its note issue to 442 million francs. A decree of December 22, 1849, increased the maximum of its note issue to 525 million francs. Finally, the law of September 6, 1850, reestablished the exchange of the notes with cash.

These facts, the constant increase of circulation, the concentration of the entire credit of France in the hands of the bank, and the accumulation of all French gold and silver in the vaults of the bank, led Proudhon to the conclusion that the bank would now shed its old and useless snakeskin and would metamorphose itself into a Proudhon People’s Bank. He would not even need to know the history of English bank restrictions, from 1797 to 1819, in order to see that this fact, unknown to him, in the history of bourgeois society was nothing but a most normal bourgeois event, which only in France occurred now for the first time. It is seen that the pretending revolutionary theoreticians, who after the Provisional Government spoke so loudly in Paris, were as ignorant of the nature and the results of the measures resorted to as were the gentlemen of the Provisional Government themselves. Despite the industrial and commercial prosperity which France enjoyed for the moment, the mass of the population, the 25 million peasants, labored under a severe depression. The good crops of the last few years had depressed grain prices in France even more than in England, and the position of debt-ridden peasants, sucked dry by usury and oppressed by taxation could not be very brilliant. The history of the last

three years, however, has amply proved that this class of the population is thoroughly incapable of revolutionary initiative.

Just as the period of the crisis appears on the continent later than in England, so does that of prosperity. Always in England does the original process take place; it is the demiurge [maker of the world] of the bourgeois cosmos. On the continent, the different phases of the cycle that bourgeois society runs through ever anew appear in secondary and tertiary forms. Firstly, the continent exports to England incomparably more goods than to any other country. This exportation, however, again depends upon the position of England, especially in regard to the over-sea markets. Then, again, England exports to over-sea countries incomparably more than the entire continent, so that the quantity of the continental export to these countries is always dependent upon the simultaneous over-sea export of England. If, therefore, the crises bring forth revolutions first upon the continent, the foundation of the same is always laid in England. At the extremities of bourgeois anatomy it must naturally come to violent eruptions sooner than at its heart, because there the possibility of adjustment is greater than elsewhere. On the other hand, the degree with which continental revolutions react upon England furnishes the thermometer on which is indicated to what extent these revolutions really call in question the bourgeois vital conditions, or how far they only affect political formations.

With such general prosperity, whereby the productive forces of bourgeois society are developed so exuberantly, as far as this is at all possible within bourgeois conditions, a real revolution is out of the question. Such a revolution is possible only in those periods where these two factors, the modern productive forces and the bourgeois form of production, come into conflict with one another. The many quarrels, now indulged in by the representatives of the different factions of the continental party of order, and whereby they mutually compromise each other, so far from giving cause to new revolutions, on the contrary are possible only because the foundation of conditions is for the moment so secure, and, although the reaction does not know it—so bourgeois. From it all attempts of the reaction to retard bourgeois development will rebound, just as will all the moral indignation and the enthused proclamation of the democrats. A new revolution is possible only on the trail of a new crisis. But, then, it is just as certain as the latter.

Let us now proceed to France. The victory which the people, in conjunction with the petty bourgeoisie, had gained in the elections of March 10, was annulled by the people itself in that it provoked the new election of April 28. Vidal, elected in Paris, had also been chosen on the Lower Rhine. The Paris committee, wherein the

Montagne and the petty bourgeoisie were strongly represented, prevailed upon him to accept for the Lower Rhine. Thus, the victory of March 10 ceased to be decisive; the decisive moment was again postponed, popular tension slackened, the people became accustomed to legal instead of revolutionary triumphs. The revolutionary sense of March 10, the rehabilitation of the June insurrection, was in the end completely destroyed by the candidacy of Eugene Sue, sentimentally-bourgeois social visionary, which at best the proletariat could only accept as a joke made to please the grisettes. As against this well-meaning candidacy, the party of order, made more bold by the vacillating policy of its opponents, put up a candidate who was to represent the June victory. This comical candidate was the Spartan pater-familias Leclerc, from whom the press tore his heroic coat of mail piece by piece, and who, at the election, met with a brilliant defeat. The new electoral victory of April 28 made the Montagne and the petty bourgeoisie bumptious. Already did they revel in the thought of arriving at the goal of their desires in a purely legal way and without having to push the proletariat again to the front in a new revolution; they calculated confidently that, at the next election, in 1852, by means of the general suffrage they would land Ledru-Rollin in the presidential chair and a majority of Montagnards in the Assembly. The party of order, made thoroughly secure by the renewal of the election, the candidacy of Sue, and by the mood of the Montagne and the petty bourgeoisie that these, under all conditions, were determined to keep quiet, answered the two election victories with the electoral law—which abolished the general suffrage.

The government took good care not to present this proposed law on its own responsibility. It made a seeming concession to the majority in that it assigned the draft of the law to the grand dignitaries of that same majority, the seventeen burgraves. Therefore, it was not the government that proposed to the Assembly, but the Assembly that proposed to itself, the abolition of the general suffrage.

On May 8 the project was brought into the Chamber. The entire social democratic press rose like one man to preach to the people the maintenance of a dignified demeanor, a majestic calm, passivity and confidence in its leaders. Every article of these journals was an admission that a revolution would, first of all, destroy the so-called revolutionary press and that, therefore, it was a matter of self-preservation for them. The pretended revolutionary press revealed its entire secret. It signed its own death warrant.

On May 21 the Montagne forced the preliminary question to a debate and moved the rejection of the project on the ground that it violated the constitution. The party of order replied that it would violate the constitution, if need be, but that there was

now no need of that for the reason that the constitution was capable of any interpretation, and because the majority alone would competently decide about the correct interpretation. As against the unbridled and wild attacks of Thiers and Montalembert, the Montagne opposed a decent and refined humanism. It took its stand on the ground of legal right; the party of order referred it to the ground where the right grows, upon bourgeois property. The Montagne whined: was it really the purpose forcibly to bring about revolutions? The party of order answered: we shall wait and see.

On May 22, the preliminary question was disposed of by a vote of 462 against 227. The same men who had proved with such solemn thoroughness that the National Assembly, and every deputy thereto, would in effect resign if they went back on the people (the source of their power), clung to their seats and, instead of acting themselves, suddenly sought to get the country to act through petitions; and they still sat unmoved when, on May 31, the law went through triumphantly. They sought to revenge themselves by means of a protest, wherein they placed on the record their innocence of the rape of the constitution, a protest which they did not even place openly upon the table but smuggled surreptitiously into the pocket of the President.

An army of 150,000 in Paris, a protracted decision, the dissuasion of the press, the pusillanimity of the Montagne and the newly elected representatives, the majestic calm of the petty bourgeoisie, above all, however, the commercial and industrial prosperity, prevented every attempt at revolution on the part of the proletariat.

The general suffrage had fulfilled its mission. The majority of the people had gone through this school of development, in which capacity it can only serve in a revolutionary epoch. It had to be removed, either through a revolution or by the reaction.

A still greater display of energy did the Montagne exhibit on an occasion following soon thereafter. The Minister of War, d'Hautpoul, from the tribune, had pronounced the February revolution a dire catastrophe. The speakers of the Montagne, who, as always, distinguished themselves by the bluster of moral indignation, were not recognized by the President, Dupin. Girardin proposed to the Montagne at once to resign en masse. Result: the Montagne kept its seats, but Girardin was expelled from its midst as unworthy.

The election law still required a supplement, a new press law. This did not have to be waited for very long. A proposition of the government, frequently aggravated by amendments of the party of order, increased the security bond, put an extra stamp tax on serial novels (an answer to the election of Eugene Sue), taxed all

publications appearing in weekly or monthly issues up to a certain number of pages, and, finally, decreed that the signature of the author must be attached to every article in a journal. The stipulations governing the security bond killed the so-called revolutionary press; the people regarded its destruction as a satisfaction for the abolition of the general franchise. But neither the tendency nor the effect of this new law was confined solely to this part of the press. So long as the newspaper press was anonymous, it appeared as an organ of the numberless and nameless public opinion; it was the third State power. But through the attachment of a signature to every article a newspaper became nothing but a collection of literary contributions on the part of more or less known individuals. Every article sank down to the status of an advertisement. Hitherto, the newspapers had circulated as the paper currency of public opinion; now they dissolved themselves into more or less doubtful individual notes, the validity and circulation of which depended upon the credit not only of the issuer but also upon that of the endorser. As the press of the party of order had favored the abolition of the right to vote, so also had it favored the most extreme measures against the bad press. But the good press itself, in its uncanny anonymity, proved irksome to the party of order and, more so, to its individual provincial representatives. For reasons of their own they now demanded only the paid writer, with name, residence and personal description. In vain did the good press lament the ingratitude with which its services were rewarded. The law went through and the feature calling for the mentioning of names hit the good press first of all. The names of the republican writers of the day were quite well known; but the respectable firms of the Journal des Débats, of the Assemblée Nationale, of the Constitutionnel, etc., etc., cut a rather sorry figure with their so strenuously asserted political wisdom when the mysterious company suddenly dissolved itself into venal penny-a-liners of long practice who had for cash defended all sorts of causes, such as Granier de Cassagnac, or into old dish clouts who called themselves statesmen, such as Capefigue, or into coquetting nutcrackers, such as Monsieur Lemoinne of the Débats.

During the debate over the press law the Montagne had already sunk to such a depth of moral deterioration that it had to confine itself to applaud the brilliant tirades of an old “louisphilippic” notability, Monsieur Victor Hugo.

With the electoral law and the press law, the revolutionary and democratic party retires from the official stage. Prior to their departure for home, right after the closing of the session, the two factions of the Montagne, the socialistic Democrats and the democratic Socialists, issued two manifestoes, two testimonia paupertatis, wherein they proved that, although power and success had never been on their side,

they had ever been on the side of eternal right and on the side of all the rest of the eternal truths.

Let us now take a look at the party of order. The Neue Rheinische Zeitung, number 3, page 16, said: "As against the restorational desires of the united Orleanists and Legitimists, Napoleon represents the title of his de facto power—the republic. As against the restorational desires of Bonaparte, the party of order represents the title of its common rule—the republic. As against the Orleanists, the Orleanists represent the status quo—the republic. All these factions of the party of order, each of which holds its own king and its own restoration in reserve, as against the usurpational and insurrectional desires of their rivals, mutually assert the common rule of the bourgeoisie, the form wherein their specific claims are neutralized and reserved—the republic. . . . And Thiers spoke more truly than he knew when he said: 'We, the royalists, are the real pillars of the constitutional republic.' "

This comedy of the républicains malgré eux [republicans in spite of themselves], their disrelish of the status quo and the constant solidification of same; the incessant friction between Bonaparte and the National Assembly; the ever renewed threat of the party of order to dissolve its several constituent parts, and the ever repeated consolidation of its factions; the endeavor of each faction to convert every victory against the common foe into a defeat of its temporary allies; the mutual jealousy, rancor, harrying, the indefatigable drawing of swords, which ever again ends with a baiser-l'amourette [love kiss]—this whole disagreeable comedy of errors never developed more classically than during the last six months.

The party of order looked upon the electoral law as a victory over Bonaparte also. Had not the government resigned when it had assigned to the commission of seventeen the drafting and the responsibility of its own proposal? And did not the main strength of Bonaparte, as against the Assembly, rest upon the fact that he was the elected, the chosen one of six millions? Bonaparte, on his part, treated the electoral law as a concession to the Assembly, wherewith he had purchased harmony between the legislative and executive powers. For a reward, this common adventurer demanded an increase of his civil list in the amount of three million francs. Could the National Assembly enter upon a conflict with the executive at a moment when the great majority of Frenchmen anathematized it? It started up angrily, seemed inclined to drive things to an extreme, its commission rejected the proposition, the Bonapartist press threatened and pointed to a disinherited people, robbed of its right to vote, a number of noisy attempts at transaction took place—and the Assembly finally yielded in the matter but at the same time revenged itself in point of principle. Instead of an annual, statutory increase of the

civil list of three million francs, it made only a temporary appropriation of 2,160,000 francs; and, not satisfied therewith, it only made this concession after Changarnier had supported it—Changarnier, the general of the party of order and the obtrusive protector of Bonaparte. Thus, in reality, it conceded the two millions not to Bonaparte, but to Changarnier.

This present, chucked at him de mauvaise grâce [with bad grace], was received by Bonaparte wholly in the sense of the giver. The Bonapartist press blustered anew against the National Assembly. When, during the debate of the press law, the amendment calling for the signing of names was made, which was again mainly directed against the minor papers (the ones representing the private interests of Bonaparte), the chief Bonapartist organ, the Pouvoir, published an unconcealed and violent attack against the National Assembly. The Ministers were forced to repudiate the paper before the Assembly; the guarantor of the Pouvoir was summoned before the bar of the National Assembly, and was condemned to the highest money fine, 5,000 francs. On the following day, the Pouvoir published a far more impudent article against the Assembly, and, as a matter of revenge on the part of the government, the public prosecutor immediately proceeded against several Legitimist journals for violation of the constitution.

Finally the question of the adjournment of the Chamber arose. Bonaparte desired it in order to be able to operate unhampered by the Assembly. The party of order desired it, partly to see through its factional intrigues, partly for the pursuance of the private interests of some deputies. Both needed it in order to consolidate and extend the victories of reaction in the provinces. The Assembly, accordingly, adjourned on August 11, until November 11. Since, however, Bonaparte in no way concealed that he only wanted to get rid of the annoying supervision of the National Assembly, the Assembly itself impressed upon the vote of confidence the stamp of distrust against the President. From the permanent commission of twenty-eight members, who were to remain behind during the vacation as the guardians of the republic’s chastity, all Bonapartists were excluded. Instead, even some republicans of the Siécle and the National were elected, just to demonstrate to the President the adherence of the majority to the constitutional republic.

Shortly before, and particularly immediately after the adjournment of the Chamber, the two great factions of the party of order, the Orleanists and the Legitimists, appeared to be on the point of reconciliation, because of the amalgamation of the two royal houses under whose banners they fought. The papers were full of offers of conciliation that were said to have been discussed at the sickbed of Louis Philippe at St. Leonards, when the death of Louis Philippe suddenly simplified the

situation. Louis Philippe was the usurper, Henry V. was the robbed one, the Count of Paris, however (Henry V. being without issue), was the legitimate heir to the throne. Now, every obstacle to the amalgamation of the two dynastic interests had vanished. But just then the two factions of the bourgeoisie discovered that what separated them was not the reverence for a certain royal house, but that far more their separate class interests kept the two dynasties apart. The Legitimists, who had made their pilgrimages to the Court of Henry V. at Wiesbaden, just as their competitors had made theirs to St. Leonards, received there the news of the death of Louis Philippe. At once they formed a Ministry in partibus infidelium [in infidel countries], consisting mostly of members of that commission of guardians of the chastity of the republic, and which, on the occasion of a squabble within the party, came out with the most frank proclamation of the right by the grace of God. The Orleanists jubilated over the compromising scandal this manifesto gave rise to in the press, and never concealed for a moment their open hostility against the Legitimists.

During the adjournment of the National Assembly, the departmental councils convened. Their majority expressed itself in favor of a more or less involved revision of the constitution, that is, in favor of a not too closely defined monarchist restoration as a “solution,” admitting at the same time that it was too incompetent and too cowardly to find this solution. The Bonapartist faction promptly interpreted this desire for revision in the sense of a desire for the prolongation of the presidency of Bonaparte.

The constitutional solution, the abdication of Bonaparte in May, 1852, the simultaneous election of a new President by all the voters of the country, the revision of the constitution by a Chamber of Revision during the first months of the new presidential term, all that is for the ruling class entirely inadmissible. The day of the new presidential election would be the day for a rendezvous of all the hostile parties—Legitimists, Orleanists, bourgeois republicans, revolutionaries. It would have to come to a forcible decision between the different factions. Even if the party of order should succeed in agreeing upon the candidacy of a neutral man outside of the dynastic families, they would always and again be faced by Bonaparte. The party of order, in its struggle against the people, is forced constantly to augment the power of the executive. Every increase of the power of the executive increases the power of its incumbent, Bonaparte. In the same measure, therefore, that the party of order strengthens its collective power, it strengthens the means of combat of Bonaparte’s dynastic pretensions, strengthens his chances, on the day of decision, forcibly to frustrate the constitutional solution. As against the party of order, he would in such case care as little about one foundation pillar of the constitution as it

cared about another when, in the matter of the electoral law, it deprived the people of the right to vote. He would, as against the Assembly, and as a matter of show, appeal even to the general suffrage. In one word, the constitutional solution calls in question the entire political status quo, and behind the menace to the status quo the bourgeois sees chaos, anarchy, civil war. He sees his purchases and his sales, his notes, his marriages, his notarial commitments, his mortgages, ground rent, house rent, profits, the sum total of his contracts and sources of income called in question on the first Sunday in May, 1852, and he cannot expose himself to such risk. Behind the menace to the political status quo is hidden the danger of a collapse of the whole of bourgeois society. The only possible solution, in the sense of the bourgeoisie, is the postponement of the solution. It can save the constitutional republic only through a violation of the constitution, through a prolongation of the power of the President. This, too, is the last word of the press of order after the long drawn-out and profound debates about the solutions in which it indulged after the sessions of the departmental councils. The high and mighty party of order is forced, much to its chagrin, to take seriously the ridiculous, ordinary and by it so much hated person of the pseudo-Bonaparte.

This unclean personage also deceived himself as to the causes that conferred upon him more and more the character of the man of the hour. While his party possessed sufficient discernment to ascribe the growing significance of Bonaparte to conditions, he believed that it was due solely to the magic power of his name and his uninterrupted caricaturing of Napoleon. Daily, he became more enterprising. The pilgrimages to St. Leonards and Wiesbaden he offset with his circuit junkets through France. The Bonapartists themselves had so little confidence in the magic effect of his personality that, everywhere, they sent with him men of the Society of December 10, that organization of the Paris lumpenproletariat, who, packed in mass in railroad trains and mail coaches, went along as claqeurs. They put into the mouth of their marionette speeches which, according to the receptions met with in the different cities, proclaimed either republican resignation or unremitting tenacity as the motto of the presidential policy. In spite of all maneuvers, these journeys were nothing less than triumphant forays.

After Bonaparte believed that he had so enthused the people, he set himself in motion to win the army. On the plain of Satori, near Versailles, he held great troop reviews at which he sought to purchase the soldiers by means of sausages, champaign and cigars. If the genuine Napoleon, during the hardships of his conquering expeditions, knew how to encourage his fatigued soldiers by means of a momentary patriarchal familiarity, the pseudo-Napoleon believed that the troops

would cry in gratitude: Vive Napoléon! Vive le saucisson!—that is, Long live the Wurst! [sausage]—Long live the Hanswurst!*3 [clown.]

These reviews brought to a head the long deferred

3 “Hanswurst”—a German compound word consisting of Hans—Jack; and Wurst—sausage, the meaning of which is a clown, a merry-Andrew, a buffoon, in short, a fellow without dignity—Translator. quarrel between Bonaparte and his Minister of War, d’Hautpoul, on the one hand, and Changarnier on the other. In Changarnier the party of order had found its really neutral man, with whom there could be no question of dynastic aspirations. Him it had intended as the successor of Bonaparte. Changarnier, moreover, through his attitude on January 29 and on June 13, 1849, had become the great captain of the party of order, the modern Alexander, who, by his brutal intervention, in the eyes of the timid bourgeoisie, had cut the Gordian knot of the revolution. Essentially just as ridiculous as Bonaparte, he had in this cheap manner become a power, and he was set up by the National Assembly against the President as a sort of supervisor. He himself coquetted with the protection he bestowed upon Bonaparte, as for instance in the question of the civil list dotation, and assumed an ever more dominant attitude against him and the Ministers. When, at the time of the passage of the electoral law, an insurrection was expected, Changarnier forbade his officers to accept any orders from the Minister of War or from the President. The press also contributed to magnify the stature of Changarnier. With the total lack of great personalities, the party of order naturally was prompted to impute the power which its entire class lacked to a single individual, and then to swell him up to a monstrosity. Thus arose the myth of Changarnier, the “bulwark of society.” The arrogant charlatanry, the secretive pomposity, wherewith Changarnier deigned to carry the world on his shoulders, form the most ridiculous contrast with the events during and after the review of Satori, proving incontrovertibly that it required but a stroke of the pen on the part of Bonaparte, the infinitely little, to reduce the colossus Changarnier, this fantastic spawn of bourgeois fear, to the dimensions of mediocrity, and to transform the society-saving hero into a pensioned general.

Bonaparte, for some time past, had revenged himself upon Changarnier by having the Minister of War provoke disciplinary squabbles with the inconvenient protector. The last review at Satori finally brought the old grudge to the surface. The constitutional indignation of Changarnier no longer knew its bounds when he saw the cavalry regiments march past with the unconstitutional cry: Vive l’Empereur! Bonaparte, in order to forestall all disagreeable debates about this cry at the coming session of the Chamber, removed the Minister of War, d’Hautpoul,

by appointing him Governor of Algier. In his place he put an old dependable general of the time of the empire, who, in point of brutality, was easily the equal of Changarnier. Then, not to make the removal of d'Hautpoul appear as a concession to Changarnier, he transferred at the same time the right arm of the great society saver, General Neumayer, from Paris to Nantes. It had been Neumayer who, at the last review, had seen to it that the entire infantry had, in icy silence, marched past the successor of Napoleon. Changarnier, himself hit via Neumayer, protested and threatened. In vain. After two days of negotiation, there appeared in the Moniteur the Neumayer decree of transfer, there being then nothing left to the hero of order but to conform to discipline or to resign.

The struggle of Bonaparte with Changarnier is the continuation of his struggle with the party of order. The reopening of the National Assembly on November 11 occurs therefore under threatening auspices. It will be a tempest in a tea-pot. In essence, the old game must continue. The majority of the party of order, notwithstanding the chatter on the part of the principle-mongers of its different factions, will be compelled to prolong the power of the President. And just so will Bonaparte, in spite of all preliminary protestations, because forced by the lack of funds, accept this prolongation of his power as a simple delegation from the hands of the National Assembly. Thus the solution will be postponed, the status quo maintained, one faction of the party of order compromised, weakened, made impossible by the other, the repression against the common enemy, the mass of the nation, extended and exhausted until the conditions themselves have again arrived at that point of development where a new explosion blows into the air all the quarrelling parties with their constitutional republic.

For the appeasement of the bourgeoisie it must, however, be said that the scandal between Bonaparte and the party of order had this result: to ruin a large number of small capitalists on the stock exchange and to play their property into the pockets of the big wolves of the exchange.

The End.